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# THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

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# THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

JULY-OCTOBER, 1929.

THE *ARGONAUTICA* OF VALERIUS FLACCUS.

THE Flavian writers of epic verse took their business seriously enough and seldom permitted themselves anything that might pass for an allusion to contemporary events: so much so that only an ingenuity that runs a risk of being perverse can wrest from them much more than what they have themselves chosen to say in their dedications or invocations. Where the man survived to complete and edit his work, such a dedication, the last thing to be written, more or less bears on its face the date of publication. The proem of the *Thebais* of Statius and the 'Flavian Panegyric,' which Silius Italicus inserted in the third book of his *Punica*, thus reveal, to within a year, when the whole of the one and a portion of the other were given to the world, viz. in 91-2 and in 92-3 respectively. With an unfinished work the case is different; indeed, the very presence of that panegyric might suffice to prove that though Silius had reached the end, in a fashion, when he finished his seventeenth book, he did not truly complete his poem or himself publish it as a whole. In order to determine at what date he got as far with his poem as he ever did, some other source of information is therefore desirable. Similarly with the *Argonautica*. Valerius Flaccus does not appear to have composed any more than the eight books that have come down to us, nor is he known to have published any part of them save, if at all, by recitation. It is for this reason that the proem, with its invocation of Vespasian, to all appearance as still living, has always been taken to be, not a later insertion, but an integral part of the first book, and thus a clear indication of the date at which Valerius began his task.

How far this is true may for the moment be postponed. Can the rest of the poem yield no guidance? The early occurrence of a reference to Vesuvius would at least suggest that Valerius cannot have written very much of his poem under Vespasian.<sup>1</sup> But there seems to be nothing else that points to a later date: Köstlin's citations can hardly prove anything,<sup>2</sup> and as for two passages that have elsewhere been alleged to be references to Domitian's Danube Wars,<sup>3</sup> to have quoted them may suffice:

VII. 645                      qualis Getico de pulvere Mavors  
intrat equis uritque gravem sudoribus Hebrum  
and VIII. 228    qualis sanguineo victor Gradivus ab Hebros.

<sup>1</sup> III, 208.

2 Zur Erklärung u. Kritik des V.F. in *Philologus* XLVIII., 1889, p. 647; I. 563 and I. 836 are quite inconclusive, and, if 'altus ab Alba Iupiter' (II. 304) is to be taken as a hint of the

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Emperor Domitian in his Alban Villa, what do we make of the sinister phrase 'Albani . . . tyranni' (V. 258)?

<sup>3</sup> Mentioned but not quoted in Butler, *Post-Augustan Poetry*, p. 181, and Schanz<sup>3</sup> II. 2, p. 136.



Thrace had always been the *Mavortia tellus*—there was no choice in the matter: for the conscientious epic poet some mention of the Thracian god and the Thracian stream was not merely permissible but even imposed itself as a duty—a duty which Valerius, like Statius and Silius, would never have thought of evading.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, there is in the *Argonautica* a clue that has hitherto escaped notice, a mention of something neither familiar nor traditional, but surprising in its novelty—the arms and tactics of the Sarmatians.<sup>2</sup> It is not only that Valerius is the first to designate a certain very long and very heavy spear, the *contus*, as a cavalry lance and as something specifically Sarmatian: a much wider claim can be made, namely that he provides the first description in the whole of ancient literature that reveals, clear and unmistakable, those striking features that once and for all distinguish heavy cavalry from light, and thereby Sarmatian from Scythian—the long lance and the coat of mail. To give substance to this claim and make clear its significance will demand a short digression—and that not for the sake of Valerius only.

The Sarmatians who came first into contact with Rome, towards the middle of the first century, were the Iazyges of the Woiwodina, between Danube and Theiss, and, a little later, the Rhoxolani, north of the Danube mouth. It is nowhere recorded that they differed at all in ways and in weapons, and it will here be assumed that they did not. Of the Rhoxolani we possess a valuable account in the *Histories* of Tacitus, written not so very long after Valerius and emphasizing like him the essential, that they were heavy cavalry, sheathed man and horse in scale (or chain) mail, and that they bore the long lance, the *contus*.<sup>3</sup> Tacitus gives two further details, that they wielded either *contus* or sword with both hands, and that they were (therefore and naturally enough) not in the habit of carrying shields. Neither Valerius nor Tacitus, it is worth noting, provides them with javelins or bows as well—which is not surprising, for they were already heavily armed and had, after all, only two hands. Indeed, on another occasion, Sarmatians are recorded to have expressed a strong distaste for arrows, and it is only an incidental statement that suggests that they may sometimes have carried the bow.<sup>4</sup> On the Trajan Column, it is true, they appear at first with the *contus* in one hand, then, in flight, shooting with the bow.<sup>5</sup> Otherwise it is hard to find evidence that the bow was a part of the equipment of a fully-armed Sarmatian. To confirm these details and complete the picture it may not be unreasonable to invoke the monuments of 'Sarmato-Bosphorans' from South Russia. The dedication of Tryphon, for example, renders in most lively fashion a mail-clad

<sup>1</sup> Compare *Theb.* IX. 438; *Pun.* XVII. 487.

<sup>2</sup> VI. 162, 231.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist.* I. 79, 'ubi per turmas advenere vix ulla acies obstiterit. sed tum umido die et soluto gelu neque conti neque gladii, quos praelongos utraque manu regunt, usui, lapsantibus equis et catafractarum pondere, id principibus et nobilissimo cuique tegimen, ferreis lamminis aut praeduro corio consertum, . . . neque enim scuto defendi mos est.'

<sup>4</sup> *Tac. Ann.* VI. 35, 'se quisque stimulant ne pugnam per sagittas sinerent: impetu et comminus praeveniendum. variae hinc bellantium species, cum Parthus sequi vel fugere, . . . Sarmatae omisso arcu, quo brevius valent, contis gladiisque ruerent.'

<sup>5</sup> Plates XXIII. and XXVII-XXVIII. In Plate XXIII. the position of the hand indicates that a *contus* is to be supplied.

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<sup>2</sup> Rost  
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<sup>3</sup> XVII  
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<sup>4</sup> That  
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horseman grasping a massive *contus* with both hands.<sup>1</sup> Similarly mural paintings from Kertch;<sup>2</sup> on them the warrior is depicted either charging in battle or, in a more peaceful attitude, with the lance held in one hand—for there is no reason to suppose that they always and invariably used both. What is typical, however, of them, as of the Roman *contarii*, is that the weapon usually demanded both hands. It would therefore appear that though Sarmatians sometimes used the bow, and though all of them may not have been able to afford a complete suit of mail, the coat of mail and the long lance at once characterizes them and distinguishes them from other races: and this, indeed, is all that Ammian, centuries later, found necessary to mention when introducing the Sarmatae Limigantes.<sup>3</sup>

But, it might well be objected, Sarmatians are mentioned many a time, long before the Flavian Age and its unread epics: this is true enough—but never unequivocally, never in terms that suggest that writers had distinguished them from the Scythians, or had even suspected the existence of such a criterion as has just been brought forward.<sup>4</sup> Ephorus, indeed, had made the noteworthy contribution to knowledge that they were cannibals, whereas the Scythians were not:<sup>5</sup> but what we commonly find is either that they are alleged to be Scythians, or that they are described in a way which shows that they have merely succeeded the Scythians as conventional literary figures—barbarian folk of cold far lands, nomad and unsociable, swift horsemen terrible with the bow, wearers of trousers. It would be tedious, were it not superfluous, to call up even a selection from the vast mass of quotations where purely 'literary' Sarmatians appear: they appear, however, where genuine Sarmatians might well have been expected and have, in fact, been proclaimed. We are told, as in these days we could be sure of being told, that Posidonius was the first to supply reliable information about them.<sup>6</sup> Investigation will, however, suggest that in this case that universal 'Forschergeist' hardly lives up to the reputation that is postulated of him. Strabo, whom we presume to be reproducing Posidonius, relates that the Rhoxolani were defeated with the utmost ease by the generals of Mithridates the Great—for they were light cavalry: they wore jerkins and caps of leather, and carried a shield, javelins, a bow and a sword.<sup>7</sup> These are poor creatures to be sure, not the Rhoxolani with whom we later became familiar, not the mailed cavalry, charging irresistibly. The explanation will be found simple enough—not a complete change in the weapons and tactics of the Rhoxolani, but ignorance or deception: it is a description of Scythians, not of Sarmatians. Nor can we find anything better till we come

<sup>1</sup> Rostovtseff, *Hist. of Decorative Painting in S. Russia* (in Russian), Plate LXXXIV. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Rostovtseff, *Iranians and Greeks*, Plates XXVIII. and XXIX.

<sup>3</sup> XVII. 12, 2, 'hastae longiores et lorica ex cornibus rasis.'

<sup>4</sup> That confusion should still survive is less to be excused: P.W., *R.-E.*, s.v. *Sarmatae*, col. 2549, states that the Sarmatians carried javelins and the bow and arrows as well as lance and

sword.

<sup>5</sup> Strabo VII., p. 302.

<sup>6</sup> P.-W., *R.-E.*, s.v. *Sarmatae*, col. 2545.

<sup>7</sup> Strabo VII., p. 306, καὶ ἐδόκουν εἶναι μάχιμοι, πρὸς μέντοι συντεταγμένην φάλαγγα καὶ ὤπλισμένην καλῶς τὸ βάρβαρον φύλον ἀσθενὲς πᾶν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ γυμνητικόν. . . . χρώνται δὲ ὡμοβοῖνοις κράνεσι καὶ θώραξι, γερροφόροι, ἀμυντήρια δ' ἔχοντες καὶ λόγχας καὶ τόξον καὶ ξίφος.





certain nor are compelled to assume—the *contus* is *docilis* by reason of its instant response to the skilled hand. As for the whole phrase, *docilis relegi docilisque relinqui*, it would appear to indicate the two alternatives that would confront a Sarmatian when he had hit his man—he could either draw back and couch his lance again, an operation in any case delicate and even dangerous,<sup>1</sup> or leave it behind lest he be swept from his seat. Emendations of *relinqui*, proposed in the belief that what Valerius is doing his best to describe is not the two alternatives but a single process, are therefore superfluous—when not otherwise objectionable.<sup>2</sup> But this does not exhaust the difficulties. The transition to what follows,

atque iterum medios non altior ire per hostes,

is certainly, after *docilisque relinqui*, a little harsh, but hardly, as Schenkl thought it, impossible.<sup>3</sup> It could be justified as a *hysteron proteron*, or, more simply, by assuming that *docilis relegi* is the dominant member of the phrase and that *docilisque relinqui* was added, almost parenthetically, but for a purpose—to fill up the line. If, therefore, in punctuating, the latter phrase were enclosed in brackets, the awkwardness would be sensibly lessened. In the last line itself several editors have substituted for *non altior* an old and feeble conjecture, *non tardior*<sup>4</sup>—quite gratuitously: *iterum non altior* means simply ‘held no higher than before,’ a detail not merely relevant, but characteristic of the way in which the *contus* was carried and used. Silius’ phrase, *pondera conti . . . prona*<sup>5</sup> would alone have been sufficient confirmation of Valerius’ *non altior*.

It may not be out of place to vindicate in a small detail the general excellence and accuracy of Valerius’ portrayal of Sarmatians in battle. The war-cry of the barbarian is commonly rendered in Latin by *ululatus*, a yell: *fremitus*, which Valerius here uses, is a roaring noise, and that such a roar was typically Sarmatian we learn from a passage in Ammian where it appears as *Marah Marah*.<sup>6</sup>

What, then, can be the reason of this sudden and startling familiarity with the Sarmatians? Surely nothing but their wars with Rome. Which of these come here into consideration? One would perhaps first think of the incursions of the Rhoxolani into Moesia in 69-70, for to one of them belongs Tacitus’ detailed account. But this was only an episode, on the fringe of a great civil war. Tacitus naturally described the Sarmatians at the occasion of their first appearance in his *Histories*, for Sarmatians were again to be spoken of, not as a mere isolated frontier incident, but, under Domitian, almost as a central theme. The Sarmatae Iazyges twice gave trouble, in 89 and again in 92, when they even cut to pieces a Roman legion, and called the Emperor himself to the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. VI. 253.

<sup>2</sup> Baehrens, ‘rescripsi id quod a sententia unice flagrat, “reponi”’; Langen, ‘itaque scripsi “refingi,” i.e., in pristinum statum restitui.’

<sup>3</sup> ‘Wenn sich ein Dichter so etwas gestatten darf, dann gibt es für ihn kein Gesetz mehr’

(*Studien zu V.F.*, p. 291, in *Wiener Sitzungsberichte*, 1871). In his edition of the same year he encloses line 238 in brackets.

<sup>4</sup> So Baehrens and Langen.

<sup>5</sup> *Pun.* XV. 684.

<sup>6</sup> XIX. 11, 6.

Danube. It may therefore be more than coincidence that Statius and Silius, in passages that were certainly written after the year 92, also speak of the *contus* as a weapon specifically Sarmatian. Statius, mentioning as he does in the same breath the scythe-like sword of the Dacian, may well be believed to have been thinking of Domitian's wars:

*Achill.* II. 132

quo turbine contum

Sauromates falcemque Getes arcumque Gelonus  
tenderet.

And Silius is so confident of the propriety of the epithet 'Sarmatian' to the *contus* that he has no compunction about letting a Numidian carry it:

*Pun.* XV. 683

necnon cornipedis tergo de more repostus  
sustentata genu per campum pondera conti  
Sarmatici prona adversos urgebat in hostes.

Statius and Silius wrote the passages in question only a very short time after Valerius and *may* have owed their information to him. Be that as it may, it is thus precisely in those years where there was a peculiar relevance in the mention of the Sarmatian *contus* that it appears, not merely once and for the first time in all literature, but, as a poetical expression, three times, and then never again in verse till Claudian thought the lines of Statius worth appropriating.<sup>1</sup> If the reason of this be what it would seem to be, Domitian's Danube Wars, it could be suggested that Valerius Flaccus had got no further than the sixth book of his *Argonautica* in 89, or even in 92. It has, indeed, always been assumed that Valerius had already got as far with his poem as he ever did, nearly to the end of the eighth book, and died *ca.* 90 at the very latest; but before the source and value of this assumption is investigated, there is a small piece of evidence, also pointing to a late date, that has hitherto lurked unseen in this same sixth book of the *Argonautica*:

VI. 402

Romanas veluti saevissima cum legiones  
Tisiphone regesque movet, quorum agmina pilis  
quorum aquilis utrimque micant, eademque parentes  
rura colunt, idem lectos ex omnibus agris  
miserat infelix non haec ad proelia Thybris.

The notion of civil war was, it must be conceded, so familiar to a Roman that a simile thence derived might be thought to deserve no comment: but it is worth noting that there *was* a civil war in the year 89, a civil war which did not proceed to its usual extremities, but stopped with the subject-matter of Valerius' simile—the clash of the legions. The revolt of Antonius Saturninus, Commander of the Army of Upper Germany, was crushed within a fortnight, but not before it had caused no little excitement at Rome.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Cos. Stil.* I. III,

non falce Gelonus,  
non arcu populere Getae, non Sarmata conto.

<sup>2</sup> *Plut. Aemil.* 25, 3, "Ὁτε γὰρ Ἀντώνιος ἀπέστη

Δομετιανοῦ καὶ πολλὸν πόλεμος ἀπὸ Γερμανίας προσε-  
δοκᾶτο, τῆς Ῥώμης ταραττομένης κτλ.

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 15 ille tibi cultusque deum delubraque gentis  
      instituet, cum tu, genitor lucebis ab omni  
      parte poli.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Kramer's text: in line 15, 'genti' V: 'gentis' *cod. Bon.* The grounds for Haupt's conjecture *centum* (which has found its way into some texts) are not valid: he says, "cultus deum" dicuntur divini honores, sed "genti" omnia turbat ac

<sup>2</sup> This was seen by Schenkl (*o.c.*, p. 274); Langen's contention that *ille* indicates the 'remote person' and thereby Titus, who was



and dutiful son who will honour with divine honours his father and his family:

ille tibi cultusque deum delubraque gentis  
instituet.

A remarkable statement indeed, were it written under Vespasian, when the succession of the younger son was only a remote (and unpleasing) contingency. But there is no necessity for assuming in Valerius such a gift of prophecy. There is in the phrase something further, something decisive that can only have been written in Domitian's reign—*delubraque gentis*, an unmistakable reference to the *Templum Gentis Flaviae*.<sup>1</sup> It could have been foreseen that the old man would receive divine honours as soon as he died, and a *Templum Divi Vespasiani* was in fact built on the Forum. The deification of the whole Flavian *Gens*, however, is something quite novel and unexpected, the work of the younger son whose sole claim to the throne lay in his being a Flavian, and he it is who is recorded, on unimpeachable evidence, to have converted the family house on the Quirinal into a temple.<sup>2</sup> This building does not seem to have been completed much before the year 93,<sup>3</sup> so that, making all allowances, we must none the less assign this passage to the later rather than the earlier half of Domitian's reign. It might indeed be urged against such a dating of the poem that the reigning Domitian would expect and demand something more enthusiastic in the way of praise than what he here receives—as witness the kind of language Martial and Statius use. But Valerius was not begging for his bread, and, for all that we can know, the exaggerations of flattery may no more have charmed or deceived that keen and suspicious intellect than (one hopes) such stuff as Pliny's *Panegyric* appealed to Trajan. Valerius may well have preferred a more indirect method—to pretend that the poem was written under Vespasian, and, subtly foreshadowing future things, gain credit for having seen even then that it was Domitian who was to be the true successor. That he should have done this would make it probable that he had actually begun the composition of the *Argonautica* when Vespasian was still alive.

This hypothesis of a beginning *ca.* 78 really fits quite well the indications referred to earlier that Valerius had not got further than the sixth book by 89 or even by 92, though it conflicts with inferences that have sometimes been made about the length of time an epic poet took over his work. Statius, a notoriously fluent versifier, took twelve years, as he himself tells us, to complete the twelve books of his *Thebais*; but it is quite illegitimate thence to deduce that he wrote a book each year, and, on a similar principle, follow Schenkl in giving Valerius only eight years of poetic activity. It would be far more natural to suppose that the earlier books demanded much more time and

not at Rome but still at Jerusalem, is perhaps an example of the 'feines Sprachgefühl' which Hosius praises in him (*Neue Jahrbücher*, 1899, p. 116).

<sup>1</sup> First pointed out by Köstlin, and used by him as evidence for his view that though the *Argonautica* was begun in 71-2, the poem was

revised in the fourth or fifth year of Domitian (*Philologus* XLVIII., 1889, p. 650).

<sup>2</sup> Suet. *Dom.* I. 1.

<sup>3</sup> The earliest clear references to it occur in the ninth book of Martial and the fourth book of the *Silvae* of Statius.

trouble than the later, and that progress was at first slow until increasing facility, or tedium perhaps and impatience of the long task, quickened the pace. Such at least is the impression one receives from reading the last three books of the *Thebais*, or an even longer section of the *Punica*. Silius must indeed in his last years have reached a remarkable rate of production as he struggled, like a Roman and a Stoic, with his incurable malady and his monstrous epic: in the last two books he is almost galloping towards the end of the poem, which was also, one feels, to be the end of his life. It would therefore be not unreasonable to suppose that Valerius, beginning *ca.* 78, was writing the sixth book as late as 92, and the eighth in 94-5, when death cut him short. Quintilian probably published his *Institutio Oratoria* in 96,<sup>1</sup> and it would therefore be to a very recent loss indeed that he was referring when he inserted the brief and abrupt obituary notice, 'multum in Valerio Flacco nuper amisimus' (X. 1, 90).

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<sup>1</sup> Vollmer's theory, *Rheinisches Museum* XLVI., 1891, pp. 343 sq.

## QUEEN PTOLEMAIS AND APAMA.

IT has been common in history for the conqueror or usurper to fortify his position by marrying a daughter of the old line. It was done by Alexander at the beginning of the Hellenistic period, by Herod at the end. There is reason to believe that it was also done both by Ptolemy I. and Seleucus.

Certain relations of Ptolemy I. when satrap with the last line of native Pharaohs, the XXXth (Sebennyte) dynasty, which began with Nakhtenebef (Nectanebo I.), who died in 361, and ended with Nakthorehbe (Nectanebo II.), are already known. After Alexander's death the large possessions of Nakhtenebef in the nomes of Buto, Tanais, and Sebennytos were in the occupation of his great-nephew, and Ptolemy as satrap confirmed this feudal prince in his possessions as *strategos* and nomarch in the three nomes.<sup>1</sup> It has also been pointed out that Ptolemy's throne-name was connected with the throne-names of the Sebennyte Pharaohs, and that apparently he honoured their gods, Onuris of Sebennytos and Neith of Sais; and the deduction has been drawn that he considered himself their legitimate successor.<sup>2</sup> But there is an inscription which, I think, takes us further than this.<sup>3</sup> It is a short document, probably (according to Sethe) of the reign of Ptolemy II., which records a dedication made by a queen Ptolemais, 'daughter'—i.e. descendant—'of Kheperkari, i.e. king Nakhtenebef (it is his solar name). Ptolemais has all the titles of a Pharaonic queen, including 'Great Royal Wife, Lady of the Two Lands'; but I do not take this necessarily to be more than a full-dress translation of the Greek *βασίλισσα*, for obviously she was not the wife of any Pharaoh. Her name Ptolemais, in fact, shows that she was the daughter of some Ptolemy, and a legitimate daughter, for in the early period they did not use the Ptolemy name for illegitimate children.<sup>4</sup> Her existence, then, implies that one of the first two Ptolemies had married a descendant of Nakhtenebef. Ptolemy II., with his purely Graeco-Macedonian outlook, need hardly be considered; if any Ptolemy married an Egyptian it was Ptolemy I. in his early period, while he was still under the influence of Alexander's ideas.<sup>5</sup> I suppose

<sup>1</sup> Werner Schnur, *Klio*, XX., 1926, pp. 297, 301, quoting a document from Sethe's *Urkunden*; see also A. Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire des Lagides*, IV., p. 5, n. 2. Schnur makes Nakhtenebef Nectanebo II. (p. 274, n. 1).

<sup>2</sup> W. Weber, *Die ägyptisch-griechischen Terrakotten*, I., 1914, pp. 112 sq. He says: 'Das kann kaum etwas anderes bedeuten, also dass er [Ptolemy I.] ihr rechtmässigen Nachfolger und als freier, legitimer Pharao angesehen zu werden gewünscht hat.'

<sup>3</sup> K. Sethe, *Hieroglyphische Urkunden der griech.*

*röm. Zeit*, p. 27, no. 12. Mr. S. R. K. Glanville kindly made me a note of its contents. It is referred to by Bouché-Leclercq, III., p. 88, n. 1; see note 1, page 2, *post*.

<sup>4</sup> See the list of the illegitimate children of Ptolemy I. in Bouché-Leclercq, I., p. 26, n. 4.

<sup>5</sup> On this phase see E. Kornemann, *Raccolta Lumbroso*, p. 235. E. Bevan, *A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty*, p. 53, rather wonders why Ptolemy, in imitation of Alexander, did not marry a native princess. I think that he did.

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it is *just* possible that Ptolemais was herself the wife of Ptolemy I. and had taken a new name on her marriage, but it seems too unlikely for many reasons to be worth considering;<sup>1</sup> doubtless she was the daughter of his Egyptian marriage. Ptolemy I. must have reached Egypt by about September, 323, at latest, and sometime in 322 he married Antipater's daughter Eurydice. His marriage with the Egyptian princess must therefore have taken place very soon after his arrival in the country; it shows that (as one supposed) he had decided that he was going to be king of Egypt *before* the allotment of the satrapies at Babylon. She may still have been alive when he married Eurydice, as Apama was when Seleucus married Stratonice; but probably she died early, or something would have been heard of her. Whether her daughter Ptolemais lived unmarried<sup>2</sup> at the court of Ptolemy II., or whether she married some Egyptian feudal prince, possibly a relative of her own, cannot be said; if we like to press her titles, the latter might be more probable, if any feudal princes yet remained. In any case we may see in her the last known descendant of the Pharaohs.

I turn now to Seleucus. At the marriage festival at Susa in 324 he married Apama, daughter of Spitamenes of Sogdiana (Arr. VII., 4, 6); whether it was chance, or some strange prescience on Alexander's part, or whether the bridegrooms had any choice, is not known. Of all the bridegrooms at Susa he was the only one who retained his Iranian wife. More than that: she was, and remained, his queen in the fullest sense; he called many cities he founded by her name, embassies to him found their profit in getting into touch with her,<sup>3</sup> cities honoured her, and her son Antiochus I. succeeded to the throne. She was still queen in 299-8<sup>3</sup>, though in 299 Seleucus for political reasons married Demetrius' daughter Stratonice; and as no further marriage of Seleucus is known after he gave Stratonice to his son in 292, we must suppose that Apama remained queen throughout, for it would at this time be most unlikely that he should have reigned for twelve years (292-280) without an official consort.<sup>4</sup>

Now Apama is an uncommon name; there are, I believe, only seven instances of it known, and two of these are mythical. Apama, daughter of Bartakes or Bazaces or Rhabezaces,<sup>5</sup> concubine of Darius I., is of course no more historical than is the story in which she for a moment appears, and Wilcken properly omitted her from the list of Apamas in Pauly-Wissowa. But one of the Apamas in Wilcken's list, the supposed daughter of Artabazos<sup>6</sup> who supposedly married Ptolemy I. at Susa (his wife's name was really Arta-

<sup>1</sup> Bouché-Léclercq, III., p. 88, n. 1, at first suspected that Ptolemais might have been a wife of Ptolemy I., but finally inclined to believe that she was merely Arsinoë II.

<sup>2</sup> The unmarried Ptolemaic princesses were called βασιλίσσα: O.G.I.S. 35.

<sup>3</sup> Miletus' decree for Apama: M. Holleaux, *Rev. Ét. Gr.* XXXVI., 1923, p. 1.

The case of Ptolemy II. is a generation later;

also his consort, being a goddess, was not officially dead.

<sup>5</sup> Jos. Ant. XI. 54; 1 Esdras 4, 29. The whole story has strong resemblances to Pseudo-Aristeas. A curious attempt, which I need not consider, has been made to prove this Apama historical and shift her to the reign of Darius III.: C. C. Torrey, *Amer. Journ. of Semitic Languages*, XXIII., 1906-7, p. 177.

<sup>6</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 1.

kama),<sup>1</sup> is also not a real person; I have shown that the name is due to a mere confusion on Duris' part.<sup>2</sup> Of the five Apamas who are historical, one in the second century B.C., wife of Prusias of Bithynia,<sup>3</sup> can teach us nothing; doubtless she was a Seleucid. Another, Apama of Megalopolis, also second century, is important, but I will consider her later. This leaves just three historical names to consider in the early period: (1) Seleucus' wife; (2) her granddaughter (she had no daughter), wife of Magas of Cyrene; and (3) Apama, daughter of Artaxerxes II., who married the satrap Pharnabazus.<sup>4</sup> In these circumstances it is almost a necessary inference that (3) and (1) were connected by blood, as (1) and (2) were; that is, Seleucus' wife would be an Achaemenid, of course through her mother, Spitamenes' wife, for there is no hint anywhere that Spitamenes was himself of royal blood.

If we infer accordingly that Seleucus' wife was an Achaemenid, descended from Apama, daughter of Artaxerxes II., we can clear up quite a number of things; this in turn makes the inference almost a certainty. We can see why Seleucus alone retained his Iranian wife: she was his connexion with the old line, and this must have been extremely useful to him in Iran; and Iran was always the Seleucid difficulty. We can explain why Spitamenes had no trouble in setting aside the Achaemenid Bessus, and why Spitamenes' Achaemenid wife figures so largely (though in distorted fashion) in the vulgate story; she was his title to lead the national war. We can explain that unexplained crux, the allusions made by Antiochus I. to the benevolence of his πρόγονοι toward Erythrae and the Ionian cities generally;<sup>5</sup> his 'forbears' were Seleucus and Apama, the Macedonian and the Achaemenid; we are too apt to overlook the distaff side, and Miletus' decree in honour of Apama sufficiently illustrates her attitude toward the Ionian cities. Lastly, we can see why the Parthian kings derived their descent from Artaxerxes II.<sup>6</sup> Many Asiatic lines traced descent from some Achaemenid, but they usually claimed to have branched off directly from one of the great names; thus the kings of Pontus and Commagene claimed descent from Darius, those of Cappadocia from an aunt of Cyrus.<sup>7</sup> But the greatest of these new dynasties, the Parthian, selected the not very glorious name of Artaxerxes II. because they were stepping into the shoes of the Seleucids, who really were descended from Artaxerxes II.

The importance of Seleucus' wife Apama in the all but vanished story of the early Seleucids can be illustrated from this, that by the second century B.C. a legend had grown up about her; and here the last of the Apamas comes in. Early in that century there lived at Megalopolis a man named Alexander, who claimed descent from Alexander of Macedon;<sup>8</sup> to give credibility to his story (ἐς πίστιν ὧν ἐλογοποιεῖ) he named his sons Philip and Alexander, and his

<sup>1</sup> Arr. *Anab.* VII. 4, 6; undoubtedly from the *Journal* through Ptolemy.

<sup>2</sup> *J.H.S.* XLI., 1921, p. 26 and n. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Hermippus, fr. 72 (*F.H.G.* III., p. 51); Strab. XII. 563. Nothing is known of her but the name.

<sup>4</sup> Plut. *Artax.* 27.

<sup>5</sup> *O.G.I.S.* 223, l. 24; 220, l. 20. Dittenberger's notes show how hopeless the difficulty has been.

<sup>6</sup> Arrian, *Parthica*, fr. 1 (*F.H.G.* III., p. 587).

<sup>7</sup> Diod. XXXI. 19.

<sup>8</sup> App. *Syr.* 13; Livy, XXXV. 47. 5.

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<sup>1</sup> O.

<sup>2</sup> Ib.

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daughter (who married king Amyntander of Athamania) *Apama*. Why *Apama*, instead of some genuine name in Alexander's family, like Olympias or Cleopatra? Clearly because a legend had already grown up which made of Seleucus' queen a daughter of the great Alexander. We meet this legend again, free from all doubt or ambiguity, in the pedigree of Antiochus I. of Commagene.<sup>1</sup> This king claimed to be descended from both Darius and Alexander. He was the son of the Iranian Mithradates I. of Commagene and a Seleucid princess, Laodice Thea Philadelphus, daughter of Antiochus VIII. (Grypus); he traces his father's pedigree back to Darius, while his mother's, which is the ordinary Seleucid pedigree carried back through the Seleucid kings,<sup>2</sup> begins with Alexander. No explanation of this has ever been offered, for Seleucus had no connexion with Alexander; but it is now obvious that the descent was traced through *Apama* in the character of Alexander's daughter. Some years ago I proved that Alexander's supposed illegitimate son Heracles was not his son at all.<sup>3</sup> Now we have, in *Apama*, a (supposed) *second* illegitimate child of Alexander's; fortunately in this case there is Ptolemy's evidence as to who she really was. Was there yet a *third* such child, through whom Alexander of Megalopolis claimed descent, or did he merely claim to be a Seleucid collateral? If we had his alleged pedigree, we might know a good deal more than we do about the fictitious relationships which grew up in the Hellenistic period beside the real ones, as did fictitious history beside the real history, relationships of which we catch an occasional glimpse in such writers as Justin or Porphyry.<sup>4</sup>

Both Ptolemy I. and Seleucus then married princesses of the old lines, the Pharaohs and the Achaemenids; but Ptolemy, as so often, was copying Seleucus, and while nothing of importance turns on his marriage, Seleucus carried his through with all its consequences. It is among other things a useful commentary on the fanciful theory<sup>5</sup> which sees in Seleucus the villain who led Ptolemy to abandon his 'native' policy for a purely Graeco-Macedonian one, a theory which seemingly derives from that unhappy will-o'-the-wisp, the *βασιλεία τῆς Ἀσίας*.

W. W. TARN.

MUIRTOWN HOUSE,  
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<sup>1</sup> O.G.I.S. 388 to 401.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* 399, 400.

<sup>3</sup> *J.H.S.* XLI., 1921, p. 18. See Wilamowitz, *Hellenistische Dichtung*, II., p. 146, n. 2, who

accepts my view.

<sup>4</sup> I gave some instances, *J.H.S.* XLI., 1921, p. 27.

<sup>5</sup> Kornemann *op. cit.*

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p. 587).

## PLATO AND ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION.<sup>1</sup>

ALLEGORICAL interpretation of the ancient Greek myths began (as I showed in *C.R.* XLI., pp. 214-15) not with the grammarians, but with the philosophers. As speculative thought developed, there grew up also the belief that in mystical and symbolic terms the ancient poets had expressed profound truths which were difficult to define in scientifically exact language. Assuming that the myth-makers were concerned to edify and to instruct, the philosophers found in apparent immoralities and impieties a warning that both in offensive and in inoffensive passages one must look beneath the surface for the true significance of the tales. Thus allegory was originally positive, not negative, in its aim; its purpose was not so much to defend the poetic traditions against charges of immorality as to make fully explicit the wealth of doctrine which *ex hypothesi* the myths contained. Those who wrote to defend the poets could, if they chose, make some use of the results of the allegorical method; passages to which exception had been taken could be shown by allegorical treatment to be quite consistent with the view that the poets were wise and divinely inspired. But the first dim beginnings of allegory can be traced to another and a weightier motive—namely, the desire of speculative thinkers to appropriate for their own use some at least of the mythical traditions. Nor is there any reason to doubt that the same motive was the main driving force in the later history of allegorical interpretation. Objectionable passages were, indeed, regarded as among the richest in deeper meaning; but the leading allegorists applied their method to offensive and inoffensive passages alike.

In the fifth century, when the allegorical method became fully developed, it was still the philosophers who played the leading part. Anaxagoras 'appears to have been the first to declare that the poetry of Homer is on the subject of virtue and justice'; and his disciple Metrodorus of Lampsacus 'developed still further the same principle, for he was the first to study seriously the poet's treatment of physical questions.'<sup>2</sup> The latter was perhaps the most thorough-going of all the allegorists. He held that neither the gods nor even the heroes of Homer had ever existed; the poet introduced them merely 'for the sake of art.'<sup>3</sup> Some results of his exegesis are extant: Agamemnon, he said, was

<sup>1</sup> I take this opportunity of annotating a phrase which I used in a previous article on Plato ('Imitation' in Plato's *Republic*, *C.Q.*, January, 1928). In a very kind letter (expressing agreement with 'practically all' of my conclusions) Professor W. C. Greene denies having ever held the view (attributed to him on p. 21, n. 2) that 'all poetry is condemned in the tenth book.' These words were, of course, my own, not Professor Greene's. They were intended to mean that according to him poetry as such (i.e.

both the ideal poetry previously praised and the non-ideal poetry previously condemned) falls under the condemnation of mimesis in the tenth book. Professor Greene has thus to explain an inconsistency, the existence of which I deny. His views on the point will be found in *Harvard Studies* XXIX., pp. 41, 54-56, and XXXI., pp. 67, 102 and *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> Diog. Laert. II. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Tatian, *ad Graec.* 21.

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either, Achilles the sun, Helen the earth, Paris air, Demeter the liver, Dionysus the spleen, and Apollo the gall.<sup>1</sup> Diogenes of Apollonia<sup>2</sup> and other Anaxagoreans<sup>3</sup> indulged in less extreme but not dissimilar theories. So, too, did Democritus of Abdera,<sup>4</sup> who appears also to have made occasional use of etymology—that pseudo-science which, assuming that the original form (τὸ ἔτυμον) of a word represented its true meaning, furnished many fanciful clues to the hidden significance of the myths. At least one etymology passed from Democritus to the Stoics. In this branch of study the sophist Prodicus<sup>5</sup> was renowned; but it seems to have been favoured most of all by the adherents of the Heraclitean philosophy, who were in this respect merely following the example of their master.<sup>6</sup> Of these Cratylus may be taken as an example. Among historical writers, Hecataeus had already, before the century began, rationalized some of Homer's monsters,<sup>7</sup> while Stesimbrotus of Thasos and Anaximander are mentioned in Xenophon<sup>8</sup> as among the many teachers from whom Niceratus had learned the hidden meanings (ὑπόνοιαι) of Homer. Stesimbrotus is mentioned also in Plato's *Ion*<sup>9</sup> as an interpreter of Homer, in company with Metrodorus of Lampsacus and a certain Glaucon whose views are otherwise unknown.<sup>10</sup> Perhaps, too, those famous lecturers on poetry, Hippias<sup>11</sup> and Protagoras (who treated the poets as 'sophists in disguise'<sup>12</sup>), occasionally used the allegorical method. It is at all events clear that the practice had become exceedingly common before Plato had begun to write. There were many clever exponents of Homer who held such views as that Athena really meant 'mind or intelligence.'<sup>13</sup> Those who were willing 'to play the sophist' and disbelieve the popularly received sense of the myths found a congenial task in substituting deeper meanings of their own invention.<sup>14</sup> The numerous allegories cited by Plato himself testify to the commonness of the practice.

It is necessary to emphasize the prevalence of allegorism in the fifth century because the statement is repeatedly made that 'Plato's attacks upon Homer lent a great impetus to this method of exegesis—the only method, as it was thought, by which his animadversions could be met.'<sup>15</sup> But, in the first place, the allegorical method was already very fully developed before Plato's strictures were written. It is true that after his lifetime many new allegorical

<sup>1</sup> See Diels, *F. der V. I.*, p. 414; Gomperz, *G.T. I.*, pp. 378, 574.

<sup>2</sup> Philodemus in Diels, *ibid.*, p. 418 (Homer intended 'Zeus' to mean 'air').

<sup>3</sup> Syncellus, *Chron.* 140c (Diels, *ibid.*, p. 414). (Zeus=mind, Athena=art; the first is probably one of Anaxagoras' own, in view of his doctrine of νοῦς.)

<sup>4</sup> Fr. 2 (Diels): Tritogeneia means that wisdom (Athena) consists of three parts (cf. *C.Q.*, January, 1929, p. 43); fr. 30: Zeus=air; cf. fr. 24.

<sup>5</sup> Plato, *Charm.* 163d; *Crat.* 384b. It seems probable that Prodicus used his etymologies to support his rationalistic views concerning the gods (Cic. *N.D.* I. 118).

<sup>6</sup> Fr. 32 (Diels): Zeus and ἔην.

<sup>7</sup> See Gomperz, *G.T. I.*, pp. 258, 563.

<sup>8</sup> *Symp.* III. 6.

<sup>9</sup> 530d.

<sup>10</sup> He may be the same person as the Glaucon mentioned by Aristotle, *Poet.* 1461b, as protesting against overhasty interpretation and condemnation of passages in the poets. If this is so, he probably used allegory for defensive purposes.

<sup>11</sup> See Plato, *Hipp.* II.

<sup>12</sup> *Prot.* 316d.

<sup>13</sup> *Crat.* 407ab.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Phaedrus* 229c sqq.

<sup>15</sup> Adam on *Rep.* 378d, 24.

interpretations were produced, and many old ones were revived or adapted to new purposes. But it is not at all clear that the practice was pursued with any greater enthusiasm after Plato than before him. The zeal of Metrodorus (whose wilder efforts appear to have been quietly shelved) was never afterwards equalled. In the second place, the statement assumes that the ruling motive of the allegorists, both before and after Plato, was to defend the poetic traditions against moral criticism. But there is no ground for believing that the Heracliteans held any brief for the morality of Homer and Hesiod, about whom their master had many hard things to say,<sup>1</sup> or that Anaxagoras and his followers were half so much concerned to defend Homer as to find illustration and support for their own dogmas. Certainly Metrodorus did not couch his allegories in the form of an apology for the poet, for he went far beyond what was necessary in order to render Homer morally unimpeachable. The Stoics also applied allegory to inoffensive, just as much as to offensive, passages. In all probability they, too, allegorized not to prove the wisdom of the poets (that was an assumption beyond all proving), but to give the sanction of antiquity to their own doctrines. In the third place, it is very questionable whether the Stoics thought they were answering Plato when they—especially Chrysippus—set about turning the works of the poets into textbooks of Stoicism. Is the mere multiplication of allegorical interpretations a valid answer to Plato? Did the acute Chrysippus think that it was? If it was, then, since allegories were already very numerous indeed, Plato was answered before ever his attack on Homer was formulated. What, then, was the Platonic reply to the allegorical defence of the poets? This last question is the one which must be answered first.

One fact, perhaps more than any other, shows how unimportant was the defensive function of allegory. There is only one passage in which Plato can be held even to have glanced at it. This is *Republic* 378d, a passage which, I believe, has never been adequately explained, and one which will repay consideration if only for two reasons: it sheds a light on what is meant by allegorical interpretation, as distinct from other forms of exegesis, and it has given rise to a wrong opinion on the part of some modern writers, who hold that Plato here denied the existence of 'undersenses' altogether.

In a recent article on Plato's criticism of Homer, S. Weinstock summarily dismisses Stählin's view that there is in Plato no rejection of allegorical interpretation as such. 'The substance of poetry is ψεύδος,' he says, 'so it is not to be tolerated in the state. For the myths about Uranus-Cronus-Zeus are not true as Hesiod told them, and, moreover, we must not seek a hidden meaning in the Homeric myths of the fall of Hephaestus, the chaining of Hera and the Theomachy.'<sup>2</sup> Apparently he means that, according to Plato, since such myths are untrue, they cannot have any underlying sense. But neither Plato nor the allegorical interpreters believed that the myths were true.

<sup>1</sup> *Frr.* 28, 40, 42, 57, 104 (Diels).

<sup>2</sup> *Die platonische Homerkritik und ihre Nachwir-*

*kung* (*Philologus* LXXXII., pp. 121 sqq.). See pp. 124-125 and n. 13.

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In order to accept the rationalization it was necessary to disbelieve the myth.<sup>1</sup> That Zeus bound Hera, for example, is not true for the Stoic allegorist any more than for Plato; but for the former a particular 'undersense' is true—namely, that air (Hera) is hemmed in by aither (Zeus) above, and by earth and water (the two anvils) below.<sup>2</sup> Plato, indeed, does not expect the myths to be literally true; it is a different kind of truth that he demands. Nor does he infer from the falseness of the literal sense that the 'undersenses' are necessarily false or non-existent. An analysis of the passage will show that the claims of the allegorists are here dismissed without prejudice.

Narratives (λόγοι) may be true or false (376e); both kinds are to be used in education. At first the young are to be taught the false only. But these false narratives are not to be altogether false; they must contain truth (377a). The young easily take whatever mould (τύπος, 377b) one wishes to imprint. Hence we must beware lest they absorb wrong opinions (δόξαι). Because most of the current myths instil wrong opinions they must be banished from the state (377c). The myths of Homer, Hesiod, and the rest of the poets must be rejected on this ground. Not because they are fictions, but because they are ugly fictions (δ, μὴ καλῶς ψεύδεται; e, οὐ καλῶς ἐψεύσατο). Examples are the stories concerning Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus, which, even if they were true, ought not to be told to the young and foolish (378a), and must not be told at all in our city. For they would foster in the young the false opinion that in committing the worst of crimes they would merely be following the example of the first and greatest of the gods (b). Similarly, from tales of quarrelling among gods and heroes, they would imbibe the view that it is right for citizen to quarrel with citizen. The stories of the binding of Hera, the fall of Hephaestus, and all the theomachies composed by Homer must for this reason be rejected whether they have been written in allegories or without allegories (οὐτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιδῶν, 378d). For the young cannot distinguish what is allegory from what is not, and whatever opinion they receive cannot as a rule be changed or effaced. Accordingly from the first they must be told such stories as are devised in the most beautiful manner possible for the promotion of virtue (ὅτι κάλλιστα μεμυθολογημένα πρὸς ἀρετήν, 378e). To this end the founders of the city must dictate the moulds or principles (τύποι περὶ θεολογίας, 379a; νόμοι τε καὶ τύποι, 380c) in accordance with which the myths must be composed, such as that God is not the author of evil, etc.

It is necessary to distinguish clearly (1) the λόγος, i.e. the narrative in its literal sense, (2) the νόμος, τύπος, or δόξα, i.e. the principle implied or illustrated by the narrative, the 'moral' of the tale, and (3) the ὑπόνοια or allegorical meaning of the narrative.<sup>3</sup>

So far as the λόγος or literal sense is concerned, the tales of which Plato

<sup>1</sup> Thus the allegorists might be accused of blasphemy (Plutarch, *Amat.* 757c).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Cornutus, c. 17; ps.-Plutarch, *Vit. Hom.* 97.

<sup>3</sup> On ὑπόνοια and its later equivalent ἀλληγορία see Plutarch, *De Aud. Poet.* 19e; Heraclitus, *Quaest. Hom.* 5; Rhys Roberts' [*Longinus*], p. 194.

here approves are just as false as those which he condemns. But whereas the former are beautiful, the latter are ugly. This element of beauty or ugliness is due to the truth or falsehood, not of the λόγος but of the moral, the mould (τύπος) in which the tale is cast, the principle (νόμος) which it embodies, the opinion (δόξα) which it conveys. It is because of the false moral which they contain that Plato rejects the theomachies, the legends concerning Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus, and the tale of Theseus and Pirithous (378bc, 391e).

Since such myths are not only literally untrue but also contain false morals, they are doubly false—ugly falsehoods, as Plato calls them. They are falsehoods because their λόγος is untrue, and ugly because their τύπος is untrue. It is because of the false lessons which they teach that they belong to the class of falsehoods which are reflections and expressions of the lie in the soul—i.e., shameful ignorance concerning first principles (382ab). On the other hand, the myths which contain truth (i.e., illustrate a true principle), and are to be used in the ideal state, belong to the class of merely verbal falsehoods, which are inoffensive and, on occasion, salutary. Their literal sense is, of course, untrue, because we are ignorant of the truth concerning the ancient times with which they deal (382cd). But since the lessons which they teach are true, these myths are beautiful, being 'made as like truth as possible' (*ibid.*).

Now, according to Plato, the young take in the moral (τύπος, νόμος, δόξα) of the tale along with the tale itself (λόγος). And an indelible impression is made thereby on the young mind. It would be of no avail to tell the young hearer a story, and then to inform him that it was false in fact and in principle but true in some underlying sense (ὑπόνοια). For the young judgment cannot distinguish the allegorical sense from the meaning which lies on the surface so as to accept the former and reject the latter. 'The young cannot discriminate between what is allegory and what is not.' Whether the child apprehends the allegorical meaning or not, one thing is certain, namely, that the literal meaning and, what is more important, the general principle illustrated by that literal meaning will have sunk deep into his impressionable mind. Therefore any myth which implies a wrong moral—which has been fashioned according to a wrong mould or principle—must not be used for the purposes of education. It does not matter whether such a myth was meant to be read as an allegory or not; the young cannot so read it. It does not matter whether or not the 'undersenses' exist, or whether they are or are not true; the child cannot grasp them, or at any rate cannot grasp them without first grasping far more securely the superficial sense of the myths and the evil principles by it involved.

This analysis makes it clear that in *Republic* 378d Plato offers no opinion whatever on the question whether the myths of Homer and Hesiod do or do not contain allegorical meanings. No answer to that question is implied in the words οὐτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν, which mean no more and no less than what they say; myths may or may not be written in allegories; in either case they are to be rejected if, like the myths of Homer

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and Hesiod, they inculcate wrong principles. (On the other hand, if, like the myths which the poets of the ideal state are to compose, their literal sense, though false, illustrated right opinions, there could be no objection on Platonic grounds should they contain true 'undersenses' also.) Is it a valid answer to point to the presence of allegorical meanings in the myths? No; for if the myths are harmful, whether written as allegories or not, it is beside the point to retort that the myths are allegories. The allegorical defence is simply set aside as irrelevant. It should be observed further that allegory provides no defence for the poets against the accusation of ignorance, for among the passages on which that accusation is based (379-392c) are many which not even the most fantastic interpretation could make square with Platonic principles. Plato has other arguments, too, for proving the ignorance of Homer and his spiritual descendants (e.g., 598c-600e); their style itself proves it, for it is 'imitative' in the condemnatory sense of the word (397abc, 595 sqq.) Such arguments could not be answered by allegory, which must begin its defence of Homer by assuming what they were meant to disprove—namely, that the ancient poet was a genuine philosopher. It is, therefore, not likely that Plato's strictures on Homer, not being answerable by allegory, gave an impetus to that form of interpretation. But the question whether the Stoics thought to refute Plato with allegories cannot be fully answered until Plato's attitude towards allegorical interpretation has been more precisely defined.

Now although in *Republic* 378 Plato does not decide whether or not there are deeper meanings latent in the myths, it may yet be contended that, since both here and elsewhere he convicts the poets of the greatest possible degree of ignorance, he virtually denies that any 'undersenses' are present. Plato (as, no doubt, the early Stoics did also) treats the poets as the creators of the myths. If, then, the poets are ignorant persons aping wisdom and aiming at pleasure instead of veracity, they cannot have expressed, or even intended to express, true doctrines, whether in plain or in allegorical language. Does Plato, then, imply that the alleged deeper meanings are either false or non-existent? No; for on the same ground the poets would never tell the truth even when they speak plainly. But in fact we find Plato 'approving of many things in Homer,'<sup>1</sup> asserting that the poets often attain to truth,<sup>2</sup> and frequently quoting their opinions to support or illustrate his argument, or to provide a starting-point for discussion. If, then, the poets, in spite of their ignorance, may tell the truth in plain language, may they not also tell the truth in the language of myth and enigma?

Plato denied that the poets had either wisdom or good intentions; but he held that they were divinely inspired. It is thanks to the Muses and the Graces that they often attain to truth. Though they have no rational knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), they may yet be divinely inspired with right opinion (*ὁρθὴ δόξα*).<sup>3</sup> For their right opinions the poets cannot show reason. If they

<sup>1</sup> *Rep.* 383a; cf. 389e.

<sup>2</sup> *Laws* 682a.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, *Meno* 99.

could, they would not be mere poets but philosophers; they would possess genuine knowledge, which alone can be securely grasped, instead of opinion which, being undefined, is unstable and liable to fly away as it came. The poets, indeed, are like the prophets and soothsayers; they do not understand the fine things which they themselves say, or at any rate do not understand them nearly so well as they are understood by the audience.<sup>1</sup>

For Plato, then, inspiration is not merely a form of genius or natural endowment;<sup>2</sup> nor does it mean an impulse which comes indeed from without, but which does not interfere with the free play of the poet's personality.<sup>3</sup> It is the state of being possessed by some indwelling power.<sup>4</sup> Like the prophetess at Delphi, the inspired poet utters not his own words but the words of some divinity. In Hobbes' derisive phrase, he speaks 'by inspiration, like a bagpipe.' We have to thank such divine interference for the scraps and shreds of right opinion which we find in the works of the poets; for right opinion is a gift of some value, though a poor substitute for the knowledge which is based on reason. True, in *Republic* X. Plato denies to the poets even right opinion which he grants them elsewhere.<sup>5</sup> The reason is that of their own unaided selves the poets are incapable even of so much; their right opinions are due not to their own efforts but to the benevolent powers—whether they be called 'Muses' or 'Graces' or simply 'the god'—which have taken possession of them for the time being. Poets, prophets, and statesmen, benighted as they are, are sometimes right. They are like lucky blind men who by the help of Providence escape the ditch.<sup>6</sup> Plato cannot explain how this happens except by the hypothesis of divine inspiration; just as the hypothesis of divine intervention will alone explain for him the survival of any good thing amid the general political chaos.<sup>7</sup>

Why then, one may ask, are the poets, if divinely inspired, not always veracious? The author of the *Theogony*, who asked himself the same question when he read the poems of Homer, would have replied that the capricious daughters of Zeus do not always tell the truth.<sup>8</sup> Such is not Plato's answer; for him the divinities cannot lie or deceive.<sup>9</sup> His explanation is that all forms of possession involve the surrender of sanity at least for the time being. The inspired poet is beside himself. By the mercy of heaven there may be elements of sense amid his ravings; he is none the less a delirious madman. Though he is often right, yet his unrestrained emotionalism and moral irresponsibility make it probable that he will be still more often wrong. The

<sup>1</sup> *Meno* 98a; *Apol.* 22bc; *Phaedr.* 278c (cf. *Rep.* 490b). Cf. *Ion* 534d; and Francis Thompson:

'We speak a lesson taught we know not how,  
And what it is that from us flows  
The hearer better than the utterer knows.'

<sup>2</sup> *Apol.* 22bc: φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες. Cf. *Meno* 99c: οὐτε φύσει οὐτε διδασκὼν ἀλλὰ θεῶν μοῖρα . . . ἀνευ νοῦ.

<sup>3</sup> The commonsense view, and the Homeric account of the matter. Phemius is self-taught, but the gods have implanted lays in his heart (*Od.* XXII. 347; cf. Finsler, *Homer* I.<sup>2</sup>, p. 267).

<sup>4</sup> *Ion* 533e sqq.; *Phaedr.* 245a; *Laws* 719c.

<sup>5</sup> See Adam on *Rep.* 601e, 32.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Rep.* 506c on οἱ ἀνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες.

<sup>7</sup> *Rep.* 492e-3a.

<sup>8</sup> v. 27; cf. Strabo I. 2, 9.

<sup>9</sup> *Rep.* 382e.

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fact that he is inspired is a justification for appealing to his opinions when they are true; it is equally the justification for subjecting his poems to a strict censorship, lest they contradict the laws of the state and breed pernicious errors. In some passages he will speak the 'words of God and nature'; in others, by far more numerous, he will speak as becomes his own irrational self.<sup>1</sup> In inspiration bought at such a price Plato places so little trust that in the *Republic* he dismisses the inspired bard from the ideal state—albeit with divine honours<sup>2</sup>—and retains only the philosopher-poet who, thanks to a natural gift (*εὐφροσύνη*), can produce poetry which is 'imitative' in the good sense of that word.<sup>3</sup>

But inspired utterances are not only untrustworthy; they are frequently obscure or even unintelligible. Plato sometimes ironically assumes the view that the poets were wise men who deliberately wrapped up their wisdom in riddles and myths, instead of imparting it to others.<sup>4</sup> Sometimes, too, he ironically regrets that it is impossible to ask the ancient poets what they meant by this or that passage.<sup>5</sup> Such remarks are very effective against persons like Hippias, who apparently used the poets as authorities on every subject. But, as we have seen, even if it were possible, it would be quite useless to ask the poets what their verses mean; for they themselves do not know.<sup>6</sup> It follows that the meaning of a poem is quite independent of the intention of the poet. The problem of the interpreter is not to arrive at the mind of the author (for, if he is genuinely inspired, not he, but some power other than himself, is responsible for his words), but to ascertain the real and objective sense of what he has written. Thus the argument that the fable was invented first and the moralization afterwards—a consideration which has seemed to many moderns a convincing retort to the allegorists<sup>7</sup>—would not for Plato impair the validity of the moralization. The poet, like all other interpreters of the gods, utters oracles incomprehensible to himself, oracles which will naturally be as obscure, as ambiguous, and as offensive to polite ears, as any that ever emanated from Delphi. The riddling and symbolic style of the inspired bard is as proper to the tripod of the Muses as to that of Apollo; it is also in all probability the style of those who established the mystic rites.<sup>8</sup> Hence it is clear that Plato's account of inspiration and the obscure and mythical style in which it naturally expresses itself is really in favour of the

<sup>1</sup> *Laws* 719c (the inspired poet contradicts himself and the laws); 682a (*κατὰ θεὸν πως εἰρημένα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν*). One can only suppose that the inspired poet when wrong has the symptoms of inspiration without the reality. (Cf. *Phaedo* 69c, [Longinus], *On the Sublime* III. 2: οὐ βακχεύουσι ἀλλὰ παῖζουσιν).

<sup>2</sup> *Rep.* 398a.

<sup>3</sup> *Rep.* 401c: τοὺς εὐφροῦς δυναμένους. Cf. *Phaedr.* 269-70: oratory requires a natural gift (*φύσις*) as well as practice (*μελέτη*) and knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*). Hence Aristotle took his distinction between the *εὐφυής* and the *μανικός*

(*Poet.* 1455a, 32).

<sup>4</sup> Put most clearly in the pseudo-Platonic *Alcibiades* II. 147bcd.

<sup>5</sup> *Prot.* 347e; *Hipp.* II. 365d.

<sup>6</sup> *Apol.* 22c.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. Bacon in the *Advancement of Learning* (Cowl, *Theory of Poetry in England*, p. 302).

<sup>8</sup> *Apol.* 21b (*αἰνιττεται*); *Phaedo* 69c; *Laws* 719. Cf. Heraclitus (fr. 93, Diels) who finds a parallel for his obscure and symbolic style in the practice of the oracle of Delphi. Cf. also Pindar, the Muse's prophet (fr. 150), whose arrows are only for the wise (*Ol.* II. 83).

view that some at least of the myths of the poets contain deeper meanings which, quite apart from the knowledge or intention of the poets themselves, may be not only profound but true. The theory that the poets enjoyed the same kind of inspiration as the prophets and the founders of mystic rites was in fact regarded as one of the chief sanctions of allegorical interpretation. Sallustius,<sup>1</sup> for example, in support of his view that the ancient myths were allegories, points to the practice of the gods themselves who 'in their oracular responses made use of myths' (i.e. of allegories). Accordingly Plato, holding the views on inspiration which I have described, does not deny that there may be hidden meanings in the myths; nor does he say that those hidden meanings, if we knew what they were, would necessarily be found to be false. There are indeed a few indications that he was by no means averse from the idea so common among his contemporaries, that poetry and myth were the natural vehicles of solemn information. See, for example, *Crito* 44b, where the prophecy of the date of his death come to Socrates veiled in the imagery of an Homeric line: the third day hence thou shalt come to fertile Phthia. See, too, *Phaedo* 69c, where the fate of the unpurified soul in Hades, as described in mythical language by the founders of the mystic rites, lends itself to a definite and philosophic interpretation, although the interpretation suggested is not stated to be necessarily the correct one.

Accordingly Plato nowhere denies that the myths may contain true 'undersenses.' Even though the poets themselves are unaware of it, true doctrines may lurk hidden in their most fantastic tales. But where the poets fail us can the interpreters help? Can they definitely ascertain the mythical doctrines by a valid process of interpretation? It might be found that the poets are often right or partly right even in mythical and enigmatic passages, if we but understood them.<sup>2</sup> How can we become certain that we have the correct interpretation of such passages? According to Plato we cannot attain such certainty; for just as the poets followed no rational process in composing, so the interpreters also must work by inspiration, not by reasoning from general principles.<sup>3</sup> Thus endless disputes arise amongst them; and there is no way of settling their differences.<sup>4</sup> This is the reason why, although there are many allegorical interpretations in his dialogues, Plato never vouches for any one of them as a true account of the actual meaning of whatever myth is in question. Whenever such an interpretation is introduced, there is in fact almost always more than a hint of humour or irony present to show that the explanation is merely tentative, merely meant as an illustration to the argument and not to be taken too seriously.

As there are no known principles of interpretation, inspired utterances really require the interpreters also to be inspired. The most that the inspired interpreter can achieve is right opinion as to the meaning of the myths or other passages the meaning of which is in doubt; that meaning in turn

<sup>1</sup> *De Dis et Mundo*, c. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Lysis* 214b.

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is, at the best, merely right opinion. But we have no means of deciding which of the interpreters has right opinion as to the meaning of this or that passage. And even if we had some such criterion, a more crucial question arises: of what value to us are the recorded opinions of the poets? In the answer to this question lies the most important Platonic objection, not only to the practice of allegorical interpretation, but to all forms of exegesis which treated the poets as authorities on every conceivable subject. Men who profess to be philosophers ought not to require the authority of another on which to base their views. Neither poetry nor prose is of any great value if recited merely to be believed and not to be tested and understood by oral question and answer. The opinions contained in the works of the poets cannot be discovered with certainty; but even if they could, and even if they were true, they would not give us that scientific knowledge of truth which is the aim of the philosopher and which is obtainable only by dialectic.<sup>1</sup>

This attitude towards the poetic traditions, so far as concerns the interpretation of the myths, may be illustrated by the opening of the *Phaedrus*, where Socrates is asked his opinion on the myth that Boreas stole away Orithyia from the banks of the Ilissus. He replies that the meaning may be that the maiden was swept away by a gust of the north wind. There are, however, grave objections to engaging in such rationalizations. The task, once begun, ought to be completed; and the monsters of mythology are so numerous and formidable that it would take up all one's time. One must, therefore, choose between this crude philosophizing on the one hand and a more urgent duty on the other—a duty which is expressed by the Delphian inscription 'Know thyself.' Being wholly absorbed in this more important task, Socrates must bid farewell to these sophistic explanations, and be content to believe the commonly received account of the matter.

The commentators are quick to point out that Socrates here expresses acceptance of a myth of a kind which he condemns in the *Republic*. But W. H. Thompson, in a note on 230a, sees no inconsistency involved. 'The mythical matter in question is harmless,' he says; and as it is only immoral myths which are condemned in the *Republic*, the tale of the rape of Orithyia has, according to him, full right of entry into the ideal state. This attempted solution (which Thompson applauds as the work of uncommon common-sense) is quite unsound; it is apparently due to confounding the literal meaning with the allegorical interpretation. As I pointed out in the analysis of *Republic* 377a sqq., we must distinguish (1) the tale in its literal sense (that Boreas carried off the maid); (2) the moral of the tale (that carrying off maidens is a right and commendable action, since divine persons engage in it); and (3) the allegorical interpretation (*ὑπόνοια*, that the north wind swept the girl away). When Thompson says that the mythical matter is harmless, he means that the *ὑπόνοια* is harmless; a tale of the north wind's fury conveys no evil lesson. Or if indeed he means that the moral conveyed by the literal

<sup>1</sup> *Phaedr.* 277 8.

sense is harmless, then he is speaking for himself and not for Plato, who could not permit such a principle to be taught or practised in his city. Myths which ascribe to divinities actions which are far from divine are ugly falsehoods not to be told in the ideal state (cf. *Rep.* 390-1).

The 'undersense' here suggested is, no doubt, a highly probable explanation of the myth. But one must, like Socrates, be careful not to assume that because it is fairly obvious it is necessarily the true account of the matter. Innumerable other explanations are possible; one of a subtler kind might be the correct one. Boreas might, for example, be treated as by Porphyry,<sup>1</sup> who, deriving the name from *βορά*, finds a meaning for the escapade described by Homer in *Iliad* XX. 224. We do not in fact know the meaning of the myth, nor have we any means of ascertaining it. Even if the meaning suggested by Socrates were known to be the correct one, we do not know that what it states is an historic fact. And even if it were a correct explanation and a correct statement of fact, it is a piece of information altogether valueless for him who is intent on the serious business of philosophy. Accordingly the treatment of the myth is consistent with the general attitude towards allegorical interpretation which I have outlined above. One point alone remains to be explained: why does Socrates here say that he accepts a myth of a kind which in the *Republic* he declares to be untrue both in fact and in principle? The apparent inconsistency need not trouble those who have any appreciation of Socratic humour. Socrates does not really believe either the literal or the allegorical sense of the myth; at any rate, he does not care whether the latter is true or not. But ironically assuming that he must accept either the one or the other, he prefers the former to the latter; for in that way he is able to escape the necessity of wasting his time on the hedge-learning<sup>2</sup> of the allegorists, which cannot aid him to fulfil the duty of knowing himself.

The above account of Plato's view of allegorism is again confirmed by the detailed criticism of the etymological method in the *Cratylus* (see especially 435 sqq.). The pseudo-philosophers who used this method assumed (though apparently the assumption was not naïvely unconscious as it is with their modern descendants<sup>3</sup>) that the meaning of words depended upon their derivation. The original names of things were 'rightly given,' they are really like the things which they name, so that a resemblance between names indicates a connexion between the things expressed by them. He who knows the meaning of names will therefore understand things also. Nor indeed is there any other way of learning the truth about things than by etymology (436a). Since language testifies so consistently to the truth of the Heraclitean philosophy,

<sup>1</sup> *De Antro Nympharum* 28.

<sup>2</sup> *Phaedr.* 229e ὑποκρίναι τὴν σοφίαν.

<sup>3</sup> Two modern examples will make my meaning clear: (1) The derivation of Saxon from Isaac's son, which 'proves' that the Anglo-Saxons (whoever they may be) are Israelites; (2) the derivation of atonement from at-one-ment so frequently cited to 'prove' that the

doctrine contains no idea of reparation. Etymologies are no argument. But when those on which argument is based are wrong, the humour of the situation is increased. 'Atone' (pace the *N.E.D.*) comes from the legal phrase *testibus idoneis* (see L. Wiener, *Commentary to the Germanic Laws*, Harvard, 1915, pp. 167-8).

the assumption that the first names were rightly given justifies itself in practice. The legislator who first assigned the names to things must have understood both the reality and the proper way to express it in names. The most probable account of the matter is that the first names were assigned by 'some power more than human, so that they must of necessity be rightly given' (438c). In briefly giving the Platonic objections to this standpoint I shall point out that they are really the same as the objections to allegorical interpretation which I have already collected from other dialogues. From the special treatment of etymology the broader principles could, in fact, be inferred.

It should be noticed first that Socrates suggests that his success in discovering derivations in this dialogue is due to his being inspired (396d). That is to say, the etymologists—like the allegorical interpreters of the *Ion*—are merely offering us random opinions (which may at times chance to be right); their derivations are not deduced rationally from general principles.

But even if we could by a rational process ascertain the real meaning of names, this meaning would tell us, not the truth about things, but what the name-giver thought was the truth about things. He may have been wrong. (Similarly, if the real meaning of the myths of the poets could be ascertained, it might give us merely the wrong opinions of the poets. Some other criterion—dialectic—is necessary in order to test the conceptions both of poet and of name-giver.)

Again, suppose that the meaning of names could be ascertained, and suppose that they were found consistent in their testimony; that consistency would not prove that the name-giver's conceptions are true. But in fact names are not consistent; many appear to support the views of the Heracliteans, but others may be interpreted as confirming the philosophy of the Eleatics. Etymology therefore cannot decide which of these conflicting doctrines is right. (Similarly, even if the myths—rationally interpreted—supported consistently the one philosophy, this consistency would not establish the truth of that philosophy. But they are not consistent. The poets and interpreters contradict themselves and one another. Confronted by such difficulties we must take refuge, not in more quotations and interpretations, but in dialectic.)

Further, suppose that the real meaning of the names could be scientifically established, and gave a philosophy not only consistent but true, yet the study of names cannot be, as Cratylus thinks, the only method of discovering truth, since the first name-giver must have known the truth independently of names. Or if the original giver of names was divinely inspired, so that the names which he gave are genuine reflections of the truth about things, yet the study of reality in itself and apart from names would be a nobler method of learning truth. And as in fact we do not know whether the names were rightly given, or which names are due to divine inspiration and which are not, and as it is impossible to define what their testimony really is, this nobler method is indeed

the only method of arriving at truth. (So, too, if the poets were wise men who expressed the truth about reality through myths and symbols, we ought to study the reality itself rather than the tales of the poets; for in this case the poets knew the truth before they devised its expression.<sup>1</sup> Or if they were not wise but divinely inspired, so that they reflected the truth in mythical language, yet there is a nobler method which, owing to the nature of inspiration, is the only method of learning truth.) Less noble methods, if by chance or providence they happened to succeed, would yield, not scientific knowledge of, but simply right opinion about, reality.

Plato's treatment of allegorism may, therefore, be summed up as follows. In what I have called its negative aspect—as a possible defence against his strictures on poetry—he dismisses it as incomplete and indeed irrelevant. In its positive aspect—as an alleged instrument for reaching truth—it succeeds better in obtruding itself upon his notice; for the Platonic method (dialectic and the inspiration born of assured knowledge) can brook no rival. The existence of 'undersenses' in the myths he neither affirms nor denies, though his account of inspiration favours the view that they may be present in some at least of the myths. If they exist, they are, at best, right opinion. But there is no scientific method of deciding what they are; dialectic may weigh opinions of the poets when ascertained; it cannot decide between rival interpretations. To waste time in ingenious guesses at the meaning of myths or other passages where the poets do not speak plainly, is unworthy of the serious philosopher. Even if the task of interpretation were less hopeless, it would be for him unfruitful; for the authority of the poets cannot free him from the obligation to think for himself. Opinions of the poets, and opinions of the interpreters as to what the poets meant—such may form topics suitable for men of small education and rustic intelligence, who have an exaggerated respect for the written word, and do not know the true way of learning or of teaching.<sup>2</sup> To such men the *καλὸς κἀγαθός* will gladly leave them; for his aim is not right opinion, nor is his method inspired conjecture. Yet he is at liberty to spice his argument, if and when he chooses, with plain-spoken words from the poets, or with 'undersenses' from the interpreters, though he will not guarantee the latter as correct interpretations; he will even venture to suggest possible interpretations himself, not, perhaps, seriously, but often with a serious meaning; if, however, he wants a really satisfactory allegory to illustrate his argument, he may bid farewell to such forms of amusement and write it himself. Thus Plotinus is thoroughly Platonic in his independent attitude towards mythology. Many explanations of the myths are possible; as there is full liberty of choice, he will, on occasion, set forth one which is useful as illustrating his own doctrine.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Seneca, *Epist.* 88, 5: 'demus illis Homerum philosophum fuisse; . . . ergo illa discamus quae Homerum fecere sapientem.'

<sup>2</sup> *Prot.* 347cd; *Phaedr.* 278a.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Enn.* IV. 3, 14, and T. Whittaker, *The Neoplatonists*, p. 98.

(To be continued.)



## NOTES ON *PROMETHEUS VINCTUS*.

### I. STRUCTURE OF THE PLAY.

It has often been pointed out that the story of the *Prometheus Vinctus*, which requires that the protagonist shall be present and motionless throughout the play, does not lend itself to dramatic effects of the more obvious kind. Yet it is dramatic: even the recent performance in Cambridge could not entirely conceal that. Although a great part of the play is expository, it is not static, it moves. This result is obtained in two ways: by the dramatic development in the character of the protagonist, and by the skilful manner in which we are made to look forward, with ever-increasing interest, to the future. Both these effects will become clearer if we pay attention to the structure of the play, which is designed to throw them into relief. If we were Greeks, we should be able to appreciate without conscious analysis; but since we are not, we must try to put ourselves in their position as far as we can by making ourselves familiar with the technique which the dramatist expected his audience to understand.

Read the play, and observe how the action advances. There are three marked pauses. The first comes at the end of the parodos (208)<sup>1</sup> with Prometheus' first prediction of future events, which carries us, by stages not yet revealed, to his ultimate reconciliation with his adversary; in particular, he alludes to his mysterious secret. The second comes at the end of the second episode (541), when he declines to reveal this same secret, which, he now declares, is the means by which his deliverance will be brought about. And the third comes at the end of the next episode (912), where he predicts the actual coming of his deliverer.

These pauses divide the play into four 'movements,' if I may borrow a term from what seems the closest analogy—music.<sup>2</sup> In the first movement, Prometheus is punished by Zeus; in the second, he relates the past history of the gods and of mankind; in the third, he predicts the future; in the fourth, his punishment is intensified.

Each of these movements has an internal unity of its own; each falls into three parts, except the third which falls into two such sets of three, while there is in each set of three a clear dramatic relation between the first and third parts, the second being in the nature of a central digression or development. Again, I use terms which musicians will readily understand. In the first movement, Prometheus is punished by his enemies: he delivers his magnificent soliloquy: and he is visited by his friends, the Ocean Nymphs. In the second, he relates the story of the war of the gods in heaven and his services to Zeus:

<sup>1</sup> References throughout are to Wecklein's edition.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. W. Headlam, *Camb. Praelections* (1906), pp. 111-12.

he is interrupted by the visit of Oceanus: he goes on to relate the story of his benefits to man. The third movement, as I have said, falls into two halves. In the first half, Io appears and Prometheus agrees to predict her future: then, at the request of the Nymphs, Io tells the story of her past: and finally, Prometheus predicts her wanderings as far as the borders of Asia. In the second half, he continues his prophecy as far as her destination in Egypt: then he reverts to her past (thus completing her own story) in order to prove his veracity: finally, he predicts her ultimate fate and the coming of his own deliverer. In the fourth movement he alludes once more, but this time more explicitly and more defiantly, to the secret which, he declares, will bring about his enemy's downfall: the emissary of Zeus appears and in vain seeks to extort from him that secret: and Prometheus is cast into Tartarus.<sup>1</sup>

Now turn to the choral odes—integral links in this dramatic development. In the parodos the Oceanids offer Prometheus the sympathy of the gods (169-70): Prometheus goes on to recount his services to the gods. In the first stasimon the Nymphs sing of the compassion of mankind: Prometheus relates his services to humanity. In the second stasimon they sing of the helplessness of man, and end with the thought of marriage: Io appears, the helpless mortal persecuted by a brutal suitor (765-6). In their third stasimon they sing of wisdom; and this, too, has its importance for the final movement of the play, when the Nymphs join with Hermes in appealing to the sufferer to follow the course of wisdom (1043-5, 1065-7, 1067-71).

Thus, the main subject of the first movement is the binding of Prometheus—the present; of the second, the history of gods and man—the past; of the third, the future of Io and the coming of Heracles—the future; of the fourth, the increase of the penalty—the present. The fourth movement balances the first; and this connexion is driven home by verbal echoes (cf. 976-8 with 7-8, 62, 82-3). But notice the difference: in the first movement Prometheus received the insults of Might in silence; in the last he himself assails Hermes with insults. He has abandoned his restraint, *σωφροσύνη*; he is guilty of *ὑβρις*. Yet we cannot withdraw our sympathy; for is not this reckless defiance his reaction to the wanton cruelty of Zeus manifested in the spectacle of Io? The two feelings in our minds conflict, producing a dramatic tension.

Now look back once again, and see with what consummate skill, throughout the play, these three themes of present, past, and future are combined, and how eagerly we are made to look to the future. The opening speech of Might is arranged thus: present, past, future; and the form is defined in the words: *πατήρ . . . τόνδε τὸν λέωργον . . . Διός*. The speech of Hephaestus which follows develops this arrangement: present, future, past, future: *Διός . . . συγγενὴ θεόν . . . πατρός . . . τῆς ὀρθοβούλου Θεμίδος αἰπνυμήτα παῖ . . . Διός*. Observe how the identity of the prisoner grows clearer with each reference. Presently Hephaestus will throw down his tools with the cry: *αἰαῖ Προμηθεῦ, σὼν ὑπερ στένω πόνων*. And the answer of Might will come at the

<sup>1</sup> In dramatic fulfilment of his own wish (161-4).

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end of the scene (*ψευδωνύμως σε δαίμονες Προμηθέα καλοῦσιν*)<sup>1</sup> when our attention is turned once more to the future: *ὅτ' ἄν τ' ἴδῃς ἐκκυλισθήσῃ τέχνης*. This parting taunt, again, is answered in the still greater climax at the end of the parodos, when Prometheus, speaking of his secret, permits us to see further into the future than at any time hitherto. We expected a return to the future, but the dramatist has overtrumped our expectation.

We are brought back abruptly to the past, as the Nymphs eagerly cry (209):

πάντ' ἐκκάλυφον καὶ γέγων' ἡμῖν λόγον . . .

Mark those two words *ἐκκάλυφον* and *γέγωνε*: both are important. Prometheus reluctantly complies, and begins his great revelation. At the end of the scene, shocked by his audacity, the Nymphs wish to change the subject, but now Prometheus insists on continuing: *τὰς προσερπούσας τύχας ἀκούσασθ'*, *ὥς μάθῃτε διὰ τέλους τὸ πᾶν*, and the Nymphs reply: *τοὺς σοὺς δὲ πόνοὺς χρήξω διὰ παντὸς ἀκούσαι*. Then comes the interlude—the visit of Oceanus. When he has gone the exposition is resumed. Now turn to the end of the movement and note how it balances the beginning—how the similarity in form drives home the dramatic effect. The Oceanids are eagerly questioning Prometheus about the nature of that secret to which he alluded at the end of the first movement. Prometheus declines to reply (538-40):

ἄλλου λόγου μέμνησθε, τόνδε δ' οὐδαμῶς  
καιρὸς γεγωνεῖν, ἀλλὰ συγκαλυπτέος  
ὅσον μάλιστα . . .

Aeschylus has not yet done with that word *γεγωνεῖν*: in this play it is a 'key-word' or recurrent motive, just as *οἴχεσθαι* is a key-word in the *Persae* (1, 13, 61, 181, 255, 918), just as the idea of *καιρὸς* or *Δίκη* is a recurrent motive in the *Septem*, and the idea of dreams in the *Oresteia*. With it go those corresponding words, *μαθεῖν*, *πάντα*, *χρήζειν*, which are made significant by constant reiteration:

- 636 λέξω τορῶς σοι πᾶν ὅπερ χρήξεις μαθεῖν.  
654 τί δῆτα μέλλεις μὴ οὐ γεγωνίσκειν τὸ πᾶν;  
667-9 οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ὑμῖν ἀπιστῆσαί με χρή,  
σαφεὶ δὲ μύθῳ πᾶν ὅπερ προσχρήζετε  
πεύσεσθε.  
723 ἐπίσχες ἔστ' ἂν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ προσμάθῃς.  
726-9 τὴν πρίν γε χρεῖαν ἡνύσασθ' ἐμοῦ πάρα  
κουφῶς· μαθεῖν γὰρ πρῶτα τῆσδ' ἐχρήζετε . . .  
τὰ λοιπὰ νῦν ἀκούσασθ' . . .  
810 καὶ τῇδε μὲν γέγωνε τὴν λοιπὴν πλάνην,  
ἐμοὶ δὲ τὸν λύσοντα . . .

<sup>1</sup> This artistic arrangement of proper names and significant words is maintained throughout the play. I quote two further examples: (1) 542-80 *Ζεὺς—Ὠκεανοῦ—Ζῆνα—Προμηθεῖ—Διὶ*

—*Προμηθεῖ—Ἥσιον*; (2) 662 *Ἰοῖ—721 Ἰοῖ*  
731 *Ἰναχεῖον σπέρμα—765 ὁ κόρη, 814 Ἰοῖ—841 Ἰοῖ*  
Cf. J. T. Sheppard in *Cambr. Univ. Reporter*,  
Vol. LIX., pp. 430-1.

811 ἐπεὶ προθυμείσθ', οὐκ ἐναντιώσομαι  
τὸ μὴ οὐ γεγωνεῖν πᾶν ὅσον προσχρῆζετε.

And finally, in the last movement:

1021-3 οὐκ ἔστιν αἴκισμ' οὐδὲ μηχανήμ' ὅτῳ  
προτρέψεται με Ζεὺς γεγωνήσαι τάδε,  
πρὶν ἂν χαλασθῇ δεσμὰ λυμαντήρια.

That, for the first play of the trilogy, is conclusive; but clearly this theme of the revelation, at first withheld, but finally granted, does not end there; it was continued in the lost *Λυόμενος* up to the great moment when Prometheus finally consented to reveal the secret which threatened the supremacy of his enemy and barred the way to his own release.

Thus, to return, the opening speeches both of Might and of Hephaestus end with our attention turned to the future; and in this respect anticipate the close of the binding scene as a whole, which ends in the same way. And this, again, prepares us for the great climax at the end of the first movement, the last speech of the parodos. The second movement brings us back to the past, but at the end of the first of its three parts (273-99) and again at the end of the third (523-41) our eyes are once more fixed upon the future. Then comes the Io scene, divided into two and arranged so as to throw the future into still greater prominence: future—past—future; future—past—future. Hence the tremendous effect, like a goal to which the whole exposition has been moving, of the prophecy of the coming of Heracles (897-9); and this climax, again, is capped, at the opening of the last movement (939-59), by the climax of that other motive, the fatal secret, which has been anticipated at the end of the first movement, and again at the end of the second.

This is composition on the grand scale—organic artistry of the kind which musicians love to study and enjoy in Beethoven or Mozart. Like a musical critic, I have temporarily divested the bones of the vital flesh in order to reveal the anatomy. But to enjoy the play, we must make ourselves familiar with the dramatist's methods and then read the play again.

Once we have understood the design of the first play, the design of the second becomes fairly clear. It is likely, for example, that the wanderings of Io in the eastern and southern regions of the world were balanced by the wanderings of Heracles in the west and north<sup>1</sup>—in the course of the trilogy our imaginations are borne on the wings of poetry over the face of the entire earth; and we suspect that the prophecy of the birth of Heracles is only a prelude to the prophecy of his deification.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, the silence of Prometheus at the beginning of the first play is balanced by his silence at the beginning of the second. What is he thinking? We have the answer in the speech translated by Cicero,<sup>3</sup> a speech as notable for the speaker's absorption

<sup>1</sup> Christ-Schmid II., p. 280, n.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Hygin. *Post. Astr.* II. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* II. 10.

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in physical agony as his speeches in the first play are notable for his indifference to it. Further, the daughters of Ocean, the Chorus of the first play, have their counterpart in the Sons of Earth, the Chorus of the second; while the visit of the God of Ocean seems to have anticipated the visit, in the second play, of the Goddess of Earth—the mother of Prometheus—and the last in the long train of compassionate kinsmen who have come to visit him in his distress, who at last prevails on him to seek reconciliation with his ancient adversary. In the course of ages Zeus, as well as Prometheus, learns wisdom; and hence their reconciliation is profoundly significant and satisfactory. But this part of the subject requires to be reinforced by evidence of another kind, and must wait to be dealt with in another paper.

## II. THE SITUATION.

The scene of the play is a mountain (4-5) in Scythia (2), and we learn from a fragment of the *Λνόμενος* (Cic. *Tusc.* II. 28 *saxa Caucasi*) that this mountain is the Caucasus: cf. Arg. II. ἡ μὲν σκηνὴ τοῦ δράματος ὑπόκειται ἐν Σκυθίᾳ ἐπὶ τὸ Καυκάσιον ὄρος. The sea, which is visible from it (89-90), if it requires a definite location, is either Ocean itself (cf. Strabo XI. 2 οὕτω δὲ διακειμένων τὸ πρῶτον μέρος οἰκοῦσιν ἐκ μὲν τῶν πρὸς ἄρκτον μερῶν καὶ τὸν Ὠκεανὸν Σκυθῶν τινὲς νομάδες καὶ ἀμάξοικοι) or the Caspian: cf. Hdt. I. 203, 1 καὶ τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἐσπέρην φέροντα τῆς θαλάσσης ταύτης (sc. τῆς Κασπίης) ὁ Καύκασος παρατείνει, ἐὼν ὀρέων καὶ πλήθει μέγιστον καὶ μεγάλῃ ὑψηλότατον. In thus placing his scene on Mount Caucasus in Scythia Aeschylus is at one with the accepted tradition: Apollod. I. vii. 1 ὡς δὲ ἦσθετο ὁ Ζεὺς, ἐπέταξεν Ἡφαίστῳ τῷ Καυκάσου ὄρει τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ Προμηθέως) προσηλωσάι· τοῦτο δὲ Σκυθικὸν ὄρος ἐστίν. *Ibid.* V. 2 καὶ περαιωθεὶς (sc. ὁ Ἡρακλῆς) ἐπὶ τὴν ἡπειρον τὴν ἄντικρυ κατετόξευσεν ἐπὶ τοῦ Καυκάσου τὸν ἐσθίοντα τοῦ Προμηθέως ἡπαρ ἀετόν, Lucian *Prom.* 4 ἀνεσταυρώσθαι με πλησίον τῶν Κασπίων τούτων πυλῶν οἰκτιστον θέαμα πᾶσι Σκύθαις: see also Apoll. Rh. II. 1247-50, Lucian *de sacr.* 6, Strabo XI. 5, Philodemus *de piet.* 30 g, Philostr. *vit. Apoll.* II. 3, Hyginus *fab.* 54. This body of evidence is amply sufficient to outweigh the statement of the Scholiast at v. 11 (ιστέον ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὸν κοινὸν λόγον ἐν Καυκάσῳ φησὶ δεδέσθαι τὸν Προμηθέα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῖς Εὐρωπαϊαῖς τέρμασι τοῦ Ὠκεανοῦ, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς τὴν Ἰὼ λεγομένων ἔστι συμβαλεῖν, which is a mistaken inference from 744-7, where Io is told that, after leaving the Scythians and Chalybians, she will come to the summit of Mount Caucasus: but, since we know from Herodotus (*loc. cit.*) that the Caucasus was thought to be the most extensive mountain in the world, there is no difficulty in supposing that Io left it at one point to return to it at another. There is therefore no justification for F. D. Allen's view (*Amer. Journal Philol.* XIII. p. 51 sq.) that Cicero's *saxa Caucasi* is a mistranslation, or for Wecklein's (ed. 2, 1898, pp. 22-23), followed by Mazon (I. p. 161 n.), that the scene of the two plays is not the same.

## III. THE PARODOS.

The daughters of the Ocean have overheard the blows of Hephaestus' hammer from the sea-caves in which they live (not far away, cf. Strabo XI. 8, quoted above); hastily coaxing their reluctant father's consent, they have rushed out, not even staying to put shoes on their feet, and on the way, in their eagerness to reach Prometheus, they have a race 'to see who will get there first.' How do they enter the orchestra—in a chariot, as 140 ὄχῳ πτερωτῷ and 295 θᾶκον κραιπνόσυντον have been thought to imply, or pretending to fly in the dance, as 125-8 and 132 seem to me to suggest? The rhythm of this parodos is not anapaestic but lyrical, as in the *Electra* of Sophocles, in the *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, *Septem c. Thebas*, *Choephoroe*, *Eumenides*, *Oedipus Coloneus*, *Hercules Furens*, and *Orestes*. In the first two of these plays the Chorus have probably taken up their positions during the latter part of the prologue, and now sing their first words as a stasimon. In the remaining six, however, that explanation is not possible, and we notice that in all these their mode of progression is not walking (as in anapaestic *παρόδοι*) but in each case peculiar: the rush of panic-stricken women, Trojan captives dancing a dirge, the awaking Furies, halting old men, girls stepping on tip-toe for fear of arousing the sleeping Orestes. It is clear, therefore, that the function of the lyrical parodos was to accompany some sort of dance, for Greek dancers διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἡθῆ καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις (Arist. *Poet.* 8): cf. Lucian *de salt.* 36 μιμητικὴ τίς ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη (sc. ἡ ὀρχήσις) καὶ δεικτικὴ καὶ τῶν ἐννοηθέντων ἀγορευτικὴ καὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν σαφηνιστικὴ. And we happen to know that there was a recognized dance to represent the halting gait of old men: Pollux, IV. 104, οἱ δὲ ὑπογύπωνες γερόντων ἐπὶ βακτηρίαις τὴν μίμησιν εἶχον (cf. Eur. *H.F.* 107-9 ὑπόροφα μέλαθρα καὶ γεραῖα δέμνι', ἀμφὶ βάκτροις ἔρεισμα θέμενος ἐστάλην). The parodos of the *Prometheus* is probably to be explained in the same way: it cannot be regarded as a stasimon sung *after* the Chorus have taken up their positions (Haigh, *Attic Theatre*, p. 302, who makes the same mistake about the *Orestes*), because they cannot appear before the end of Prometheus' soliloquy, while the close connexion between 129 (πᾶν μοι φοβερόν τὸ προσέρπον) and 130 (μηδὲν φοβηθῆς) does not allow of a pause. Christ-Schmid (II. p. 297), arguing from vase-paintings, suggest that each Oceanid is mounted on a wooden sea-horse: see Reinach, *Répertoire des vases peints*, I. 21, 54, 112, 188, II. 89, and cf. Ps.-Arion fr. Bergk III. p. 80 δελφῖνες ἔναλα θρέμματα κουρᾶν Νηρεΐδων θεᾶν, Nonn. *D.* I. 72-3 ὥς δ' ὅτε Νηρεΐδων τις ὑπερκύψασα θαλάσσης ἐξομένη δελφῖνι χυτὴν ἀνέκοπτε γαλήνην. But surely, in view of the symbolical character of Greek dancing, one of the recognized functions of which was to make manifest the invisible (cf. Lucian, *loc. cit.*, Athen. 22 sq. φανερά ποιῆσαι τὰ πράγματα δι' ὀρχήσεως), it is more likely that these sea-horses were merely symbolized in the dance: in other words, the Chorus performed a dance conventionally associated with the flight of sea-nymphs on their winged sea-horses. In that case, 295 κραιπνόσυντον θᾶκον will refer not to a chariot but to the

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animal's back, 140 ὄχῳ πτερωτῷ to the animal itself. The Schol. took ὄχῳ metaphorically: ὄχῳ, ἄρματι· πτερωτῷ, τοῖς πτεροῖς· ὄχημα γὰρ ἦν αὐτοῖς τὰ πτερά, ὥσπερ οἱ ἵπποι τοῖς ἵππευσιν: and cf. the paraphrase of a lost poem by Alcaeus in Himerius *Or.* XIV. 19 (Bergk III. p. 147) ὅτε Ἀπόλλων ἐγένετο, κοσμήσας αὐτὸν ὁ Ζεὺς, δούς δὲ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἄρμα ἐλαύνειν, κύκνοι δὲ ἦσαν τὸ ἄρμα, and the epigram on the monument, representing a man mounted on a dolphin, which commemorated Arion's landing at Taenarum (Bergk III. p. 80) ἀθανάτων πομπαῖσιν Ἀρίονα Κύκλονος υἱὸν ἐκ Σικέλου πελάγους σῶσεν ὄχημα τόδε. The rhythm of 130-50 is probably designed to suggest flight: see my *Greek Lyric Metre*, pp. 30-31. If this interpretation of the parodos is right, it removes the only real difficulty in the *Prometheus*, which F. Bethe's monstrous theory that the play is largely post-Aeschylean (*Proleg. zu Geschichte des Theaters im Altertum*, pp. 159-83) was invented to explain. Thus, after the static severity of the prologue, our eyes and ears are relieved by a sudden access of dance and song: the corresponding release of the emotional tension is similar to that produced by the beautiful interlude in *Il.* XVIII. 35-67, where, at the turning-point of the whole epic, with Achilles groaning in the dust, our imaginations are transported to the caves of Thetis and her Nereids beneath the sea.

#### IV. ORPHIC INFLUENCE.

This subject has been discussed by Miss J. R. Bacon in *C.R.* Vol. XLII. pp. 115-20. To the comparison of 24 ἡ ποικιλείμων Νύξ with Orph. *Argon.* 1026 ἀστροχίτων Νύξ, I would add Eur. *Ion* 1150 μελάμπεπλος Νύξ, Nonn. *D.* I. 66 συναλέη Νύξ οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντι διεχλαίνωσε χιτῶνι, and would point out that the image underlying all these passages is clearly related to an Orphic allegory attributed to Pherecydes by Clement of Alexandria: *Strom.* III. 68 ἡ ὑπόπτερος δρῦς (i.e. the earth) καὶ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτῇ πεποικιλμένον φᾶρος (i.e. the stars), πάντα ὅσα Φερεκύδης ἀλληγορήσας ἐθεολόγησεν, *ibid.* VI. 130, and Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, I. p. 86.

Two other points of contact with Orphic literature deserve mention.

(1) The character of Oceanus in this play is that of the trimmer, ἡσυχαστής: he urges Prometheus to follow the line of least resistance and yield to the world's new master. This is in keeping with the light in which he is presented in an Orphic fragment quoted by Proclus in *Plat. Timaeum* V. 296a (Abel, p. 191): ἐνθ' οὖν Ὠκεανὸς μὲν ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἔμιμνεν | ὀρμαίνων ποτέρωσε νόον τράποι, ἡ πατέρα δν | γυμνώσῃ τε βίῃ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα λωβήσαιο | ξὺν Κρόνῳ ἢ δ' ἄλλοισιν ἀδελφοῖς οἱ πεπίθοντο | μητρὶ φίλῃ, ἡ τοὺς γε λιπὼν μένοι ἐνδον ἔκκηλος· | πολλὰ δὲ πορφύρων μένει ἡμενος ἐν μεγάροισι | σκυζόμενος ἢ μητρὶ κασιγνήτοισί τε μᾶλλον.

(2) 463 sq. with this account of the condition of primitive man cf. *Orph. fr.* Abel, p. 182, θήρες τ' οἰωνοὶ τε βροτῶν τ' ἀλιτήρια φῦλα, | ἄχθεα γῆς, εἶδωλα τετυγμένα, μηδαμὰ μηδὲν | εἰδότες, οὔτε κακοῖο προσερχόμενοι νοῆσαι | φράδμονες, οὔτ' ἀπόθεν μάλ' ἀποστρέφαι κακότητος | ἱδρῖες, ἀλλὰ μάτην ἀδαήμονες ἀπρονόητοι. This view of human evolution, which Aeschylus expounds here in mythological

symbolism, was perhaps not particularly Orphic, but traditional: cf. Hippocr. *M.A.* III. τὰ δὲ νῦν διαιτήματα εὐρημένα καὶ τετεχνημένα ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γεγενῆσθαι μοι δοκέει; Diod. Sic. I. 8 τοὺς οὖν πρώτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μηδενὸς τῶν πρὸς βίον χρησίμων εὐρημένου, ἐπιπόνως διάγειν, γυμνοὺς μὲν ἐσθῆτος ὄντας, οἰκήσεως δὲ καὶ πυρὸς ἀθεεῖς . . . ἐκ δὲ τούτου κατ' ὀλίγον ὑπὸ τῆς πείρας διδασκομένους, εἷς τε τὰ σπήλαια καταφεύγειν ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι καὶ τῶν καρπῶν τοὺς φυλάττεσθαι δυναμένους ἀποτίθεσθαι· γνωσθέντος δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν χρησίμων κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ τὰς τέχνας εὐρεθῆναι, Lucian *Amor.* 34 οὐκ ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν εὐθὺς τοῦ βίου σκέπης δεηθέντες ἄνθρωποι νάκη, θηρία δείραντες, ἡμφιέσαντο; καὶ σπήλυγγας ὀρῶν κρύους καταδύσεις ἐπενόησαν . . . τὴν δὲ ἀπὸ τούτων μίμησιν ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον αἰεὶ μετάγοντες ὕφηναν μὲν ἑαυτοῖς χλανίδας, οἴκους δὲ ᾠκίσαντο. With 475-6 ἀριθμόν, ἔξοχον σοφισμάτων, cf. Iambl. *vit. Pythag.* 17 τί τὸ σοφώτατον; ἀριθμός. The Pythagoreans paid special attention to memory-training: *ibid.* 29 ἐπὶ πλέον ἐπειρῶντο τὴν μνήμην γυμνάζειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μείζον πρὸς ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐμπειρίαν τοῦ μνημονεύειν.

## V. 441-6.

These verses are corrupt, but there is no reason why we should regard them as spurious (Badham, followed by Wilamowitz and Mazon). The repetition of the Atlas motive is characteristically Aeschylean, and it is important for the sequel, because it is from Atlas that Heracles will get the apples of the Hesperides, in accordance with the instructions given him by Prometheus (Apollod. II. 5. 11). The corruption lies in 444-6: (1) the words ὑπέροχον σθένος, as the text stands, seem to be the object of the verb, but clearly they ought to qualify it, cf. Orph. *fr.* 1 (Abel) Ἀτλαντὸς τε καὶ Αἰῶνος μέγ' ὑπέροχον ἰσχύν; (2) τε is then superfluous; (3) ὑποστενάζει cannot mean μετὰ στεναγμοῦ φέρει (Schol.), nor can ἔχων be understood (λείπει ἔχων Schol.). Hermann proposed ὑποστεγάζει, cf. Aesch. *fr.* 312 αἱ δ' ἐπὶ Ἀτλαντος παῖδες ὠνομασμέναι | πατρὸς μέγιστον ἄθλον οὐρανοστεγῇ κλαίεσκον. στέγειν (to support a weight from beneath) is plainly the right word; but it is a pity to expel the idea of στένειν, which is the keynote of the ode (413 στένω, 422 στονέω, 425 στένουσι, 429 μεγαλοστόνοισι, 448 στένει, 451 στένουσι), just as οἶκτος is the keynote of the Cassandra scene in the *Agamemnon* (1053, 1220, 1240, 1285, 1320, 1329). Perhaps we should read: Ἀτλανθ' ὃς αἰὲν ὑπέροχ' σθένει κραταιὸν οὐρανοῦ πόλον στέγων νότοις ὑποστενάζει. For the rhythm of the last three words (dochmiac, see *Greek Lyric Metre*, p. 133), cf. Aesch. *Supp.* 547 παλαιὸν δ' εἰς ἔχνος μετέσταν, *Agam.* 379 Διὸς πλαγὰν ἔχουσιν, εἰπεῖν; 387 πνεόντων μείζον ἢ δικαίως, etc. With 441 μόνον δὴ πρόσθεν cf. Eur. *Med.* 1271 μίαν δὴ κλύω, μίαν τῶν πάρος, Bacchyl. V. 156 μῶνον δὴ τότε.

V. 532. Cf. *Il.* XIX. 86-7 ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἰτιός εἰμι, ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἡερόφοιτις Ἑρινύς. Zeus, says Prometheus, is weaker than the Fates: cf. Pind. *Paeon* VI. μορσίμ' ἀναλύει Ζεὺς ὁ θεῶν σκόπος οὐ τολμᾷ; Simon. 5, 21 ἀνάγκα δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται; Hdt. I. 91 τὴν πεπρωμένην μοῖραν ἀδύνατά ἐστι ἀποφυγεῖν καὶ θεῶ. Similarly, in *Il.* XV. 187-93, Zeus dares not transgress the decree



of the Fates. The idea of an omnipotent God does not seem to have crystallized till later, cf. Xenophanes, *fr.* 3, Aesch. *Supp.* 102-10, 598-607; Iambl. *vit. Pythag.* 109 οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τὰ μὲν δύνата τοῖς θεοῖς τὰ δὲ ἀδύνата ὥσπερ οἶσθαι τοὺς σοφίζομένους ἀλλὰ πάντα δύνата . . . ῥᾶδια πάντα θεῶν τελέσαι καὶ ἀνήνυτον οὐδέν. Aeschylus reconciled the later with the earlier doctrine by means of his theory of a progressive Zeus who, at first at variance, eventually became reconciled, with the Fates: that is one of the lessons of the Oresteia (cf. *Eum.* 1046-7 Ζεὺς ὁ πανόπτας οὕτω Μοῖρά τε συγκατέβα, and hence Mel. *fr. adesph.* 5 (Diehl) κλῦτε, Μοῖραι Διὸς αἵτε παρὰ θρόνον ἀγχοτάτω θεῶν ἐξόμεναι περὶ ὧσι' ἄφυκτά τε μῆδεα παντοδαπῶν βουλῶν ἀδαμαντίνοισιν ὑφαίνετε κέρκισιν, implying that the will of the Fates is at one with the will of Zeus). The same lesson seems to have been inculcated in the Prometheia. At the early period of his reign described in the first play, the will of Zeus is weaker than that of the Fates—Prometheus is fated not to die, and Zeus cannot kill him even if he would (779, cf. 1086). In the *Λυόμενος*, however, it is the will of Zeus which keeps Prometheus alive despite his own desire: Cic. *Tusc.* II. 10, v. 24 *sed longe a leto numine aspellor Iovis*. The implication is that the two wills have since become identical. The Furies are associated with the Fates in 532 because what the Fates decree the Furies carry into effect: Schol. (reference lost) *Parcae autem fata decernunt, Furiae exsequuntur* (cf. Hermias in *Plat. Phaedr.* 24b, p. 148 διαφέρει δὲ (sc. ἡ Ἀδράστεια) τῆς . . . Δίκης ὡς νομοθετικῆ τῆς δικαστικῆς). So Heracl. *fr.* 94 (Diels) "Ἡλῖος γὰρ οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα, εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσιν. That is why it is the Furies who silence the horse of Achilles when it has said all that is fated to say (*Il.* XIX. 418), and no doubt it is because of this association that, in an Orphic fragment (Abel, p. 94) the Fates and Furies are regarded as identical.

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### SOPHOCLEA III.

O.T. 463 sq.

τίς ὄντιν' ἂ θεοπέπει-  
α Δελφίς εἶπε πέτρα.

BRUHN followed Zielinski (*Philol.* LV. 523) in adopting εἶδε from Γ, and used the variant together with others as establishing the value of Γ as an independent source. We have already seen reason for refusing to attach much importance to the authority of this MS. (384), but it should be observed that both readings are recognized by Σ, and the question between εἶπε and εἶδε must be settled on its merits. Γ itself has πε written over the last syllable of εἶδε, and Zenodotus read εἶπη for εἶδη in Hom. O 207. Zielinski thinks that Eur. *Andr.* 998 τελουμένων δὲ Δελφίς εἴσεται πέτρα is an echo of this passage, but the inference is by no means certain. It may be that the original text of Trin (εἰπέτρα) points to the true solution, that πε fell out by haplography, and the isolated εἶ became εἶδε or ἦδε.

O.T. 525

πρὸς τοῦ δ' ἐφάνθη ταῖς ἐμαῖς γνώμαις ὅτι  
πεισθεὶς ὁ μάντις τοὺς λόγους ψευδεὶς λέγοι;

I have no hesitation in returning to the vulgate in 525 as written above, notwithstanding the authority of Bruhn and Jebb to the contrary, who prefer LbΓ. Neither MS. deserves so much deference, and in itself πρὸς τοῦ is infinitely superior. Consider the situation. Creon enters astounded. There is no question in his mind that the odious charge has been made. What stirs him is—why? (525). Did Oedipus really mean it? (528). But τοῦτος spoils everything. Observe that if introduced it would necessarily from its position bear a very strong emphasis, but in fact, as everyone can see for himself, it is quite unemphatic. There are certain subsidiary matters: (1) We must not accept τοῦ πρὸς (see cr. n.), since there is no justification for such an anastrophe. The dislocation of the order arose from the writing of τοῦ above the line to show that the text was not πρὸς τοῦδ'. (2) It is assumed by the advocates of τοῦτος that there was an accidental insertion of ρ, for which Herwerden referred to Aesch. *Pr.* 49, but it is just as likely that the letter was accidentally omitted: cf. *Ai.* 704, 900, 926. (3) τοῦ is neuter, not masculine, and means 'wherefore': cf. *infr.* 1236 πρὸς τίνος ποτ' αἰτίας. Blaydes well remarks that Creon could not ask *who* had slandered him, for he knew it was Oedipus (514). But the reason for such a proceeding was altogether inexplicable.

O.T. 579

ἄρχεις δ' ἐκείνη ταῦτ' ἂν γῆς ἴσον νέμων;

Why does Jebb say 'γῆς ἴσον νέμων would mean "assigning an equal share of land"? See rather *Phil.* 393 ἂ τὸν μέγαν Πакτωλὸν εὐχρηστον νέμεις. *Ai.* 1016 ὡς τὰ σὰ κράτη θανόντος καὶ δόμους νέμοιμι σοῦς. Also I incline to think that O.C. 879 τάνδ' ἄρ' οὐκέτι νεμῶ πόλιν means 'then am I no longer a free Athenian.' Moreover, what authority can be found for νέμειν = κρατεῖν in the phrase ἴσον νέμων taken alone? On the other hand for the adverbial ἐκείνη ταῦτ' we have an exact parallel in *Ai.* 687 ταῦτ' αὖτ' ἐμὸι τάδε τιμᾶτε.

O.T. 598

τὸ γὰρ τυχεῖν αὐτοῖσι πᾶν ἐνταῦθ' ἐνι.

Such is the vulgate reading which is retained in default of anything better. αἰτοῦσι, or even αἰτοῦντα, is perhaps worth consideration. So far as we know αὐτοῖσι

is given by Γ alone. πᾶν is not in Lb as asserted by Campbell and Jebb, but quoted from Γ and Lc. As between αὐτοῖς and αὐτοῦς there is nothing to choose, and whether Sophocles would have lengthened the second  $\alpha$  of  $\alpha\pi\alpha\nu$  we cannot tell.

O.T. 622 sqq. This passage does not seem to me to be nearly so difficult as has been supposed in recent times; and I regret to add that I cannot agree with any part of Jebb's interpretation as declared in his note and Appendix. He arbitrarily assumes as 'beyond question' that 624 belongs to Oedipus and 625 to Creon. It is impossible to admit these assumptions or either of them. Without going into all the details let me call attention to two of his arguments: (1) He desires to prove that προδείξῃς means to show forth, and labours (quite needlessly) to establish that the simple verb would be appropriate to the context. But when he goes on to add that 'it is a mere accident that προδείκνυμι does not elsewhere occur as = to show forth,' we are obliged to demur. (2) Holding rightly that if spoken by Oedipus πιστεύων must mean 'obey me,' he refuses to accept this solution on the ground that the only instances of πιστεύειν in this sense are *Trach.* 1228 and 1251. But what better example of Sophoclean usage did he desire than the words of the poet himself? (3) In order to reach a satisfactory solution, J. is obliged to alter ὅταν to ὡς ἄν, to give 624 to Oedipus and 625 to Creon and to assume the loss of a line after 625. Let us see if it is not possible to arrive at a reasonable sense without such violent measures. The only assumption required is that after φθονεῖν Oedipus impatiently interrupts. In answer to the king's θνήσκειν σε βούλομαι Creon endeavours to make his defence: 'only let me know first wherein my envy lies' . . . he would have gone on 'and then I am ready to obey' or with some such continuation. The reference, as some critics have seen, is to 382, where Oedipus opens his indictment with a charge of treasonable envy against Creon. This had been reported to Creon (513), and the whole of his defence is made to rest on the absurdity of accusing him of φθόνος (584 sqq.). But Oedipus will not heed him: 'this is no yielding or compliant mood.' It might be possible to escape from the break by accepting Blaydes's προδείξῃς γ', but there is a certain awkwardness in supplying 'you may wish,' which is the smallest possible amplification. Professor Phillimore in *C.R.* XVI. 338 offers a somewhat similar defence of the MS. reading.

O.T. 656 sq.

τὸν ἐναγῇ φίλον μήποτ' ἐν αἰτίῃ  
σὺν ἀφανεί λόγῳ ἄτιμον ἐκβαλεῖν.

So the preponderance of the MSS., which obviously requires some alteration. I should have thought λόγων certain, but Campbell defends the hiatus after a dochmiac by *Ant.* 1319, which is itself corrupt. Apart from this, I have adopted Elmsley's μηδέποτ' for μήποτ' ἐν and Blaydes's σ' ἐν for σὺν, neither of which is violent in the circumstances. Another possibility is Nauck's μήποτέ σ' . . . λόγων, but ἐν seems to be wanted somewhere. It seems impossible to draw any sound inference from Σ, which strangely shows no trace either of σὺν or on the other hand of σί. It might be thought that the μὴ ποιήσης of Σ points to Musgrave's σί γ', which would of course be the easiest remedy of all, unless σί γ' is preferred. But the imperative use does not fit the context, and the subordination of the infinitive to χρήζω might account for the schol.'s δέμεθα. Of course σὺν and ἐν are readily confused (fr. 679). In *Trach.* 940 we should probably read 'μβάλοι. Here ἐκβαλεῖν has been confused with ἐμβαλεῖν (μ and κ are easily interchangeable), and that in its turn was I suppose a gloss on βαλεῖν.

O.T. 665 sqq. The words are not difficult and the general sense is clear, but it is not easy to fit the requirements of the antistrophe. The metre is quite simple, and we require three iambic trimeters distributed as follows :

— 0 — — 0 — — 0 — —  
 0 — — — 0 — — 0 — 0 — —  
 0 — — — 0 — — 0 — —

There is no room for a trochaic metre to close 665 (γά φθίνουσα), and since the antistrophe has a cretic (ἐν πόνοις) we should not bolster up a correspondence by adopting Bergk's ἐν πόνοισιν, but rather let the last syllable of φθίνου- σα run on to 666 (σα τρύχει corresponding to 695 σαλεύου-). This, however, leaves ψυχὰν καὶ τὰδ' εἰ answering to -σαν κατ' ὀρθ-, and it becomes probable that ψυχὰν has displaced the lost object of τρύχει (I suggest λῆμα<sup>1</sup>). For the disappearance cf. 891, where Ven has ματάων ψυχῇ (sic), and for λῆμα Wilamowitz on *Her.* 1416, Kaibel's *Electra*, p. 291. The vulgate, following the unmetrical γῇ φθίνουσα or Dindorf's objectionable γῇ φθινάς, has τρύχει ψυχὰν τὰδ' (or τὰ δ') εἰ κακοῖς κακά. προσάψει is commonly, and I think rightly, taken to be intransitive, although Elmsley, quoting *Eur. Her.* 1212, regards it as transitive, with γὰ as subject. That being so, surely καί, which Hermann deleted for metrical reasons, is indispensable in order to couple the clauses γὰ φθίνουσα and εἰ προσάψει. For similar combinations they quote *Ar. Ach.* 338 λέγ' ὃ τι σοι δοκεῖ τὸν τε Λακεδαιμόνιον ὁποῖω τρόπῳ σοῦσσι φίλον. *Vesp.* 612 τοῦτοιςιν ἐγὼ γάννμαι κεί μὴ με δείσει εἰς σέ βλέπει.

O.T. 685

γὰς προνοομένην.

It is strange that this reading, which we know now to have in its favour the respectable authority of M and Ven, has attracted so little attention. To me it appears undoubtedly right, and to have the way prepared for it by the introductory ἔμοιγε. It is worth observing that προνοομένην was conjectured by Margoliouth (*Studia Scenica*, p. 27), and independently so long ago as in 1859 by Blaydes. προνοου- would easily pass to προπονου- (cf. πόνοις 694), and προπονομένης, the best established text, is due to the assimilation of terminations.

It is difficult to agree with Jebb's treatment of the antistrophic 689-697: (1) εἰ σ' ἐνοσφίζομαι was introduced on the false assumption that πεφάνθαι μ' ἂν was the oblique form of πεφασμένος ἂν ἦν, whereas Whitelaw was undoubtedly right in pointing out that it represented πεφασμένος ἂν εἶην. Jebb's dictum that this construction gives 'a playful or ironical tone' is entirely unwarranted, as may be seen by anyone who will take the trouble to study the copious material collected by Goodwin, *M.T.*, § 503, Kuehner-Gerth II., p. 467, Stahl, *Syntax des gr. Verbums*, pp. 386 sq., and Wyse on *Isae.* 1. 30. It is a present particular supposition, which admits in the apodosis such words or combinations of words as are logically possible. (2) Jebb thinks that Dobree's σαλεύουσιν is tame: I should rather regard it as a certain conjecture in view of the frequency of the naval metaphor applied to the πόλις, and of the appearance of οἰρισας and εὐπομος in the immediate context. It is right to point out that the error is a very old one, since it appears to have stood in the papyrus (πb), where there is barely room for ἀλύνουσιν. (3) I follow Bergk in restoring εἰ γένοιτο for εἰ δύναι (or δύναιο) γενοῦ in 697. Jebb, who adopts ἂν γένοιτο (after Blaydes), thinks that 'εἰ δύναιο was a marginal gloss intended to define the sense of ἂν γένοιτο, and that ἂν γένοιτο was' [subsequently] 'corrupted to γενοῦ.' Surely this is highly improbable and quite unlike the methods of scholiasts, who, while ready enough to tamper with difficulties real or imaginary, would not have been

<sup>1</sup> Among the Hesychian glosses of λῆμα are *Her.* 1416. For the meaning *courage* see Pind. βούλευμα and φρόνημα. Cf. Wilamowitz on *Eur.* *N.* 1, 87, Aesch. *Theb.* 448.



likely to interfere with a straightforward expression such as *ἂν γένοιτο*, which needed no amplification. On the other hand, if *εἰ γένοιτο* was the original text, it would seem to cry out for an apodosis, and *εἰ δόναι γενοῦ* would be a natural scholiastic paraphrase which might readily take the place of what it was intended to elucidate. That this is not altogether an imaginary proceeding may be seen from the Homeric scholia: schol. A on II 559 ἀλλ' εἰ μιν ἀεικισσαίμεθ' ἐλόντες] ὅτι ἔξωθεν προσυπακουστέον τὸ καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι· εἰ αὐτὸν ἀνελόντες ἀεικισσαίμεθα, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι. Eustathius (p. 1038. 1) notes the ellipse in O 571. So too Σ on infr. 863 paraphrases *εἰ μοι ξυνείη κ.τ.λ.*: *μοῖρα δὲ εὐτυχία οἷον εἰ ἀληθεύω γένοιτό μοι καὶ εὐτυχεῖν τὸ ἀληθὲς διασφύζοντι.*

O.T. 709

*βρότειον οὐδὲν μαντικῆς ἔχον τέχνης.*

The last three words are usually understood to mean 'sharing in the art of divination,' but nothing relevant has been quoted in support of this rendering except Plat. *Phaedr.* 244E τὸν ἑαυτῆς (scil. *μανίας*) ἔχοντα, which in itself requires justification. Hermann prefers: *nihil rerum humanarum ex uatum arte pendet*, but for this no authority has been adduced. I suggested *εὖ σχὼν* in the critical note, but this ought rather to have been *εἰ 'χον* = *well provided with*, as in Eur. *Hclid.* 379 τὰν εὖ χαρίτων ἔχουσαν πόλιν, *Hipp.* 462 κάρτ' ἔχοντας εὖ φρενῶν.

O.T. 713

*ὥς αὐτὸν ἦξοι μοῖρα πρὸς παιδὸς θανεῖν.*

J. thinks that *ἦξοι* is better than *ἔξοι* as expressing the suddenness with which his doom would overtake him. But the remark is open to serious question, and *ἔξοι* is rendered almost certain by the echo in *Phil.* 331 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔσχε μοῖρ' Ἀχιλλέα θανεῖν. Add Eur. *Hec.* 5 ἐπεὶ Φρυγῶν πόλιν | κίνδυνος ἔσχε δορὶ πεσεῖν Ἑλληνικῷ. Eur. *Suppl.* 618 ἀλλὰ τὸν εὐτυχία λαμπρὸν ἂν τις αἰροῖ μοῖρα πάλιν. Hom. *ρ* 326 Ἄργον δ' αὖ κατὰ μοῖρ' ἔλαβεν μέλανος θανάτοιο.

O.T. 724

*ὦν γὰρ ἂν θεὸς  
χρεῖαν ἔρευνε· ῥαδίως αὐτὸς φανεί.*

In C.R. VII. 343 I proposed to read *χρεῖαν ἀνείρη*, and still believe that this solution is possible. In Hesych. IV. 305 Musurus corrected *ἀνείρητον* to *ἀνερύνητον*. Earle accepted *ἦν . . . χρεῖαν* from Musgrave, who understood *χρεῖαν* as = *πράξις*, *rem, negotium*. But this neutral sense of *χρεῖα*, though it may be well established for Polybius and Plutarch, is doubtful for Sophocles, and is certainly not proved either by O.C. 1755 *τίνος, ὦ παῖδες, χρεῖας ἀνύσαι*; or *Ai.* 740 *τί δ' ἐστὶ χρεῖας τῆσδ' ὑπεσπανισμένον*;

O.T. 766 sq.

*δέδοικ' ἑμᾶντόν, ὦ γύναι, μὴ πόλλ' ἄγαν  
εἰρημέν' ἦ μοι δι' αὖ νιν εἰσιδεῖν θέλω.*

The comma after *μοι*, which Jebb thought conducive to clearness, I have removed, believing that the sense is: 'I fear I have already given too many reasons for wishing to see him'—in the present dialogue.

O.T. 772 sq.

*τῷ γὰρ ἂν καὶ μείζονι  
λέξαιμ' ἂν ἢ σοί, διὰ τύχης τοιαῶσδ' ἰών;*

There can be no question that these words ought to mean, 'to whom would I rather speak (lit. tell of my sorrows, with the object supplied from 770<sup>1</sup>) than to thee, when in such hap?' H. Richards (*Aristophanes and others*, p. 292), holding that *μείζων* never means *preferable* or *more suitable*, proposed to substitute *κάμεινον*, as in effect the comparative of Iocasta's *ἀξία μαθεῖν* in 769. Platt (*C.Q.* V. 258), while

<sup>1</sup> This is in view of Platt's objection that *λέξαιμ* without an accusative is utterly intolerable.

assenting to Richards's premiss, will have nothing to say for his remedy, and prefers *μείζονα*, which may have been a traditional variant (C.Q. IX. 85), and was thrown out tentatively by Wunder. But *μείζονα* fails to give the meaning which we require; for what crisis more serious than the present could Oedipus have had in mind? Moreover, Platt does less than justice to Richards, when he suggests that *ἀμείνων* in the ethical sense is irrelevant. Richards says quite clearly that his *ἀμείνων* is predicative, i.e. *to what fitter person?* In fact, Richards's proposed text would be the personalized form of *τίνι γὰρ ἂν ἀμεινον εἴη ἢ σοὶ λέγειν*; Or, in other words, it would correspond to infr. 1368 *κρείσσων γὰρ ἦσθα μηκέτ' ὢν ἢ ζῶν τυφλός*, Hdt. 1. 37 *ἀμείνω ἐστὶ ταῦτα οὕτω ποιούμενα*, Steph. Byz., p. 351, *μὴ κίνει Καμάρινα, ἀκίνητος γὰρ ἀμείνων*. Lobeck on *Ai.* 634 yields much more. Is it not possible after all to understand *μείζονι* in the same way? That *μέγας* with its comparative and superlative may as an attribute mean something like *important* is admitted, and that Verrall on *Med.* 549 was wrong in denying that *μέγας φίλος* could be identified with our 'great' friend is shown by *Soph. Phil.* 586, where *φίλος μέγιστος* is applied to Philoctetes, who certainly was not powerful, and by *Ai.* 1331 *φίλον σ' ἐγὼ μέγιστον Ἀργείων νέμω*. *Ant.* 652 *τί γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν ἔλκος μείζον ἢ φίλος κακός*; what wound could be worse? *O.C.* 439 *μείζω κολαστὴν τῶν πρὶν ἡμαρτημένων*, 'too severe a chastiser.' *Dem.* 20. 44 *τοὺς μεγίστους καιρούς*, 'the most critical times'; id. 27. 7 *μέγιστοι αὐτοὶ μάρτυρές μοι γέγονασι*, 'my opponents have proved to be my best witnesses.' So here, 'to whom could it be better, fitter to tell?' The best illustration is to be found, I believe, in *S. Ant.* 182 *καὶ μείζον' ὅστις ἀντὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ πάτρας φίλον νομίζει, τοῦτον οὐδαμοῦ λέγω*, 'regards as of more importance.' In weighing so minute a matter as this, we must always remember that it is impossible to find any single rendering which will at once suit the various applications of the Greek texts and satisfy the requirements of English idiom.

*O.T.* 779 *ὑπερπλησθεὶς μέθης*. Ven c has the gloss *οἶνον*, and for the genitive with *ὑπερπλησθεὶς* cf. 874. *Plat. Rep.* 571c *ἢ σίτων ἢ μέθης πλησθέν*. In view of these facts I have returned to the old vulgate, which editors since Dindorf have changed to *μέθῃ*, seemingly in excess of deference to the first hand of L. The dative with words expressing fullness is rare: see Elmsley on *Eur. Bacch.* 18, who, however, in his Appendix quotes *Eur. Her.* 372 *πεύκαισιν χέρας πληροῦντες*.

*O.T.* 807: *C.R.* XXXVIII. 14.

*O.T.* 827: The illogical order *ἐξέθρεψε κάξέφυνσε* is given by five or more of the *deteriores*, but it was tacitly assumed that it was a mere blunder. Yet this particular form of *Hysteron Proteron* often occurs (*Kuehner-Gerth* II. 603. 4), and Weil on *Eur. El.* 969 *πῶς γὰρ κτάνω νιν, ἢ μ' ἔθρεψε κάτεκεν*, points out its rhetorical advantage. Now that the generally discredited variant can be traced back at least to the fifth century, future editors may feel free to adopt it.

*O.T.* 866: The superscript readings *οὐρανίας δι' αἰθέρος* are probably a conjecture by some critic who saw that the accusative could not stand in this context, and that the genitive was at least possible. *οὐρανίᾳ* 'ν passed to *οὐρανίαν*, and *αἰθέρα* was consequential. The correspondence of 866=867 involves a metrical difficulty: Wilamowitz, keeping *ἀκρόαταν*, which is more than suspicious, finds two choriambi, in the strophe at least without synaphea. But *ὑψίποδες*=*ἀκρόατα* may be cretics with the second long syllable resolved. 867=877 are iambic trimeters, with *αἰθέρι* corresponding to *ἀπότομον*:

ὀοοοο- -ο- ο--

*O.T.* 870: Elmsley's somewhat obscure critical note has misled Jebb and Campbell, who attribute *μή* for *μήν* to a codex E, whereas E is Elmsley's symbol for Erfurdt, and Erfurdt's contribution to the text was the substitution of *μάν* for *μήν*.

This last Elmsley prints in his text, but himself<sup>1</sup> proposed οὐδὲ μήποτε κ.τ.λ., which most modern editors have accepted from him.

Whether we should read κατακοιμάσῃ or κατακοιμάσῃ is another question. The subjunctive, as indicated in Elmsley's array of examples supplemented by the modern grammars (Kuehner-Gerth II. 222, Stahl, p. 367, 2), is very much the more frequent, if we may rely on the evidence of the MSS.

O.T. 888-891: By an unfortunate misprint a full stop which ought to be a comma is placed after χλιδᾶς, and a comma which ought to be a full stop is placed after ματίζων. This is the more surprising, since the original copy from which the text was printed is correctly punctuated.

ἔξεται = become involved with. The word is freely used as roughly equivalent to *capessere*, and is by no means limited, as Jebb seems to imply, to the sense of *to cling to*. Cf. Eur. Or. 502 αἵματος δίκην ὅσῃαν διώκοντ' ἐκβαλεῖν τε δωμάτων καὶ τοῦ νόμου τ' ἂν εἶχετ' (=stood by) εὐσεβίης τ' ἂν ᾔην. So ἔργον ἔχεσθαι, τῶν λοιπῶν ἔχεσθαι Thuc. I. 49, 2. 2, 8. 67. Menand. Hero 47 ἐχόμεθα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιθυμίας does not (*pace* Capps) mean 'to cling to,' but simply 'to share.' Pind. Pyth. 4. 244 δράκοντος δ' εἶχετο λαβροτατᾶν γενύων, of the fleece = was within the grip of . . . It follows that ἔξεται needs no change whatsoever, but sooner than adopt Blaydes's clumsy ἀθίκτων θίξεται, I should prefer to guess γλίξεται.

892 sq.: Dindorf accounts for the variant τούτοις (instead of τοῖσδ') as an attempt to fill the trimeter. If so, it was a causeless interpolation; but τούτοις is nothing more than the regular gloss ὅδε] οὗτος.

These are the most difficult lines in the play, and no one has satisfactorily explained θυμῷ (or θυμοῦ or θυμῶν) βέλη. The schol. τὴν θεῖαν δίκην suggests that the original may have been θεῶν βέλη (or, with Kennedy, βέλη θεῶν) to assist the metre of 906: cf. O.C. 155 χειρὸς τῆς ἀνικήτου βέλη, fr. 961 θεῶν πληγῇ.

The appearance of ἔρξεται again after 890, not to speak of ἔξεται in 891, is open to very grave suspicion, but what is to be made of it or how it can be convincingly emended no one has shown. Recently Musgrave's εὐξεται has met with some favour, but it coheres ill with ἀμύνειν, for εὐχεται in the sense required ('vows' or 'boasts') should be followed by a fut. infin., although in the sense of 'prays' the present infin. may stand.<sup>2</sup> As a stop-gap I have adopted ἀμύνων—a very easy change from ἀμύνειν—which is suggested by the schol.'s ἀπελαύνων; but τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφέξεται seems more suitable to 890 than to ἔρξεται in 894. It is just possible that ἔρξεται is middle = ward from oneself, reinforced by ἀμύνων. In that case cf. Hom. Δ 128-130 Διὸς θυγάτηρ ἀγελείη | ἣ τοι πρόσθε στᾶσα βέλος ἔχευεν ἄμυνεν | ἣ δὲ τὸσον μὲν ἔεργεν ἀπὸ χροός.

O.T. 935

τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; πρὸς τίνος δ' ἀφειγμένος;

Jebb, supporting παρά, assumes that, whichever proposition be adopted, the meaning is *from whom*. But surely πρὸς may be justified both here and in *El.* 70 πρὸς θεῶν ὠρμημένος in the sense 'at whose bidding,' or 'in whose service.' To this the Homeric usage points: Z 456 καὶ κεν . . . πρὸς ἄλλης ἰστὸν ὑφαίνοις, A 239 δικασπόλοι οἳ τε θέμιστας πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύναται 'on Z.'s commission.' Hence the γραμματικοὶ glossed πρὸς with παρά as in Cramer, A.O. I. 337, 26, quoting A 239, and in Hesych. III. 386 and in schol. Hom. ζ 207 πρὸς Διὸς εἰσιν ἅπαντες ξείνοι τε πτωχοὶ τε, Hesych. III. 385 πρὸς αὐτοῦ· παρ' αὐτοῦ. See also gl. Harl. on Ai. 842, cr. n. on Ant. 727, Med. 297. Bast, pp. 837, 934, points out that the confusion of πρὸς and παρά is often due to misreading of the texts.

<sup>1</sup> L in Elmsley's apparatus stands for certain readings which he intended to discuss in his notes, and almost adopted in the text (Praef.,

p. vii).

<sup>2</sup> Jebb avoids this difficulty.

O.T. 955 ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου is very strange here, especially since the future participle ἀγγελῶν, which normally would require a verb of motion to precede it, is awkwardly attached to λέγει. It is perhaps worth suggesting that ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου may have strayed here from 936, and displaced the genuine text πάρεστιν ὄναξ or καὶ μὴν ἀφίεται or what not.

O.T. 957 αὐτός μοι σὺ σημήνας (or σημάτων) γενοῦ.

Since Jebb remarks that in his opinion σημάτων is unquestionably right, it seems to be incumbent upon those who dissent to give their reasons. Apart from the Homeric usage, which is adequately represented by Liddell and Scott, σημάτων, so far as I can ascertain, does not occur before the Alexandrine texts, where it is first used in the sense of *indicator*, either as a substantive or an adjective. What Apollonius, *Lex.* s.v. σημάτων, means by his λέγομεν, unless this is a reference to Ap. Rh. I. 355, I do not know. But the word was certainly common in later Greek as = *indicator*. Jacobs, *A.P.*, Vol. XIII. 435, quotes four examples. Add Tryphiod. 237 δῆϊον ἀγγέλλουσα φόβον σημάτωνι καπνῷ. Orph. 6. 6 ἀστέρες πάσης μοίρης σημάτων; Hesych. IV. 7 σαμένονα τὸν βραβεύτην τῶν σφαιριζόντων, i.e. a marker rather than a referee. The lemma stands for σαμάτων, or Doric (perhaps Tarentine) form. All this goes to show that σημάτων may be a late intruder, whether parallel or not to the gloss μηντής in B. It is true that there is no example of γίγνεσθαι with an aorist participle in Sophocles except where it is accompanied by a negative. But that is perhaps not very remarkable in so small a field. For Jebb ought certainly not to have said that such a case of γενέσθαι with aor. partic. would be unexampled. Cf. Aristid. VIII, p. 51 (to Sarapis), ὥσπερ τὰ πρῶτα ἔδωκας, οὕτω καὶ τὰ δεύτερα εἰσακούσας γενοῦ; W. Schmid, *Atticismus* II. 100, IV. 144.

O.T. 976 καὶ πῶς τὸ μητρὸς λέκτρον οὐκ ὀκνεῖν με δεῖ;

So the verse is written in A, whereas L supports λέχος in the place of λέκτρον, with λέκτρον superscript in the hand of the διορθώτης. If we follow A (with Jebb, Kennedy, Bruhn, and others), it is difficult to account for the corruption, unless we are prepared to say that λέχος is a mere blunder. There cannot be any question here of a gloss supplanting the true text, and we must assume that the cause of the variation was what Headlam used to call *simplex ordo*, i.e. the scribe was prompted by the desire to bring λέχος into close connexion with τὸ μητρός, a very common fault, and that λέχος should be transposed to follow ὀκνεῖν or δεῖ, as proposed by Dindorf in 1836. λέκτρον was therefore a conjecture adopted for metrical reasons.

O.T. 1031 τί δ' ἄλγος ἴσχοντ' ἐν χεροῖν με λαμβάνεις.

L has ἐν καιροῖς and Pal. ἐν καιροῖς με. The dropping of με in the L tradition must have been accidental. A's ἐν κακοῖς με, though a well-supported reading, was surely a Byzantine conjecture. M's γράφεται printed above is unquestionably right, and it is surprising that others have not followed the lead of W. W. Walker, who conjectured the truth, and Professor Housman, who came near to it with εἰς χέρας με. The confusion of κ and χ (Verrall on *Eum.* 448, supr. 472 κῆρες and χείρες) is scarcely less common than that of αἰ and ε; but the most convincing testimony in favour of χεροῖν here is *Trach.* 517, where in place of χερός the variant καιρός appears in B and Lc (with χε superscript in the latter by a recent hand).

O.T. 1035 καλόν γ' ὄνειδος σπαργάνων ἀνειλόμην.

All our MSS. have δεινόν γ' ὄνειδος, but nevertheless I believe that καλόν is right. Eustathius (on A 211), p. 88, ὅτι δὲ οὐκ αἰεὶ τὸ ὄνειδος βαρεῖα λέξις ἐστὶ καὶ



ἀηδής, δηλοῖ οὐ μόνον ὁ γράψας ὡς καλὸν ὄνειδος σπαργάνων ἀνελόμην, ἀλλὰ σὺν ἄλλοις καὶ ὁ εἰπὼν κάλλιστον ὄνειδος (Eur. *Phoen.* 821). Eustathius quotes our line as an example of ὄνειδος used in a good sense, and thereby justifies the epithets employed in our text and in the *Phoenissae*. Now, although this view is wrong (Verrall on Eur. *Med.* 514), the passage is quoted as an authority for a particular meaning of ὄνειδος, to which interpretation the presence of καλόν is absolutely essential. To suppose that Eustathius suffered from a defective memory, as is generally supposed, or to accept Valckenaer's notion that he confused our passage with *Med.* 514, is utterly impossible when once his context is examined. It should of course be remembered that the authority in question is not that of Eustathius in the twelfth century, but that of his source, which may have been a thousand years earlier. For we have not yet done with Eustathius. On p. 1097, 25 (P 105), he interprets the proverbial κακῶν δέ κε φέρτερον εἶη· ἀντὶ τοῦ ὡς ἐν κακοῖς κάλλιον. ἐντεῦθεν Σοφοκλῆς παραξέσας ποιεῖ τὸν Οἰδίποδα λέγοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι κάλλος κακῶν ὑπουλον ἐξετράφη (*O.T.* 1396) ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν κακοῖς μέγα καὶ περιφανές. εἴη δ' ἂν ὁμοίον τι καὶ τὸ καλόν γ' ὄνειδος σπαργάνων ἀνελόμην, i.e. a fine reproach, a similar, but more ironical, admixture of καλόν and κακόν. Cf. *Phil.* 477, Eur. *Bacch.* 652, *I.A.* 305. Observe that here too καλόν must have stood in the text quoted. But the source from which Eustathius drew was different, so that if we assume that here too there was a slip of memory, the coincidence was indeed strange.

But if the explanation is so simple, how is it that all our MSS. have inherited δεινόν, which Sophocles did not write? It may be at once admitted that δεινός was certainly not a normal gloss on καλός. But here the critic has to deal with a refractory text, and having misunderstood ὄνειδος, he has to force καλόν. So he proceeds (p. 88, 18): εἴη δὲ ἂν τοιοῦτον ὄνειδος ὁ λόγος ὁ προφέρων πάθος τι δεινὸν μὲν ἐπίσημον δὲ ἄλλως ἐν ἀνθρώποις καὶ θανατούμενον, ὅποιον καὶ τὸ τοῦ Οἰδίποδος διήγημα. Does it not appear that δεινόν came from the commentary rather than the text? But however that may be, I hold that Sophocles wrote καλόν.

*O.T.* 1062: The reason for adopting Hermann's conjecture here is that a preposition is frequently added to explain the construction, and subsequently makes its way into the text. See Starkie on Ar. *Ach.*, p. lxxx. So *supr.* 1005 the gloss διὰ is superscript in Me: διὰ τοῦτο Σ, *infr.* 1157 n.

*O.T.* 1064                      ὅμως πιθοῦ μοι, λίσσομαι, μὴ δρᾶν τάδε.

This is one of the numerous cases where the original text of L (δρᾶ) has been corrected to the A tradition (δρᾶν). This has occurred especially in the triad, and most of all in the *O.T.*, where I have counted 97 examples against 53 in the three plays, *Trach.*, *Phil.*, *O.C.*, taken together; and most of the latter (38) are of the special superscript class, which is mentioned on p. xi of the Preface. Of the *deteriores* 10 at least have δρᾶ, whereas ET alone have δρᾶν. Which of the variants should be adopted is not easy to determine, but it would be wrong to decide the question on the strength of L's original reading. In favour of the infinitive Elmsley quoted Aesch. *Eum.* 794 ἐμοὶ πίθεσθε μὴ βαρυπτόνως φέρειν.

*O.T.* 1131                      οὐχ ὥστε γ' εἰπεῖν ἐν τάχει μνήμης ἄπο.

The MSS. have μνήμης ὕπο, but there should be no hesitation in adopting Reiske's μνήμης ἄπο. The two prepositions are, as everyone knows, constantly confused; and whereas μν. ὕπο is, so far as we know, solecistic, μν. ἄπο is justified by ἀπομνημονεύειν and its own frequent employment. Suid. has ἀποστοματίζειν glossed by ἀπὸ μνήμης λέγειν. The same gloss is found in Tim. *Lex. Plat.*, p. 43; cf. ἀπὸ στόματος, Plat. *Theaet.* 142d, Bekk. *Anecd.* 436, 6 ἀπὸ στόματος: ὡς ἡμεῖς, τὸ μὴ διὰ

γραμμάτων ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μνήμης. He proceeds to quote Philemon Νεμόμενοι (II. 490 K.) and ἀπὸ γλώττης from Cratinus Νόμοι (I. 51 K). Add Xen. *Mem.* III. 6. 9 οὕτως γ' ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπεῖν. O.C. 936 is quite different.

O.T. 1157

ἐδωκ' · ὀλέσθαι δ' ὠφελον τῇδ' ἡμέρᾳ.

I mention this passage solely for the reason that it is a clear example of the tendency noted on 1062, whereby an explanatory preposition finds its way into the text. ἐν ἡμέρᾳ is the reading of nearly all the copies with which we are acquainted (LA, Ven., Ven. c, Lb, Trin, ΓΔΘ), and the omission of ἐν seems to be due to Triclinius. This intrusive ἐν often appears in scholia: cf. sch. Pind. *P.* 4. 113a, ib. 10. 12a.

O.T. 1160

ἀνὴρ ὅδ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐς τριβὰς ἐλᾷ.

Jebb gives to ἐλᾷ as a future its modal force: 'is determined to cause delay.' This is of course possible, although, as Gildersleeve observes (*Syntax*, § 267), 'in principal clauses the modal force is more or less effaced.' We should, however, bear in mind that Blaydes may be right in treating ἐλᾷ as a present, since ἐλᾶν and ἐλα are found in tragic texts belonging to the present stem, and Pind. *N.* 3. 74 supports the indicative. Gl. B has ἐλᾷ · ἐλαύνει.

O.T. 1168

ἢ δούλος, ἢ κείνου τις ἐγγενὴς γεγώς;

I should prefer to read ἐν γένει for ἐγγενής, just as Valckenaer corrected *Rhes.* 413 οἱ δ' οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ἐγγενεῖς πεφυκότες, on the strength of O.T. 1016, Eur. *Alc.* 904 ἐμοί τις ἦν ἐν γένει, Dicaeog. fr. 1 τοῖς . . . ἐν γένει πεφυκόντων, Dem. 47. 70 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν γένει σοι. In defence of ἐγγενής in the *Rhesus* Porter rightly calls attention to O.C. 1167 ὅρα κατ' Ἄργος εἴ τις ὑμῖν ἐγγενής; but this is a stronger case, seeing that no parallel has been adduced for ἐγγενής with the genitive, which Jebb labours to defend. Blaydes notwithstanding, κείνου must not be taken with γεγώς.

O.T. 1170

κάγωγ' ἀκούειν · ἀλλ' ὁμως ἀκουστέον.

There is no doubt whatever about the true reading here, notwithstanding that LA and a large preponderance of the *deteriores* support ἀκούων. It is in fact a clear example of the common confusion of the infinitive and participial suffixes (see e.g. fr. 462). The true reading stands, apart from Plutarch's evidence, in Liv. p and v Me Lc<sup>s</sup>. I only refer to the line as a warning to any who are concerned to verify their references. Jebb's critical note simply bristles with error. He states that four MSS., namely, V, V<sup>2</sup>, V<sup>3</sup>, V<sup>4</sup> [according to his notation of the MSS. Ven. 468, 616, 467, 472], have ἀκούων corrected to ἀκούειν. The reading of Ven. 616 and 472 I do not know, although I have a shrewd suspicion. But for Ven. 468 and 467 I have accurate collations, and they both have ἀκούων without any correction. Jebb's error is all the more strange since he professes (p. lii) to have collated these MSS. But that is not all. Jebb proceeds: 'The schol. in L. κάγω ὡσαύτως εἰμὶ τῷ νῦν ἀκούειν . . .' But the words do not come from Σ as might be inferred, but from a much later hand. The gloss in a better form, ἐπ' αὐτῷ for ὡσαύτως, is quoted by Brunck and referred to B by Blaydes. That being so, Jebb's suggestion that 'τῷ νῦν ἀκούειν might be an instrumental dative paraphrasing ἀκούων' is untenable. A further misunderstanding is due to the hastiness of Wilamowitz. Bruhn, following Jebb as I suppose, assigns to V<sup>2</sup> the reading ἀκούων, with -ειν superscript; but owing to the way in which Bruhn's page (237) is made up Wilamowitz is induced to assign the reading to Vat. a [Vat. 40], and unfortunately misled by an error of Campbell, who on 1011 ascribes παρβῶν to the same Vat. a, proceeds to urge the collation of this MS. on account of its age as well as of its remarkable readings. Here again Campbell is at fault, for Vat. a has in its text a reading which Triclinius claims as his own conjecture.

O.T. 1178

ὡς ἄλλην χθόνα δοκῶν ἀποΐσιν.

It is generally conceded that ὡς here goes with δοκῶν, that in 1481 ὡς is defensible in view of the personal relations involved, and that in *Trach.* 366 ὡς is doubtful and should perhaps be replaced by ἐς. The nature of the problem may be gauged by Hude's cr. nn. on Thuc. 8. 36, 103. I cannot feel satisfied with the tacit assumption that ἐς was glossed, e.g. in Thuc., by ὡς. The origin of the construction is unknown. See Brugmann-Thumb<sup>4</sup> (1913), p. 522.

O.T. 1197-1203: This tiresome passage raises two questions which nevertheless are interdependent for their solution. (1) Should ἐκράτῃσθαι, said to be the reading of Mb, and conjectured by Hermann, be substituted for ἐκράτῃσας in 1197, which, save as above, is supported by all the known copies? The statement borrowed by Jebb from Campbell that Vat. a has ἐκράτῃσεν is incorrect; it has ἐκράτῃσας quite clearly. (2) Should the vulgate, which has ἀνέστας, be abandoned in favour of the less well-supported ἀνέστα? The choice lies between the adoption of the second or third person, so that the two lines may correspond. Few, I am sure, will follow Erfurdt in referring ὅστις to the preceding δαίμονα. Hermann's text shows ἐκράτῃσθαι and ἀνέστας, but that is because his final judgment inclined to ἐκράτῃσας ἐς πάντ' κ.τ.λ. The ultimate choice is not easy, although Dindorf, Wunder (who, however, subsequently changed his mind), Schneidewin, Campbell, Tournier, Jebb, Masqueray show no qualms when deciding in favour of the third person. And yet the sole objection that is raised to the second person is on the score of metre, which will be discussed presently. If we leave metre out of account, the transition to the third person in 1197 and back again to the second at καλεῖ is extremely awkward, and the double hitch cannot be defended by such simple instances as *Phil.* 934 or *Hom. P.* 248 sqq. (quoted by Brunck). Wunder says quite frankly: 'si quis quaerat, quid sibi tertia persona uelit . . . , quum chorus in reliquo cantu ubique Oedipum adloquatur, non aliud equidem respondere possum, quam propterea tertia usum persona Chorum de Oedipo hic loqui uideri, quod oratio ad Jovem (ὁ Ζεῦ) conversa est.' Jebb stands alone in making a virtue of necessity: 'To read ἐκράτῃσας and ἀνέστας would be to efface a fine trait, marking the passion of grief which turns from earth to heaven and then again to earth.' But ὁ Ζεῦ is not an appeal at all: it is merely a parenthetic exclamation, exactly like *Trach.* 993 sqq. ὁ Κηναία κρηπὶς βωμῶν, ἱερῶν οἶαν οἶων ἐπὶ μοι μελέφ' χάριν ἤνυσας, ὁ Ζεῦ.

Let us not shrink from facing the facts. What has really influenced editors is the tacit assumption that the last syllable of ἐκράτῃσας must be short in order to correspond with τό in 1187. They have been impressed, I have no doubt, by the vigorous assertion with which Hermann voices his great authority: 'Glyconeus, qualis hic est, τοξεύσας ἐκράτῃσας τοῦ, voce monosyllaba in spondeo terminatus, inauditus est Graecis, nullaue machina defendi potest.' Nevertheless, metricians now admit not only that a Glyconic may have a spondaic close, but also that the irregular long syllable may answer to an antistrophic short. See *Phil.* 1128 ὁ τόξον φίλον, ὁ φίλων = 1151 τὰν πρόσθεν βελέων ἀλκάν. But you will have observed how strictly Hermann has fenced in his principle, and that he limits it by requiring that any verse adduced as a parallel must end with a monosyllable. We must therefore call attention to *Eur. El.* 700 ὀρέων ποτὲ κληδὼν ἐν = 714 σελαγεῖτο δ' ἀν' ἀστυ πῦρ. Hermann's rule, then, is merely a statement of the ordinary practice, and must not be too rigidly interpreted. There is even an *a fortiori* case where the verse division occurs in the middle of the word: cf. *Eur. Hipp.* 143 = 153, *El.* 1130 = 1140.

O.T. 1264

πλεκταῖς ἑώρας ἐμπελεγμένην · ὁ δέ.

Such is the reading of all our best copies, and the only reason for disturbing it arises from the doubt whether ἑώρας (for αἰώρας) is admissible in the text of an Attic poet. Several modern editors, but not M. Masqueray, answer this question in the negative. It is true that an early parallel is not forthcoming, but the passage of Athen. 618e is not without significance. Since αἰ was always tending to become ε, the occurrence of the word where its quantity was fixed by metre was eagerly seized upon by the grammarians. It will be observed that the evidence in favour of ἑώρα here is overwhelming, where the important testimony of Eustathius confirms that of the MSS. Jebb's attempt to make light of Eustathius is singularly misleading. αἰώρα, he says, 'is the only form for which there is good authority of the classical age.' But Eustathius (389. 42) comments: ὅτι δὲ ἡ ῥηθεῖσα αἰώρα καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἐψιλοῦ ἔχει τὴν ἄρχουσαν, ὡς δηλοῖ οὐ μόνον τό, πλέκταῖς ἑώρας ἐμπελεγμένην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τό, μετέωρος, ἕτεροι ἐπαγωνιζέσθωσαν. Arguing against Kennedy, who quoted the extract to prove the classical use of ἑώρα, Jebb maintained that it 'indicates that this verse furnished the only classical example of ἑώρα known to Eustathius; and there is no proof that here he was following an older or better MS. than L.' The knowledge or ignorance of Eustathius is quite irrelevant. He is no more than a copyist, and the value of his testimony depends entirely on the quality of his source. Our extract is referred by Schwabe to the Atticist lexicographer Aelius Dionysius (fr. 23), who lived in the reign of Hadrian (Sophocles, *Fragments*, Vol. I., p. lxxix sqq.), and there can be no doubt that he is right. Not only does the significant name of Pausanias occur in the immediate neighbourhood, but the connexion with μετέωρος is vouched in the recurring gloss by Σ on this passage, Phot. Suid. *Anecd. Bachm.* I. 246, 6. Cf. Suid. v. αἰώρα, B.A. 357, 20. Now the Eustathius material may not prove that Sophocles wrote ἑώρα, but it is conclusive that this form appeared in the best Alexandrine texts, whence it was quoted by the Atticists in support of their campaign. That the form with ε was not alien to Sophocles is indicated by Wunder's brilliant restoration of ἐωρήσασα for θεωρήσασα in O.C. 1084. If Dindorf and others choose to write αἰωρήσασα that is their affair. That ἑωρ- at one time stood in the text is certain, altogether apart from the support which it receives from the short syllable in the antistrophe. The necessity of a short syllable is not quite so inevitable as Platt maintained: see O.C. 122 sq. In Plu. 2. 449a συνέορσεις is given by the MSS. where συναιωρήσεις is apparently intended = suspense. Cf. id. *Nutm.* 7 συναιωρουμένων τῷ μέλλοντι.

O.T. 1278 sq. ἀλλ' ὁμοῦ μέλας ὄμβρος χάλαζα θ' αἵματοσς' ἐτέγγετο.

ὁμοῦ is glossed with συνεχῶς in B, and modern editors seem generally to agree, i.e. those who adopt Heath's χαλάζης αἱματοῦς, that in means 'all at once (ἀστακτί).' Campbell quotes in support Aesch. *Pers.* 401 ὁ πᾶς στόλος ἐπεξεχώρει, καὶ παρὴν ὁμοῦ κλύειν πολλὴν βοήν, but surely there πολλήν makes all the difference. It is perhaps worth noting that the presence of ὁμοῦ, so far as it goes, supports Porson's conjecture. Cf. *Trach.* 782 μέσου κρατὸς διασπαρέντος αἱματός θ' ὁμοῦ.

O.T. 1280 sq.

τάδ' ἐκ δυοῖν ἔρρωγεν οὐ μόνου κακά,  
ἀλλ' ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ συμμυγῇ κακά.

So the MSS.; but Campbell seems to be alone in thinking that Sophocles could have so written. Even he in his *Paralipomena* was inclined to accept Otto's οὐ μόνου κατά, which Jebb also suggested. Conjectures are many, but none has met with much approval: if one were compelled to adopt a stop-gap, Porson's οὐχ ἐνδὲς μόνου is perhaps as good as any. I wish to point out certain considerations which suggest that the corruption is not limited to the last two words of 1280. Notice, in the first

place,  
*Hipp.*  
objecti  
same  
compa  
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κινδυν  
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illustra  
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O.  
So  
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as a var  
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O.T.

So E  
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ἀνδραγαθία  
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The  
and πρό in



place, the datives in Aesch. *Pers.* 433 κακῶν δὴ πέλαγος ἔρρωγεν μέγα Πέρσας, and Eur. *Hipp.* 1338 σοὶ τὰδ' ἔρρωγεν κακά, whence it follows that the victim is regarded as the objective rather than the source of a flood of woe. The datives in 1281 point in the same direction, so that the origin (ἐκ) of the calamity becomes irrelevant. Now compare *Ant.* 1272 ἐν δ' ἐμῷ κάρῳ θεὸς τότ' ἄρα τότε μέγα βάρος μ' ἔχων ἔπαισεν, ib. 1345 τὰ δ' ἐπὶ κρατὶ μοι πότμος δυσκόμοστος εἰσήλατο, *O.C.* 564 εἰς πλείστα . . . ἤθλησα κινδυνεύματ' ἐν τῷμῳ κάρῳ, *O.T.* 263 νῦν δ' ἐς τὸ κείνου κρᾶτ' ἐνήλαθ' ἡ τύχη. On the strength of these passages I propose εἰς δυοῖν . . . κάρῳ. It is unnecessary to illustrate the common confusion of ἐκ and εἰς. It will be observed that in any case we have an example of the Sophoclean triad, for which see on fr. 591, 4.

O.T. 1320

διπλᾶ σε πενθεῖν καὶ διπλᾶ φέρειν κακά.

So A, but L has φορεῖν. It is well known that φέρειν, φορεῖν and φρονεῖν are constantly confused. Here M actually gives φρονεῖν (to feel), which Mr. J. Jackson conjectured. But φέρειν seems simpler (cf. 1415), and need not be disturbed.

O.T. 1349

ῥλοιθ' ὅστις ὅς μ' ἀπ' ἀγρίας πέδας.

The MSS. have ἦν after ὅστις, which Hermann struck out, introducing μ' [so Jebb states, but I have not been able to trace where he made the proposal]. The object of this note is to vindicate the construction as given by Hermann, which proceeds on the assumption that there is an ellipse of ἦν (or perhaps rather of ἐστίν) after ὅστις. Such a construction with a double relative clause is very rare; it is clumsily rhetorical but not illogical; and it is capable of justification. In this way I explained *Ichm.* 325 ἴσθι τὸν δαίμον' ὅστις ποθ' ὅς ταῦτ' ἐτεχνήσατ(ο). Observe that the recognition of this principle makes *Ant.* 2 sq. quite simple, with Ζεὺς thrown forward for the sake of emphasis: ἀρ' οἶσθ' ὅ τι (ἐστίν) τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν ὁποῖον οὐ Ζεὺς τελεί; Analogous instances are to be found in the usage of οὐδεὶς ὅς οὐ: *O.T.* 373 ἂ σοὶ οὐδεὶς ὅς οὐχὶ τῶνδ' ὀνειδιεῖ τάχα. *Plat. Crit.* 53e οὐδεὶς ὅς ἐρεῖ; *Alc.* I. 103b οὐδεὶς ὅς οὐχὶ ἐπερβληθεὶς πέφευγε.

O.T. 1355: ἄχος and ἄχθος are commonly confused. In *El.* 120 Γ records ἄχος as a variant, and in Aesch. *Cho.* 419 M has ἄχθεα, which has been corrected from the scholiast.

O.T. 1362

ὁμογενὴς δ' ἀφ' ὧν αὐτὸς ἔφυν τάλας.

Jebb abandons the common explanation (= jointly engendering) on the ground that such a meaning of the compound is impossible. But he seems to have overlooked Eur. *H.F.* 798 λέκτρων δύο συγγενεῖς εὐναί. The variant of Γ μονογενὴς is illustrated by the same confusion in the MSS. of Eur. *Hel.* 1685.

O.T. 1459 sq.

παῖδων δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀρσένων μὴ μοι, Κρέον,  
προβῆν μέριμναν.

So Elmsley for προσθῆν, the reading of all the known MSS., for Jebb's statement that V [i.e. Ven. 468 according to p. lii] has πρόθη is incorrect. Elmsley founded his proposal on *El.* 1334 νῦν δ' εὐλάβειαν τῶνδε προνέμην ἐγώ—'as it was I took heed for this.' Jebb allows this to be plausible, but thinks it weaker than the reading of the scribes. The question is rather which is the more appropriate to the context, and it is not easily answered. Whereas προστίθεσθαι generally implies the assumption of a burdensome task, προτίθεσθαι is to display or make manifest a quality (e.g. ἀνδραγαθίαν in *Thuc.* 2. 42). The one throws its chief emphasis upon the verb, the other upon the object.

The fact that the MSS. support προσ- is absolutely without significance, for πρός and πρό in composition are universally confused.

O.T. 1474: *ἐκγονος* and *ἐγγονος* are different ways of spelling the same word. In view of the evidence collected by Meisterhans<sup>3</sup>, p. 107, it is impossible to determine which spelling Sophocles adopted, and I have given the preference to *ἐκγονος* as the Homeric form. See further Shilleto, *cr. n.* on Dem. *F.L.* § 53, Adam on Plat. *Rep.* 364e, Sandys on Dem. 6. 31. It should, however, be observed that the papyrus of the *Ichneutae* gives *ἐγγόνους* (v. 222).

O.T. 1476 sq. λέγεις· ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμ' ὁ πορσύνας τάδε,  
γνοὺς τὴν παροῦσαν τέρψιν ἢ σ' εἶχεν πάλαι.

The passage may be construed in different ways, and if any commas are introduced I should place them after *τέρψιν* and *εἶχεν*. The purpose of this note is to maintain that τὴν παροῦσαν τέρψιν does *not* mean 'the delight which you now feel.' παροῦσαν cannot be used of absolute time without forcing upon γνοὺς the altogether inappropriate sense of *foresseeing*. We should paraphrase: 'You have me to thank for this, since I knew the delight which you were wont to feel in them from of old.' παροῦσαν is thus relative in time to γνοὺς, and πάλαι qualifies παροῦσαν. Everyone should recognize the principle of the divided attribute, though it is much more widely prevalent than is usually admitted: see Jebb on *supr.* 1199, 1245. But if anyone prefers to take πάλαι with εἶχεν, he cannot be refuted. Clumsy as this may seem at first sight, it is thoroughly idiomatic, and the true view is indicated by *Al.* 337 sq. ἀνὴρ ἔοικεν ἢ νοσεῖν ἢ τοῖς πάλαι νοσήμασι ξυνούσι λυπεῖσθαι παρών—brought face to face with the ills that long have harassed him.

From the point of view of Sophoclean usage, the material collected by Ellendt, p. 293, shows that there is nothing to choose between *τέρψιν ἔχω* and *τέρψις ἔχει με*.

O.T. 1493 sqq. τίς οὗτος ἔσται, τίς παραρρίψει, τέκνα,  
τοιαῦτ' ὀνειδέη λαμβάνειν ἂ τοῖς ἐμοῖς  
γονεῦσιν ἔσται σφῶν θ' ὁμοῦ δηλήματα;

I have adopted the infin. λαμβάνειν because the infinitive is the normal construction after verbs expressing *daring*, and the palaeographical difference is trifling (*supr.* 1170). Cf. Thuc. 3. 74 ἡ πόλις ἐκινδύνευσεν πᾶσα διαφθαρῆναι. Ar. *Ach.* 645 ὅστις παρεκινδύνευσεν εἰπεῖν ἐν Ἀθηναίοις τὰ δίκαια. Jebb, however, justly quotes in defence of the participle Plat. *Legg.* 699a οὐδεὶς τότε ἐβοήθησεν οὐδ' ἐκινδύνευσεν ξυμμαχόμενος. The distinction between the two constructions is explained by Goodw., § 903; and here at least the infin. seems to be the more natural and direct. This, however, is an unimportant matter as compared with the difficulty of 1495.

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# VERTITVR VERTVMNVS.

Too late for my edition of Propertius, but in time, I hope, to anticipate one criticism of the many that will be aimed at its details, I have detected a serious flaw in my text of his elegy upon Vertumnus (IV. ii.; IV. iii. of my edition). It is not so serious as some of the flaws caused in it by the corruption of our archetype; but instead of helping I have hindered truth in respect of two of the couplets. Now I should like to put forward a correction, which seems to set us in a fair way to recover the author's pattern, as well as his words, in the second half of the elegy.

The pattern and the order of the first half have been recovered by the aid of Housman and Schrader, who by transferring to it a passage of eight and another of six verses, found in the MSS. between v. 45 and v. 56, cause *mendax fama, uaces: alius mihi nominis index* (v. 19 of the MSS.) to become the first of the second half; the sense then leaves no doubt that the first thirty-two verses of the original ran in stanzas of six verses each, with an introductory couplet before the first one, introducing the *cognomen priscum* to be derived. The last stanza of six (vv. 59-64) has an introductory couplet to match the first, and refers specifically to the equal series of stanzas of six to be expected in the second half: *sex superant uersus*.

When vv. 41-46 of the vulgate have thus been moved to precede v. 19 (whose *fama, uaces* must bear reference to *fama est* in v. 41), and vv. 49-56 to precede v. 5 (whose *haec turba* must bear reference to the *turba togata* of v. 56), the couplet which intervenes between these passages in the MSS., vv. 47, 48, remains as the conclusion of the god's own account of himself, and gives the final authoritative derivation of his name.

at mihi, quod formas unus uertebar in omnes,  
nomen ab euentu patria lingua dedit.

I very wrongly allowed myself to transpose this couplet to follow v. 20—to which it bears direct reference—believing that thereby I was restoring the stanzas of six verses as far as v. 58, not perceiving at the time any recoverable pattern in the distichs succeeding. Yet the stanzas of the first half are marked off with great distinctness according to subject. Only a series of careless mistakes by scribes has, I now think, obscured a hardly less distinct grouping of distichs in what follows.

For the first stanza of the second half I should have grouped with vv. 19-22 of the vulgate, not vv. 47, 48, but vv. 27, 28, as follows:

My Edition.		MSS.
33	Mendax fama, uaces: alius mihi nominis index: de se narranti tu modo crede deo.	19
43	arma tuli quondam et, memini, laudabar in illis; corbis in inposito pondere messor eram.	27
35	opportuna mea est cunctis natura figuris: in quamcumque uoles uerte, decorus ero.	21

The distich *arma tuli . . . eram* is the only one, except vv. 47, 48, which is in past tenses; in all the rest the modern worshipper of the god is bidden to supply or suppose the attributes which will cause him to change shape. He is referring here, as in no other of these distichs, to the chief associations of his worship in ancient times warfare and harvest, already discussed in the first twenty-six verses of the elegy. It is possible that the distich was omitted because *-or ero* ended the following pentameter, as *-or erā* this, while each hexameter ended in *-is*. Once omitted, it might well be inserted after *gramina secta* (26) because of *messor*.

The second stanza should pick up *decorus* (22) with a series of specially ornamental impersonations, thus:

39	indue me Cois, fiam non dura puella;	23
	meque uirum sumpta quis neget esse toga?	
45	sobrius ad lites: at, cum est inposta corona,	29
	clamabis capiti uina subisse meo.	
47	cinge caput mitra, speciem furabor Iacchi:	31
	furabor Phoebi, si modo plectra dabis.	

A man goes in his *toga ad lites*; *corona* and *uina* lead on to Iacchus; as Phoebus he is more *decorus* still. These are the forms in which Vertumnus would first appeal to the town-bred elegist. It is just possible that *sobrius . . . dabis* was omitted because of the similarity of *furabor*, *pectra* (32) and *iurabis*, *secta* (26). But this omission would seem to be due more probably to gross carelessness. With regard to the point at which it was inserted by correction, I shall have more to say.

The third stanza will have begun with the first in order of the remaining distichs (25, 26), whose hexameter picks up the last distich of the second stanza (32 and 31):

*da falcem et torto frontem mihi conprime faeno.*

*iurabis* and *manu nostra* in its pentameter similarly refer to *clamabis* and *capiti meo* in v. 30.

Into the same stanza the next in order of the remaining distichs will fall (33, 34); and, after *sum deus* and the hunting, *est etiam . . . Vertumnus* and horsemanship aptly follow in vv. 35, 36.

41	da falcem et torto frontem mihi conprime faeno;	25
	iurabis nostra gramina secta manu.	
49	cassibus inpositis uenor: sed harundine sumpta	33
	fautor plumoso sum deus aucupio.	
51	est etiam aurigae species Vertumnus et eius	35
	traicit alterno qui leue pondus equo.	

As I have done injustice to this last couplet in my edition, I must explain my belief that v. 35 is sound. It is quite a trick of Propertius in this book to put the third person into the mouth of a speaker referring to himself. The turn is seen in xii. 13, 14 (*habuit Cornelia . . . et sum . . .*) and 33, 34 (*non fuit Cornelia; quin et erat . . .*), in iv. 1, 2 (*suo mittit . . . si potes esse meus*); and we have seen it at our vv. 33, 34 (*mihi . . . de se*). As to the name Vertumnus appearing at this point I shall have more to say; the note in my edition springs from my original error of removing vv. 47, 48 of the MSS. into the first stanza. But Ovid may, I think, be used to confirm the form of the sentence *est . . . species Vertumnus*, at which many have stumbled before me. The passage in which he plagiarizes ours to his own ends is *Metam.* XIV. 643-655, where those of Vertumnus' shapes which might appeal to Pomona are catalogued.

o quotiens habitu duri messoris aristas	
corbe tulit uerique fuit messoris imago!	
tempora saepe gerens faeno religata recenti	645
desectum poterat gramen uersasse uideri;	
saepe manu stimulos rigida portabat, ut illum	
iurasses fessos modo disiunxisse iuuenocos;	
falce data frondator erit uitisque putator;	
induerat scalas, lecturum poma putares;	650
miles erat gladio, piscator harundine sumpta.	



denique per multas aditum sibi saepe figuras  
 repperit, ut caperet spectatae gaudia formae.  
 ille etiam picta redimitus tempora mitra,  
 innitens baculo, positus per tempora (?) canis,  
 adsimulauit anum. . . .

He has changed the context of *harundo*, *mitra*, and *baculum*; but where so many echoes of our vv. 25, 26, 33 appear, it is fair to infer that *uerique fuit messoris imago* is a recollection of our v. 35.

The fourth stanza continues without alteration :

53	suppetat hoc, pisces calamo praedabor ; et ibo	37
	mundus demissis institor in tunicis.	
55	pastor ouem ad baculum possum curare ; uel idem	39
	sirpiculis medio puluere ferre rosam.	
37	at mihi, quod formas unus uertebar in omnes,	47
	nomen ab euentu patria lingua dedit.	

The rod for preying on the water is contrasted with the staff for guarding on the land, the spruce trader in the town with the flower-hawker on the dusty highway—each bent on *uersura*. But vv. 37-40 differ from all the rest in that the two impersonations mentioned in each couplet have no obvious or even verbal connexion with one another.

Now for the pattern of these stanzas. Three of them begin, *indue me, da falcem, suppetat hoc*, with a request for the attribute. Three of them end with reference to the derivation of the god's name: *uerte, Vertumnus, unus uertebar in omnes*. (*Vertumnus* in v. 35 implies: *uertit unus omnes equos auriga, uertit unum et alterum equum desultor*.) *speciem* (of two kindred gods) appears in the last hexameter of the second stanza, *species* (of two kindred performers) in the last of the third; *cunctis figuris* in the last hexameter of the first stanza is echoed by *formas omnes* in that of the fourth. But more curious is the appearance of the participle *inpositus* in the middle distich of the first three stanzas. In the MSS. order the word occurs thrice in six lines, with intolerably flat effect. Now it sounds as a keyword marking stanza from stanza, like the *quoniam* of II. xii. (my *Ell. Lib. II. xi.*), 7, 11, 15, or the *magnus* of my IV. i. 6, 12, 20, 21. As between the second and third stanzas the verbs are thus distributed: *sumpta, esse, inposita, cinge, dabis, and da, conprime, inpositis, sumpta, est*. (*inpositus* occurs in the last stanza of the first half of the elegy.)

If the reader will do me the honour of looking at my text as published, he will see that fol. 131<sup>b</sup> of the ancestor MS. should now end, not with the six lines which I propose to move from their traditional place, but with the distich following these, *cassibus inpositis . . . aucupio*; for my vv. 37, 38 are to return, whence they came, to the middle of fol. 132<sup>a</sup>. But the scribe who copied from this ancestor MS., *incuriosissimus omnium*, had omitted eight verses of fol. 130<sup>b</sup> and six of fol. 131<sup>a</sup>, and was now fourteen lines behind his exemplar (which in the preceding poem he had been reproducing, according to his lights). Therefore, when he had copied fourteen lines of fol. 131<sup>b</sup>, he finished one of his own pages of sixteen lines. The last six lines of these fourteen were *arma tuli . . . plectra dabis*. He inserted them at the bottom of his page because he had omitted them just above, and in this order, because the *messor* came in aptly after *gramina secta*.

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## ΘΗΙΚΗ ΛΕΞΙΣ AND DINARCHUS.

IN the opening chapter of the *Iudicium de Dinarcho*<sup>1</sup> Dionysius quotes a passage from the *Περὶ ὁμωνύμων* of Demetrius Magnes, at the end of which come the words ἡ δὲ λέξις ἐστὶ τοῦ Δεινάρχου κυρίως ἡθικὴ πάθος κινούσα σχεδὸν τῇ πικρίᾳ μόνον καὶ τῷ τόνῳ τοῦ Δημοσθενικοῦ χαρακτήρος λειπομένη τοῦ δὲ πιθανοῦ καὶ κυρίου μηδὲν ἐνδέονσα. [I have deliberately omitted all punctuation marks, because the punctuation of this sentence is still doubtful, though I hope to suggest a possible interpretation of its meaning at the end of this article.] Now there is nothing in this sentence or in the words preceding it to indicate beyond all possibility of doubt the precise meaning of κυρίως ἡθική. And in such circumstances, to allow free play to personal (or perhaps natural) prejudices regarding the significance of the phrase is more than dangerous. The whole problem of ἡθικὴ λέξις has been treated too cursorily. If one mentions the phrase to a non-professional student of Greek, who, however, has some acquaintance with the Attic orators, he immediately replies: 'I suppose you mean the sort of thing you meet in Lysias.' And he is to be excused, because, after all, that is the predominant meaning of the term. But it has other senses, and therefore one must fight shy of vague statements like that of Finke,<sup>2</sup> who, after quoting the above lines, comments: 'Demetrius Magnus attribuit ei (sc. Dinarcho) τὴν κυρίαν λέξιν, qua non sit Demosthene inferior' (the last few words of which are possibly not even a correct translation of the text); or of Burgess,<sup>3</sup> who enumerates qualities, ideas, and topics 'of special value to the epideictic and court orators,' among which appears ἡθοποιία, which he merely translates 'impersonation or delineation of character,' without offering any further comment. Sandys<sup>4</sup> talks of 'the ethical warmth of colouring, by which the dullest details are lit up with a fresh life and interest.' Gromska is even more vague (and seems almost to confuse ἡθος and χαρακτήρ): 'Grammatici antiqui, qui de Hyperide tractabant, de eloquentiae eius genere disputabant, orationum Hyperidearum compositionem et ἡθος respicientes, i.e. quantum in arte rhetorica et oratoria valeret, examinantes.'<sup>5</sup> In the hope, therefore, of being able to represent the difficulty inherent in these lines, and of attempting to remove it, or at any rate to shed a broader beam of light upon it than has been shed hitherto, I propose to review very briefly the fluctuations of meaning in the life of this phrase and its equivalents, as we find them used in the critical writings of the Greek philosophers and rhetoricians.

The adjective ἡθικός does not, according to Ast's *Lexic. Plat.*, appear in Plato. In Aristotle, on the other hand, it is a word of comparatively frequent occurrence; but, for the purpose of this discussion, only the *Rhetoric* need be considered. From this work three passages are of interest in the present connexion, viz.:

(a) III. 7. 1: τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἐξεῖ ἡ λέξις, εἴαν ᾗ παθητικὴ τε καὶ ἡθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον. Aristotle explains what he means by each of these expressions:

<sup>1</sup> Dionys. Hal., *Opusc.*, Vol. I., 299 (ed. Usener and Radermacher).

<sup>2</sup> Reinholdus Finke, *Quaestiones Dinarchae*, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Theodore C. Burgess, *Epideictic Literature: Studies in Classical Philology*, Univ. of Chicago (Vol. III., p. 109 footnote): 'for the epideictic orator ἐγκωμίων, ψόγος, κενὸς τόπος, σύγκρισις,

ἡθοποιία, γνώμη, θέσις . . . for the court orator θέσις, κοινὸς τόπος, ἀνασκευή, παρασκευή, ἡθοποιία, σύγκρισις, νόμος εἰσφορά.'

<sup>4</sup> Sandys and Paley, *Demosthenes' Priv. Orat.* II., p. xxx.

<sup>5</sup> D. Gromska, *De Sermone Hyperidis*, in *Studia Leopolditana*, 1927.

(b) πρότερον, ἡθικούς n (Welldor)

(c) ἡθικούς γ γινώμαι π προαιρετώ Here the of χρηστ the mean

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(a) c πολλῶν ἡ ἀνηθοποίη Jebb<sup>6</sup> tra

<sup>1</sup> Cf. als 113; and ἐπόμενα ἐκά

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Co pp. 180-181: nostra per quale sit U (ad init.), ἔχον εὐνοῦν

<sup>3</sup> On the Denniston mark a beg

(1) τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον = proportionate to the subject-matter (= propriety ?).

(2) παθητική = making the right appeal to the right emotion.

(3) καὶ ἡθικὴ δὲ αὕτη ἢ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δείξῃς, ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ ἢ ἀρμόττουσα ἐκάστω γένει καὶ ἔξει, which Cope translates: 'And this mode of proof, arising out of (external) signs (exhibited in language, tone, and action), may be invested with an ethical character, in that (in so far as) that which is appropriate (i.e. the appropriate language, etc.) to each class and moral state (i.e. character, ἦθος; the sum of the moral states and habits which characterizes the individual) is attendant upon each of them.' To this he adds the note: 'The dramatic ἦθος, *morata oratio* . . . conveys a favourable impression of the accuracy of the speaker and the truth of his description.' We must then understand by ἡθικός 'in character' (designed to produce the right attitude in the audience) or 'in keeping'.<sup>1</sup>

(b) II. 18. 1: περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας ἡθῶν ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον, ὥστε διωρισμένον ἂν εἴη πῶς τε καὶ διὰ τίνων τοὺς λόγους ἡθικούς ποιητέον, where ἡθικούς means 'adapted to the character of the audience to whom it is addressed' (Welldon's trans., p. 175).<sup>2</sup>

(c) II. 21. 16: ταύτην τε δὴ ἔχει μίαν χρῆσιν τὸ γνωμολογεῖν καὶ ἑτέραν κρείττω· ἡθικούς γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους. ἦθος δ' ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις δῆλη ἢ προαίρεσις. αἱ δὲ γνώμαι πάσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προαιρετῶν, ὥστ' ἂν χρησθῇ ὅπως αἱ γνώμαι, καὶ χρηστοῖται φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα. Here the presence of the technical ethical term προαίρεσις (even without the addition of χρηστοῖται lower down) would inevitably suggest 'moral' or 'of moral value' as the meaning of ἡθικούς, or possibly 'to mark a particular moral character'.<sup>3</sup>

These three Aristotelian passages, then, supply three meanings for the word—(1) in character or in keeping; (2) suited to the character of the audience; (3) morally good in tenor or appearance. From Aristotle onwards the word seems to become increasingly commoner in works on literary criticism. Dionysius himself uses it or words akin to it fairly frequently. In the *De Comp. Verb.* there is perhaps only a single passage<sup>4</sup> relevant to the present discussion, and that I will refer to later. Such references as are to be found in the *Judic. de Thuc.* (where, however, the word ἡθικός does not occur) are all in connexion with the speeches in Thucydides,<sup>5</sup> and in each case the reference is to 'propriety' or 'suitability of language and expressions to the characters of the speaker and the subject.' The treatises on the Attic Orators are more fruitful, and in them appears the first hint of the gradual change in the meaning of ἡθικός.

The *Jud. de Lys.* contains six passages of interest, three of which are of special importance here:

(a) c. 8: ἀποδίδωμί τε οὖν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν εὐπρεπεστάτην ἀρετὴν καλουμένην δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἡθοποιῶν. ἀπλῶς γὰρ οὐδὲν εὐρεῖν δύναμαι παρὰ τῷ ῥήτορι τούτῳ πρόσωπον οὔτε ἀνηθοποιήτον οὔτε ἄψυχον, where ἀνηθοποιήτον = 'not lifelike,' 'not natural,' though Jebb<sup>6</sup> translates 'inartistically drawn.'

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also Cope, *Introd.* to *Arist. Rhet.*, pp. 108-113; and possibly *Rhet.* III. 16, 9, ἡθικά τὰ ἐπόμενα ἐκάστω ἡθεῖ.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Cornific. I. 5, 8, Wyse, *Speeches of Isaeus*, pp. 180-181, for the 'captatio benivolentiae ab nostra persona'; Stephanus, 'ἡθικὸν προοίμιον quale sit Ulpianus docet ad Demosth. *Olynth.* I. (ad init.), τὸ ἐν τῇ λείξει μέτριον καὶ ἐπιεικὲς ἦθος ἔχον εἶναι ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν κ.τ.λ.'

<sup>3</sup> On the analogy of the suggestion of Mr. Denniston in *C.Q.*, January, 1929 (ἀρκτικός = to mark a beginning).

<sup>4</sup> *Opuscula* II., p. 97, ll. 7-8.

<sup>5</sup> Viz. c. 36, λόγους ἀποδίδωσκ' . . . τοῖς τε προσώποις πρέποντας καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν οἰκείους. c. 41, λείπεται δὴ σκοπεῖν εἰ τοῖς τε πράγμασι προσήκοντα καὶ τοῖς συνέληλυθόσι εἰς τὸν σύνλογον προσώποις ἀρμόττοντα τέπλακε τὸν διάλογον, and ἀρ' οὖν ὥσπερ τοῖς Μηλίοις οἰκείοι καὶ προσήκοντες ἦσαν οἱ περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας λόγοι; c. 45, πράγμασιν προσήκοντα καὶ τοῖς προσώποις καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασιν.

<sup>6</sup> *Attic Orators* I., p. 171.

(b) c. 9: διαφοράς τε αὐτῷ λαμβάνει κατὰ τὰς ἰδέας τῶν πραγμάτων ἢ λέξις. ἀρχομένῳ μὲν γάρ ἐστι καθεστηκυῖα καὶ ἠθικῇ. Here the meaning is something different (it is true that the difference is not great) from the Aristotelian significance—'natural,' 'restrained,' 'unexaggerated,' 'not over-acting,' 'quiet' (i.e. the direct opposite of παθητικός in its strongest meaning). (Cf. possibly the *De Comp. Verb.* passage mentioned above.)

(c) c. 13: (ἢ λέξις) ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθεσὶν ἐστὶ πιθανή κ.τ.λ. Lysias is convincing in his characterization; he makes the speaker live or have a definite character in court.

It has always been assumed (and rightly, I think, if we except the second of these passages) that the reference is to what Jebb<sup>1</sup> calls 'the faculty of seizing and portraying character'; and cf. Müller,<sup>2</sup> in Jebb's footnote: 'Lysias distinguished, with the accuracy of a dramatist, between the different characters into whose mouths he put his speeches . . . this is what the ancient critics praise under the name of his Ethopoeia.'<sup>3</sup>

From the *Iudic. de Isocr.* two passages only emerge that are of interest here:

(a) c. 2: (ἢ λέξις) ἠθικὴ τέ ἐστι καὶ πιθανή καὶ <πρέπουσα>. Again the meaning is 'graphic' or 'convincing as a character study'; as also in—

(b) c. 11 (comparison of Lysias and Isocrates): ἐν ταῖς ἡθοποιαῖς ἀμφοτέρους εὗρισκον δεξιούς . . . τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ πρέποντος οὐδέτερον ἐδόκουν ἀπολείπεσθαι.

The *Iudic. de Isaeo* raises afresh the problem regarding the shifting significance of ἠθικός in—

(a) c. 3 (differences between Lysias and Isaeus): ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀφελής τε καὶ ἠθικὴ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ σύγκειται τε φυσικώτερον . . . ἢ δὲ Ἰσαίου τεχνικωτέρα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι κ.τ.λ., and—

(b) c. 9: τοῦτο μὲν ἀφελῶς καὶ ἡδέως εἴρηται ἡθός τε οὐ πεπλασμένον ἀλλὰ φυσικὸν ἐπιφαίνει.

In the first of these Dionysius seems to mean, not so much the style of a particular character, but rather the simple style that fits the ordinary average man, and which an audience of similar men might reasonably be expected to understand, i.e. 'simple,' 'everyday,' 'of the man in the street,' coupled with a suggestion of 'unartificially secured.' In c. 11, however, the sense 'dramatic' or 'in character' is manifestly intended.<sup>4</sup>

The uses of ἦθος and ἠθικός in the *Iudic. de Dem.* fall into five classes, all more or less distinct, viz.:

(a) c. 2: οἱ τῶν ἠθικῶν διαλόγων ποιηταί, with its reference to τὸ Σωκρατικὸν διδασκαλεῖον = writers on ethics, i.e. the purely philosophical meaning of the term.

(b) cc. 4, 13, in close combination with πιθανή and πιθανά = 'in character.'<sup>5</sup>

(c) cc. 18, 22, of good character, i.e. 'uplift' meaning.<sup>6</sup>

(d) cc. 2, 8, 43, 53, in contrast to πάθος and παθητική; cf. especially c. 8, αὐστηρὰν ἱλαρὰν, σύντονον ἀνεμμένην, ἡδεῖαν πικράν, ἠθικὴν παθητικὴν, and c. 43, τὰ μὲν ἀποτραχύνει τε καὶ πικραίνει τὴν ἀκοήν, τὰ δὲ πραῖνει καὶ λεαίνει, καὶ τὰ μὲν εἰς πάθος ἐκτρέπει τοὺς ἀκούοντας, τὰ δ' εἰς ἦθος ὑπάγεται. The contrast is so striking in these two instances that one is sorely tempted to translate by 'gemütlich.'<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Attic Orators*, I., p. 169.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>3</sup> The other three passages in the *De Lys.* are c. 8 'suitability'; c. 19 'faithful representation'; c. 24 'good impression.'

<sup>4</sup> ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴν κέρρηται, ὅτι νέος τε καὶ ἀπειρος εἰν πραγμάτων καὶ οὐδὲν δεδωμένος εἰς δικαστήριον εἰσιέναι. καὶ ἐπιφέρει πάντῃ ἠθικῶς.

<sup>5</sup> With this cf. perhaps c. 33 κρατίστη λέξει καὶ

πρὸς ἅσας ἀνθρώπου φύσιν ἡρμοσμένη.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. especially c. 22, where the reference is to the effect on the hearer's mental outlook. Isocrates is like a military band; he makes you stick out your chest and think yourself 'no end of a fellow.' Cf. Isocrates, *Evagoras*, §§ 73-75.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Uhlig's note ap. Apollonius Dyscolus in *Grammatici Graeci*, Vol. II. (index).

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Fiti tioni Lysia

<sup>2</sup> Cf. ed. 102, 104, 11

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p. 117, II. συμπληροῦντ

φανερὸν ἦν ἀ συγγραφικόν

<sup>4</sup> περὶ ἰδε pp. 320-322.



(e) cc. 24, 58, doubtful, but possibly to be grouped with (3).

The passage mentioned above from the *De Comp. Verb.* is difficult to place because of the nature of the distinction it contains; if we press the proportion φύσει : κατὰ πάθος = τέχνη : κατ' ἥθος, an impossible contradiction in the meaning of ἥθικός arises, because ἥθος must be represented by φύσει.

The material gain, then, from Aristotle to Dionysius consists of the sense 'natural' (without appeal to πάθος), and of the sense which appears to have developed out of that (probably originating in the 'suavitas'<sup>1</sup> noticeable in the ἥθικῃ λέξις of Lysias), noticed in (d) above.

Aristides (τεχναὶ ῥητορικαὶ) deals with the whole problem in considerable detail,<sup>2</sup> but in the main he is concerned to urge the necessity of producing the illusion of a certain character, and to suggest the requisite means for the attainment of this end. Perhaps the most striking points in his essay are to be found in his insistence on the close relationship of ἥθος and τὸ ἀφελές. One cannot help feeling that his whole treatment is to some extent coloured by the intrusion of the (d) meaning; cf. especially p. 83, ll. 19 sqq.: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἥθος χαρίεν πάνν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀφελοῦς ἔργον. ἡθοποιία leads via τὸ ἀφελές to 'suavitas'.<sup>3</sup> It gives 'tone.'

The same doctrine is preached and neatly stated by Hermogenes:<sup>4</sup> ἥθος τοίνυν ἐν λόγῳ ποιεῖ ἐπιείκεια καὶ ἀφέλεια, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις τὸ κατ' αὐτὸν ἐμφαινόμενον ἀληθές καὶ ἐνδιάθετον. ἡ δὲ βαρύτης<sup>5</sup> ὑπόκειται μὲν ὑπὸ τὸν ἡθικὸν λόγον, οὐ μὴν συμπληροῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἡ ἀφέλεια καὶ ἡ ἐπιείκεια, τό τε ἀληθές καὶ τὸ ἐνδιάθετον κ.τ.λ. ἀφέλεια is now the very lifeblood of ἡθοποιία.

Nicolaus Sophistes<sup>6</sup> in his ὅρος ἡθοποιίας produces merely a revised version of the Aristotelian views cited above, viz. suitability to speaker, audience, and subject—a definitely reactionary standpoint. The old 'moral' significance also reappears in Longinus<sup>7</sup> and in Aphthonius,<sup>8</sup> ἥθικὸς μῦθος ὁ τῶν τεττίγων καὶ τῶν μυρμήκων προτρέπων τοὺς νέους εἰς πόνους. But alongside these old-fashioned meanings run, or rather are now developed, certain other senses, e.g.:

Zonaeus<sup>9</sup> and the anonymous author<sup>10</sup> of the περὶ τῶν σχημάτων τοῦ λόγου say that ἡθοποιία consists in investing lifeless or voiceless objects with the power of speech, and in putting appropriate speeches into their 'mouths': τὰ ξύλα, ἡ θάλασσα, ναὺς, γῆ are given as examples.

Aphthonius, however, after defining ἡθοποιία as the μίμησις ἥθους ὑποκειμένου προσώπου, proceeds to draw sharp lines of distinction between ἡθοποιία, προσωποποιία, and εἰδωλοποιία—an academic distinction, which concerns the drama rather than oratory, as his illustrations from the Heracles myth, from Eupolis, and from Menander seem to suggest. I mention this distinction because the growth of the meaning of ἡθοποιία appears to have been the prime cause of the confusion observable in the treatment of ἡθοποιία and προσωποποιία in later Greek (and Roman) literary criticism. To cite merely one special instance of the later use of ἡθοποιία,<sup>11</sup> which might have surprised Aristotle, τῶν δὲ ἡθοποιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι παθητικαί, αἱ δὲ

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Finke, p. 21, 'suavi ac moratae dictioni Lysianae.'

<sup>2</sup> Cf. ed. Schmid, pp. 55, 74, 76, 83, 84-94, 102, 104, 111, 112, 117.

<sup>3</sup> There remain in Aristides some passages to which these general statements are perhaps inapplicable, viz. p. 93, ll. 9 sqq., and especially p. 117, ll. 9 sqq., ὅταν δὲ τὸ νόημα ἐξ ἐνὸς τοῦ συμπληρουμένου ὀνόματος ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα 'ὡς δὲ πάνν φανερόν ἦν ἀχθόμενος, εἰ μὴ ἔφαιτο, συνακολούθησαν,' συγγραφικόν ἐστι καὶ λόγον ἥθος ἔχοντος.

<sup>4</sup> περὶ ἰδεῶν (ed. Rabe). B. V. περὶ ἥθους, pp. 320-322.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Anon. τεχνὴ ῥητ. Spengel I. 444, ἐὰν μέντοι διήγημα ἡθικὸν ᾗ καὶ βαρύ.

<sup>6</sup> Progymnasm., Spengel III. 489.

<sup>7</sup> ἐκ τῶν Λογγίνου, No. 13. Spengel I., p. 327, ἥθικὸς λόγος γίνεται κατὰ διάνοιαν, ὅταν χρηστὴν ἔχη προαίρεσιν καὶ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω ῥέπουσαν. But ought we to make a distinction here between λόγος and λέξις—'discourse' or 'story' as opposed to 'style'?

<sup>8</sup> Progymn. περὶ μύθου (ed. Rabe), p. 2, ll. 3-4.

<sup>9</sup> Spengel III. 162.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 177.

<sup>11</sup> Aphthonius, l.c.

ἠθικαί κ.τ.λ., where obviously the term has a more comprehensive sense than when applied to Lysias by Dionysius.<sup>1</sup> There is an interesting note,<sup>2</sup> which illustrates the confusion in terminology, in the 'Schol. in Aristidis orat., ὑπὲρ τῶν τεσσάρων,' εἰ δὲ τὴν τῶν ζώντων προσωποῖαν ἐποίησε, λείπεται πᾶσαν ἠθοποιῖαν προσωποῖαν εἰπεῖν.<sup>3</sup>

Alexander<sup>4</sup> offers a meaning similar to the special sense assigned by Aphthonius to ἠθοποιῖα as distinguished from προσωποῖα, ἠθοποιῖα δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν ὑπάρχοντα πρόσωπα τιθέντες λόγους τινὰς αὐτοῖς περιτιθῶμεν πρὸς τὸ πιστοτέρους αὐτοὺς δόξαι εἶναι ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ ἐλέγομεν αὐτοὺς (cf. sense of προσωποῖα in Quintilian, especially IX. 2). In Minucianus<sup>5</sup> ἠθικαὶ πίστεις are drawn 'from the reputation of the character concerned' (his Alcibiades illustration leaving no lurking doubt what he means).

Phoebammon<sup>6</sup> returns to a close approximation to the ethical sense: ἡ ἠθοποιῖα διχῇ γίνεται πρὸς παρόντας καὶ πρὸς ἀπόντας, ὥστε εἰ βουλόμενος ἐλέγξαι τινὰς ῥαθυμοῦντας (i.e. didactic characterization).

Finally, in Stephanus,<sup>7</sup> the note appears 'Hesych. mire interpretatur per κατηχητικόν,' which we must connect with κατήχησις (=training), and translate 'instructive,' i.e. no longer 'to suggest a character,' but 'to inculcate a character.'

These, then, are the chief facts concerning the usage of ἠθικός that can be culled from the Greek critics. Outside the purely critical writings of this type the word seems to bear two meanings—(1) 'moral, ethical'; (2) 'in character,' or 'true to character.'<sup>8</sup> The list of passages I have cited is by no means exhaustive, but it is sufficiently representative (of a wide variety of meanings) to make my point clear that the interpretation of the note of Demetrius, to which I now return, may perhaps offer some difficulty.

It may be asserted at the outset that Demosthenes was famous *inter alia* for πικρία and τόνος. Does that help? Usener and Radermacher, believing that it does, put a comma after κινούσα and after λειπομένη, i.e. the style of Dinarchus is ἠθική (whatever sense they give to it), 'emotional,' but is inferior to Demosthenes only in 'incisiveness' and 'sonority.' But, one may object, what of all the other qualities, e.g. ἡ τῆς λέξεως μεγαλοπρέπεια, ἡ τῆς συνθέσεως ἐξαλλαγή, τὸ τῶν παθῶν ἐμφύλον, τὸ νοερόν, in which he is stated by Dionysius<sup>9</sup> to fall behind Demosthenes? The same objection is even more destructive against Finke's<sup>10</sup> κυρίως ἠθική, πάθος κινούσα σχεδὸν τῇ πικρίᾳ μόνον, καὶ τῷ τόνῳ τοῦ κ.τ.λ., as also against Blass,<sup>11</sup> κυρίως ἠθική, . . . πάθος κινούσα, σχεδὸν (etc., as Usener).

Now the strong contrast that seems to be intended here, assuming, as is safer, that no lacuna should be marked between ἠθική and πάθος κινούσα, can be preserved if we adopt as the meaning of ἠθική the sense which I called (d) above, i.e. 'what you would expect of a normal, not-too-emotional, or irritable man.' After saying that Dinarchus' style is especially of this type, any reference to παθητική must necessarily be qualified. The fact that there is no conjunction between ἠθική and πάθος suggests that we cannot limit the qualification to σχεδὸν τῇ πικρίᾳ μόνον, because we shall then have to begin the next part of the sentence with a (perhaps) unnecessary καὶ. The comma must be placed after τόνῳ, as the few hints we derive from the three

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Ernesti, *Lex. Tech. Graec. Rhet.* s.v. ἦθος, ἠθικόν, ἠθοποιῖα, προσωποῖα, and *Lex. Tech. Lat. Rhet.* s.v. 'affectio,' 'affectus,' and 'prosopopoeia.'

<sup>2</sup> Sopater, *Progymn.* (ed. Rabe), p. 64, ll. 11-16.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Aphthonius, *l.c.*

<sup>4</sup> *περὶ σχημάτων*, Spengel III. 21.

<sup>5</sup> *περὶ ἐπιχειρημάτων*, Spengel I. 418.

<sup>6</sup> *περὶ τῶν τῆς διανοίας σχημάτων. περὶ μεταθέσεως*, Spengel III. 52.

<sup>7</sup> S.v. ἠθικός.

<sup>8</sup> To cite merely a single instance. In the *Scholía ad Pindar* (ed. Drachmann) there are five references to ἦθος or ἠθικός, viz. I. 326. 8, II. 225. 24, II. 228. 1, III. 146. 2, III. 274. 25, in all of which the meaning is 'in character.'

<sup>9</sup> *Iudic. de Din.*, c. 7.

<sup>10</sup> *L.c.*, p. 4, also suggested as an alternative by Blass.

<sup>11</sup> *Din. Orat.*, p. xix.

Dinarchus' speeches (where the emotional appeal is not considerable, and, such as can be noticed, is due to the quality of incisiveness and a certain air of *δεινότης*<sup>1</sup>) appear to indicate. This leaves the phrase τοῦ Δ. . . . λειπομένη rather bare, though it could stand by itself here as a general description of the style of the κρίθινος Δημοσθένης. In that case the final clause would be added to limit the application of this too wide generalization. But perhaps it is better to suppose that δέ has dropped out between τοῦ and Δημοσθένους, and that του . . . λειπομένη is then to be regarded as a parenthesis, i.e. while Dinarchus has certain qualities, yet he is inferior to Demosthenes. The loss of δέ before Δη. is not difficult, and its addition helps to give point to the passage. The mention of πικρία and τόπος inevitably suggests Demosthenes to the critic, who reminds his readers that Demosthenes is the master in that particular field.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Hermogenes' note on Dinarchus.

## ΛΕΟΝΤΑ ΤΕΚΕΙΝ.<sup>1</sup>

Λάαινα, ὀνειδιζομένη ὑπὸ ἀλώπεκος ἐπὶ τῷ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου ἕνα τίκτειν, ἕνα, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ λέοντα.

IN his recent pamphlet on *Herodotus the Historian*, Friederich Focke has discussed the lion-portent which accompanied the birth of Pericles:<sup>2</sup> ἐκ δὲ Ἰπποκράτεος Μεγακλῆς τε ἄλλος καὶ Ἀγαρίστη ἄλλη, ἀπὸ τῆς Κλεισθέneos Ἀγαρίστης ἔχουσα τὸ οὐνομα· ἡ συνοικήσασά τε Ξανθίππῳ τῷ Ἀρίφρονος καὶ ἔγκνος εἶδον εἶδε ὅψιν ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ· ἐδόκεε δὲ λέοντα τεκεῖν· καὶ μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας τίκτει Περικλέα Ξανθίππῳ. As this is the only occasion on which Herodotus mentions Pericles by name, those critics who are concerned to show that Herodotus was 'Pericles' man' have made much of the passage, and have deduced therefrom that Herodotus here means to express all his pent-up admiration for Pericles, which otherwise the scope of his work did not give him an opportunity of displaying.<sup>3</sup> This admiration is at least conveyed in cryptic form, and Focke, following up a hint of Nissen<sup>4</sup> that Pericles is here called a lion ambiguously, combats the view that Herodotus is expressing great reverence for him; and after examining fifth-century parallels, comes to the conclusion that Herodotus was repeating (whether as a mere marvel or with some personal *arrière pensée* he cannot decide)<sup>5</sup> a tradition that had been set afoot as a purposely ambiguous and derogatory reference to Pericles as a 'tyrannical man of might.' After an examination of Focke's evidence, however, I remain unconvinced. It seems possible to account for most of the quotations which Focke makes by bringing them into line with the ordinary Greek use of leonine symbolism, which, as I shall try to show, was complimentary, not derogatory. The problem of the Herodotean passage however remains, and together with it are to be grouped certain other references to the connexion of lions and lion-portents with child-birth, which, when considered together, seem to merit a particular explanation as remnants of folk belief, as popular echoes of the doctrine of transmigration. The procedure I have adopted, therefore, is, first, to examine Focke's evidence; secondly, to bring into juxtaposition passages which I think are truly pertinent parallels to the Herodotean one; thirdly, to suggest—for I would do no more than suggest—an explanation on transmigration grounds; fourthly, to append three items of interest, to which the transmigration explanation of leonine symbolism may perhaps be pertinent.

### I.

The Greek leonine metaphor applies in a double sense: it not only denotes ordinary physical prowess, but carries also a reference to psychological characteristics. A man must be a 'lion-heart' to be an excellent warrior. Homer applies it in this double sense to the retreating Ajax; and Plato uses the imagery to describe that part of the soul which is the seat and ground of physical prowess, the θυμός, that

<sup>1</sup> I have especially to thank Mr. A. D. Nock, of Clare College, Cambridge, for his criticism and advice on this paper, though I naturally remain solely responsible for the suggestions advanced in it.

<sup>2</sup> Fr. Focke, *Herodot als Historiker* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1927), pp. 29 sq. See also *Cl. Rev.* XLII (May, 1928), p. 86. The reference to

Herodotus is VI. 131.

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Jacoby, *R.E. Suppl.* II. 238, 1 sqq. So How and Wells, *ad loc.*, speak of 'this exaltation of Pericles.'

<sup>4</sup> *Hist. Zeitschrift* LXIII. (1889) 420.

<sup>5</sup> Focke denies the possibility of deducing from the passage, with certainty, Herodotus' own feelings towards Pericles.

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conglomerate of noble sentiments and ambitions which, instinctive and not reasoned, lies at the root of true aristocratic feeling.<sup>1</sup> τὸ λεοντώδες (= τὸ θυμοειδές) is the natural ally of τὸ λογιστικόν, and is the second highest part of man's soul. In making this use of the metaphor, Plato may well be supposed to be employing, albeit in a heightened form, a current application of his time. Otherwise his use of it for explanatory and descriptive purposes is beside the point. So far as popular parlance goes, the physical significance of the simile seems to have been uppermost. So with the idiom ξυρεῖν λέοντα,<sup>2</sup> and the Aristophanic line,<sup>3</sup>

ὄντες οἶκοι μὲν λέοντες, ἐν μάχῃ δ' ἀλώπεκες,

which implies no more than that the proper place for lions is on the field of battle. Other proverbial expressions of like kind may be gathered from Suidas: ἐνδύεται μοι τὴν λεοντήν—ἐπὶ τῶν μεγάλοις ἐπιχειρούντων πράγμασιν. ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τοῦ Ἡρακλέους;<sup>4</sup> and πρὸς λέοντα δορκάδες ἄπτονσι μάχην—ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς κρείττονας ἐριζόντων.<sup>5</sup> Thus it is scarcely fair for Focke to claim Euripides, *Suppl.* 1222 sq. as a derogatory use of λέων:

πικροὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἦζεν' ἐκτεθραμμένοι  
σκύμνοι λεόντων, πόλεος ἐκπορθήτορες.

It is here simply foretold that the Epigoni will come up against Thebes with superior martial strength and spirit. Nor can Plato, *Gorgias* 483e, bear a bad sense:

ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπράδοντες τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα.

Timid society tames young men as it tames lions; and it is exactly that quality of which they are robbed in this taming process, the quality of spirit which makes them lions, that Callicles is primarily concerned to praise.

The passage from the *Agamemnon* chorus (717 sqq.) and its adaptation in the *Frogs* of Aristophanes (1431 sqq.), which Focke also quotes as derogatory uses of λέων, are based essentially on a reshaping of the ordinary symbolism. To the metaphor as we have seen it in Homer and Herodotus and in popular parlance, Aeschylus seems to have added the notion of the semi-tractability of lions. They could be tamed to a certain extent. This remains an essential element in the Platonic symbolism; but the point of the Aeschylean and Aristophanic use of the metaphor is not the general character of the lion. It is indeed only half tameable, but it is the tamers not the lion, the Athenians not Alcibiades, who are censured. Focke quotes also the oracle of Herodotus V. 92,

αἰετὸς ἐν πέτρῃσι κύει, τέξει δὲ λέοντα,  
καρτερὸν ὠμωστήν· πολλῶν δ' ὑπὸ γούνατα λύσει,

and the oracular parody of Aristoph. *Equit.* 1037,

ἔστι γυνή, τέξει δὲ λέονθ' ἱερὰς ἐν Ἀθήναις.

In both these cases the commentators have brought the leonine symbolism into line with the Herodotus examples above, and interpret it as implying royal power (How and Wells, and Stein *ad loc.*). From the oracle itself no conclusion whatever can be

<sup>1</sup> Compare, e.g., *Rep.* 588c sqq. with 440e sq. So far as I know Plato never speaks ill either of θυμός or of λέων.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. *Plat. Rep.* 341c.

<sup>3</sup> *Pax* 1189.

<sup>4</sup> Suidas s.v.: Cornutus, *Epitome* 31, should be compared, where, in a discussion of the attributes of Heracles, we read: ὁ μὲν γὰρ λέων τὸ ἀλκμώτατον τῶν θηρίων ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ βόβαλον τὸ καρπερώτατον τῶν ὀπλων.

Suidas s.v.: see also s.v. μὴ πρὸς λέοντα

δορκὰς ἄψωμαι μάχης—ἐπὶ τῶν τὴν ἰσχὺν ἀνίστων. It is rendered possible, however, by *Et. Magn.*, s.v. Λεοντοκόμος, that the expression may have had a different connotation from that given to it by Suidas: ἀλλ' ἴσως ὡς ἡ δορκὰς ἀνεωγμένους ἐν τῷ καθέδδεν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχει, καὶ λοιπὸν ἐπὶ νοίαν παρέχει τοῦ μὴ καθέδδεν, οὕτως καὶ ὁ λέων ἀνεωγμένους ἔχει τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς, ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν μεγάλων ὄντων, τὸ ἐπικείμενον δέρμα τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς μικρότερον ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐ δύναται σκεπάσαι αὐτούς.

drawn, for its imagery is purposely calculated to give a bizarre impression, as far removed from current usage as possible. In the parody it is certainly unfortunate for Focke that the lion who is to be born is no other than the actual speaker of the parody. As this is Cleon, the sense of the symbolism cannot be anything but blatantly complimentary. In fact, it is fully interpreted in the context as meaning that he is the lion who shall defend the Athenians in battle just as he would his cubs. The symbolism is the familiar one of military prowess (1038 sqq.):

λέονθ' . . .  
ὅς περὶ τοῦ δήμου πολλοῖς κώνωσι μαχεῖται  
ὥστε περὶ σκύμνοισι βεβηκώς· τὸν σὺ φυλάξαι  
ἔφραζεν ὁ θεός σοι σαφῶς σφῆξιν ἐμέ·  
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ λέοντός εἰμί σοι.

These lines indeed come from a comedy. Yet it was surely in no comic spirit that the Greeks erected that stone lion over the dead who fell at Thermopylae (Herodotus VII. 225), nor by any stretch of the imagination can it be supposed that they were levelling a delicate insult at the characters of those who had fallen fighting for their country. A colossal lion, whose remains are still extant, was set up over the common tomb of those Thebans who fell at Chaeronea; and Pausanias gives it as his opinion of this ἐπίθημα that φέροι δ' ἂν ἐς τῶν ἀνδρῶν μάλιστα τὸν θυμὸν (Paus. IX. 40, 10, and Frazer *ad loc.*). Such lions are known also in Ceos and at Thespieae (Frazer *loc. cit.* and p. 141). The best commentary on them is the imagery of Cleon's speech in the *Knights*. They stand high on their mounds representing the spirits of the dead who lie underneath, and guarding massively their living countrymen ὥστε περὶ σκύμνοισι βεβηκότες. That their erection was a common custom is evinced not only by the remains and references, but also by the fact that a mythological 'aition' was invented to explain it [Ptolomaeus, *Nov. Hist.* 2 (Westermann), p. 184]. It seems very probable that this use of lions to decorate a tomb should be connected with the occurrence of the lion-motif in the decorations of South Italian and Asia Minor tombs.<sup>1</sup> It is possible that here too the lion signifies the defender of the place, just as it seems to have done among the Hittites.<sup>2</sup> At least this much is clear therefor, that a Greek did not normally call a man a lion insultingly.

Lastly, Herodotus has actually applied the imagery to a 'tyrannical man of might' in his account of the dream of Hipparchus which preceded the eventful Panathenaic procession (V. 56):

τλήθι λέων ἀτλητὰ παθὼν τετλητότι θυμῷ·  
οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων ἀδικῶν τίσιν οὐκ ἀποτίσει.

Focke does not quote the passage, and for good reason; for it is clear that, tyrant-hater as Herodotus was, he has preserved verses in which Hipparchus is addressed with all honour as a lion. It is very difficult to read any disparaging sense into the appellation. Taken at its face value, it merely implies courage and endurance.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Pagenstecher, *Unterritalische Grabdenkmäler*, pp. 51 sq., and Brandenburg, *Mitt. d. vorderasiat. Gesellschaft* XIX. 2 (1914), 55 sqq.

<sup>2</sup> Ed. Meyer, *Reich und Kultur d. Chetiter*, p. 62, for the meaning and origin of the symbolism; also his index, s.v. Löwe, for examples. Brandenburg, *loc. cit.*, speaking of animal reliefs on the façades of tombs in Asia Minor, remarks that the 'animals, mostly lions, have an apotropaic significance: they are the watchers whose

duty it is to guard the grave against sacrilege. He also calls attention to Etruscan parallels.

<sup>3</sup> I cannot pass these verses by, however, without making the suggestion that they derived eventually from an Orphic source. This suggestion is supported on purely internal evidence, though it cannot be regarded as unnatural that the prince of a court where Onomacritus and the South Italian poets flourished (see Kern, *Orpheus*, pp. 1 sq.) should have been connected with

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It seems inadvisable, therefore, to accept the explanation of Focke that the dream-portent was a fiction designed originally to discredit Pericles; for even if he had been termed a lion, which he is not, it would have been necessary to interpret this as meaning that he possessed spirited and martial qualities. Such qualities were of course by no means characteristic of Pericles, and consequently one is led to doubt the other interpretation of the passage as well—that interpretation which finds in the portent the quintessence of praise compressed in truly masterly fashion for the sake of pathos and effect. So far as arguments are forthcoming from the passage itself to support this laudatory interpretation, they seem to centre round its brevity. 'The brevity with which Herodotus, in accordance with one of his rules of composition, avoids any further remark about the man who is still alive, has a more moving effect than the most highly coloured pathos of rhetoric.' This stylistic judgment of Jacoby (*R.E. Suppl.* II. 238, 5 sqq.) must always in itself be open to the criticism that the brevity was not intended in this sense. It may be mere artistry, calculated rather to grace the page than Pericles. The only safe view is that of Focke, that so far as Herodotus himself is concerned, he was merely repeating a 'wonder' as was his wont, and that it is impossible to see further into his mind.<sup>1</sup> It may be added that the baldness of his account is quite characteristic of his treatment of these lesser 'wonders.' A far more marvellous one than this is to be found at I. 84 for example: κατὰ τοῦτο τῆς ἀκρόπολις τῇ οὐδαὶς ἐτέτακτο φύλακος· οὐ γὰρ ἦν δεινὸν κατὰ τοῦτο μὴ ἄλῳ κοτε· ἀπότομός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ ταῦτη ἡ ἀκρόπολις καὶ ἀμαχος· τῇ οὐδὲ Μήλης ὁ πρότερον βασιλεὺς Σαρδίων μούνη οὐ περιήνεκε τὸν λέοντα τὸν οἱ ἡ παλλακὴ ἔτεκε, Τελμηρσέων δικασάντων ὡς περιενειχθέντος τοῦ λέοντος τὸ τεῖχος ἔσονται Σάρδιες ἀνάλωτοι.<sup>2</sup> If no comment is vouchsafed on the actual birth of a lion from a human mother, why

verses of Orphic origin. The stress on the inevitability of justice and retribution is found in Orphism, whose personification of Δίκη seated at the side of Zeus caught the imagination of Plato and the fourth century (see *Legg.* IV. 715e, and [Dem.] XXV. 11), and which held that even the crimes of impious ancestors must be expiated (Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta*, No. 232, with which should be compared Plat. *Rep.* II. 364b; to Kern's bibliography should now be added Lagrange, *Rev. Biblique* (1920) 435 n. 32, and Nock, *Pagan Background of Early Christianity* 136 n. 2).

As for the first verse, the Thurian Orphic tablet, p. 16, line 4 (Olivieri), seems to provide a parallel, which gives practically the same sense:

χαῖρε παθὼν τὸ πάθημα· τὸ δ' οὕτω προσθ' ἐπεπόνθεις.

In this connexion it should be remembered that (1) there is no reason why the verses on these tablets should not have been taken from an Orphic poem descriptive of the underworld; in fact, their form, with its dialogue in hexameters, interspersed with catch phrases in prose, seems explicable only on some such assumption (see also Gruppe in Roscher: s.v. *Orpheus* 1124). (2) Kern has shown in *Hermes* (1916) that the sentiment expressed on the tablets is closely bound up with the myth of human contamination owing to the crime of the Titans. The soul in the next life has to prove his purification from this blemish. The sentiment of the lines in Herodotus admirably fits such a situation. (3) Orphic literature was bound up with the

oracle form; and notably at the court of Pisistratus the oracle-monger Onomacritus was at least living in close contact with South Italian Orphics (see above), even if the statement of Pausanias VIII. 37, 5, that Onomacritus wrote an Orphic poem himself be unreliable.

If this was the origin of this particular oracle, the λέων would form a most interesting parallel to the ἐριφος of the Orphic tablets. Whatever the reason for it may be, the tablets with their enigmatic ἐριφος ἐς γάλα ἔπετες (or ἔπετον) do equvalate the soul who is speaking with the animal—a striking anticipation of later Mithraism. If the lion be added to the list, this parallel becomes more striking still.

<sup>1</sup> This is not to say that it is impossible to discover the sense in which the story was first invented or circulated.

<sup>2</sup> This passage has never been satisfactorily explained, nor can I explain it. It seems possible to strip away the magical folk-tale motif of the dragging round the walls and the omission of a part of them which was to prove the Achilles heel of the place; and, as we have already seen, the lion in this part of the world had been credited ever since Hittite times with defensive qualities. But there still remains the concubine that gave birth to a lion. How and Wells, *ad loc.*, suggest a local story in connexion with the god Sandon. Salomon Reinach has explained the matter on totemistic grounds (*Cultes, Mythes, et Religions*, Vol. I.; *Les Carnassiers Androphages*, p. 293).

should our author turn aside to comment on the mere fevered dream of a pregnant woman? The baldness of the account is quite natural: the account of the dream simply serves Herodotus to end a long and somewhat laboured genealogy. As we have seen, the dream itself lends no colour to the view that it was invented or related in a disparaging sense. It is a curious genre in which to couch slander. Without strong evidence to the contrary it must be most natural to regard it as a family story, the evidence for which goes back ultimately to the dreamer herself.

## II.

It remains to investigate the phenomenon in this light in order to see if anything more lies behind the tradition than a mere pregnant woman's dream. Now the dream book of Artemidorus, which has recently been shown probably to contain much fifth-century material,<sup>1</sup> provides a most pertinent comment on the passage of Herodotus. In Book II., cap. 12, we read: σκύμους δὲ λέοντος ἰδεῖν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίσης πᾶσιν, ὥς δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺν παιδίον γένεσιν προαγορεύει. It is at once apparent that the passages of Herodotus and of Artemidorus are complementary one to the other. Agariste dreams that she gave birth to a lion; and such a dream can be interpreted as being prognosticatory of child-birth much more easily than the mere seeing of a lion cub, which is all that is referred to in Artemidorus, who may have shortened his source. Moreover, we gather from Artemidorus that a lion cub in a dream was a good omen; and so, whether Herodotus realized this or not, it would seem probable that the inventors, or rather the reporters, of the story meant it as a compliment to Pericles. The dream as given in Artemidorus would merely apply before conception was an assured fact; but if Artemidorus has shortened his source, a dream of this type may also have been prognosticatory of a worthy child, which is more in keeping with the first clause of the Artemidorus passage, and also with the laudatory sense of the leonine symbolism that has been already elucidated. The matter is really decided by a line from the *Thesmophoriazusae*<sup>2</sup> (evidence certainly from Pericles' own century), the meaning of which can only be clearly seen when it is considered in conjunction with Artemidorus and Herodotus:

λέων λέων σοι γέγονεν, αὐτ' ἔκμαγμα σόν  
τά τ' ἄλλ' ἀπαξάπαντα καὶ τὸ πόσθιον  
τῷ σῷ προσόμοιον, στρεβλὸν ὥσπερ κύτταρον.

The comedy of the situation must be grasped. It is an exaggerated burlesque of a midwife's complimentary address to a fortunate husband. In spite of Focke, the sense must be entirely complimentary. The humour is gained firstly by the quotation of a homely popular saying normally used in 'interesting' situations, secondly by the 'profane' descant on the theme in the sequel. Hence I conclude that a child that was called a lion was a worthy child, and that to dream of bearing a lion cub was a good omen so far as the character of the child was concerned. Moreover, the Aristophanes passage really shows that there is a basis of popular belief behind the statements of Artemidorus and Herodotus: that in some way the lion was given a special significance in connection with the birth of a human child.

<sup>1</sup> See S. Luria, *Bulletin de l'Académie des Sciences de l'U.R.S.S.*, 1927. The fifth-century source in question is Antiphon the Sophist. I would not definitely assert that the passage of Artemidorus in question actually comes from Antiphon, though the differentiation between two possible interpretations of such a dream, one of vague beneficiary import, the other in a more restricted sense as implying child-birth, might make it

possible to attribute the treatment to the 'genus artificiosum' of dream interpretations. If so, the likelihood of its ultimate source being Antiphon is certainly increased, especially if my contention is correct—that the Pericles portent is really an example, also from the fifth century, of this interpretation of a lion dream. See also note 5 (b), p. 192.

<sup>2</sup> 514.

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Moreover, in connexion with the birth of Alexander the Great, we read in Plutarch's life (II. 2 sq.): ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ μετὰ τὸν γάμον εἶδεν ὄναρ, αὐτὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα σφραγίδα τῇ γαστρὶ τῆς γυναικὸς (sc. Ὀλυμπιάδος). ἡ δὲ γλυφὴ τῆς σφραγίδος, ὡς ᾤετο, λέοντος εἶχεν εἰκόνα. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων μάντεων ὑφορμύμενων τὴν ὄψιν, ὡς ἀκριβεστέρως φυλακῆς δεομένων τῷ Φιλίππῳ τῶν περὶ τὸν γάμον, Ἀρίστανδρος ὁ Τελμησεὺς κύειν ἔφη τὴν ἀνθρωπον, οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀποσφραγίζεσθαι τῶν κενῶν, καὶ κύειν παῖδα θυμοειδῆ καὶ λεοντώδη τὴν φύσιν. Here again there is question of a dream and its interpretation; here again a lion is brought into connexion with the birth of a child; here again the interpretation is that the child will be worthy,<sup>1</sup> as well as that conception has taken place. The dream itself is, indeed, a different one; but the difference is, perhaps, simply the result of the sex of the dreamer. Whereas Agariste dreamt that she gave birth to a lion, Philip dreamed that in his progenitorial capacity he took steps to ensure the leonine character of his child. His dream is the masculine counterpart of the other. It is easy to gather from the context in Plutarch that the passage forms part of a list of birth prodigies (for which see also Justin XII. 16) calculated to enhance the divine nature of Alexander and to support the claims he made after his visit to the temple of Ammon. The ultimate 'source' is probably Clitarchus,<sup>2</sup> and the list itself is perhaps what is repudiated by Arrian IV. 10, 2, καὶ οὖν καὶ τοῦ θείου τὴν μετουσίαν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν Ὀλυμπιάς ὑπὲρ τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ ψεύδεται ἀνηγοῖσθαι . . ., although Otto Ausfeld thinks that Olympias herself actually circulated such stories.<sup>3</sup> In any case, the 'tendency' of the stories is clear: they were not calculated to relate simply to the birth of a successful soldier, but to one who was more than mortal. Moreover, the story of Philip's dream did not simply remain in the history books and romances,<sup>4</sup> for Tertullian, *de anima* 46, quotes it not in connexion with the history of Alexander, but à propos of dream interpretations in general, in exemplification of the thesis: 'Telmessenses nulla somnia euacuant, imbecillitatem coniectationis incusant.' Tertullian's version is: 'Philippus Macedo nondum pater Olympiadis uxoris naturam obsignasse uiderat anulo. Leo erat signum. Crediderat praeclusam genituram, opinor quia leo semel pater est. Aristodemus uel Aristophon coniectans immo nihil uacuum obsignari filium et quidem maximi impetus portendi. Alexandrum qui sciunt, leonem anuli recognoscunt.'<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> θυμοειδῆ and λεοντώδη are an echo of Platonism; see above, p. 187.

<sup>2</sup> Fraenkel, *Quellen der Alexanderhistoriker*, p. 303 and p. 172, attributes the passage to Clitarchus on the ground of its agreement with Justin. As the story is accepted or rehandled by pseudo-Callisthenes and the Alexander Romancers, this attribution is probably strengthened; for modern investigators have shown, in the words of W. Kroll: 'uerba eius (sc. pseudo-Callisthenis) saepe cum historicis congruunt quia narratione Clitarchea pendent.' (*Historia Alexandri Magni* (pseudo-Callisthenes), Vol. I. [1926], praef. p. xv.) See also O. Ausfeld, *d. gr. Alexanderroman* (Leipzig, 1907), p. 223.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 127; see also Berve, *d. Alexanderreich* II. 286.

<sup>4</sup> The story is found in greater or less detail in (a) Alexander Romances; see e.g. pseudo-Callisthenes, *op. cit.*, p. 9 (cap. 8, 2). Syrian trans. v. Ryssel, *Arch. f. d. Stud. d. neueren Sprachen* xc (1893). Aethiopian trans. Wallis Budge, *Life and Exploits of Alexander the Great* (London, 1896), Vol. II., p. 22. For the astrological influence see O. Feis, *Archiv. f. Gesch. u.*

*Medizin* (1919) 266 sqq. (b) Other authors: e.g. Eustathius on Dionys. Perieg. 254; Steph. of Byzantium s.v.

An interesting mediaeval parallel may perhaps be mentioned. Arnald of Villanova, *de parte operativa*, fol. 127, states that a lion on a lead seal prevents one from feeling pain from an operation for the stone, and this 'medicine' was used by Pope Boniface VIII. against pain from stone (Thorndyke, *Hist. of Magic and Experimental Science*, Vol. II., pp. 857-8). Similarly Peter of Abano tested the virtues of a like seal in gold as an antidote to pains in the intestines (*Diff.* 10; see Thorndyke, *op. cit.*, p. 899). The nature of the pain against which the seal was used and the known prevalence of the Alexander Romances might lead one to suppose that Philip's dream, as well as the astrological reasons adduced, had something to do with the practice. On lion as amulet see O. Jahn, *Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss.* (1855), p. 97.

<sup>5</sup> (a) The leonine characteristics of Alexander (for which see Plut. *Moralia* 186d) and the strange restriction on the fecundity of the animal (which—although, I believe, not hitherto noticed

Hence it is probably permissible to conclude that in the case of this dream, too, the dream-interpreters were convinced that a lion dreamed of in connexion with child-birth portended a child of extraordinary attainments.

If before going on to discuss those attainments space may be found for a little rationalization, it may be pointed out that in his account of the succeeding birth-portent of the snake Plutarch has seen fit to give a rationalizing explanation, which on the face of it is not a bad one, and which, if true, would explain the invention of the story, and vindicate Arrian's judgment that Olympias was not the author of these prodigies. Plutarch's source pointed out that the wild women of Illyria commonly handled snakes in the course of their worship.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, it may be pointed out that these women tattooed, as is proved at once by vase paintings<sup>2</sup> and by the direct statement of Strabo 315. It is quite possible, therefore, that the ultimate ground for the lion story was the figure of a lion tattooed<sup>3</sup> on the body of Olympias; and whether this was actually done in connexion with the birth of Alexander or not matters little, for in any case popular belief was such that either Olympias or the historians could rely on the verisimilitude of a story which connected that tattooed lion with child-birth.

### III.

On the basis, then, of these references to the connexion of lions with child-birth, it may be worth while to probe a little further into this connexion. There is little similarity between a lion cub and a child; and although undoubtedly the use of the lion-metaphor as applied to men is laudatory, it is yet not of so frequent occurrence as to warrant the assumption that it was simply the obvious likeness between a spirited warrior and a lion which gave its special significance to a lion-dream before child-birth. Pericles was not pre-eminently a spirited warrior. The child which is called a lion in the *Thesmophoriazusaë* is not so called with any reference to physical prowess or to *θυμός*. The tendency of the prodigies accompanying the birth of Alexander the Great is to prove him, not a good soldier, but superhuman. As the matter is one of popular superstition, it is not to be hoped that the ideas which originally underlay the superstition can be probed to the uttermost. The original sense of the superstition was probably by no means obvious to those who believed it in the fifth and fourth centuries.

—must be a mistaken echo of the Herodotean belief that a lioness only had one cub; Herodotus III. 108; Babr. 189 sq.; Basil, *Hexaem.*, 9th hom., cap. 5) are not original elements in the story. (b) The method of dream interpretation employed by the Telmessians is clearly the 'genus artificiosum'—Aristandros, according to Plutarch, was a Telmessian—hence this may further help to support the suggestion made above (note 16) that the dream about lions and child-birth was interpreted according to this canon, and may date back to Antiphon. (c) Ausfeld conjectures that behind the name Aristophon there lies the name Aristandros. It is barely possible that Aristandros and Antiphon were mentioned here originally together, though that might explain Tertullian's reading. In any case, the mistake is not to be blamed on to the MSS. of Tertullian.

<sup>1</sup> For a parallel statement about the women's worship in those parts, see Plut. *Crassus* 8 on the wife of Spartacus.

<sup>2</sup> The paintings show animals as tattooed on

arms or legs. See Cook, *Zeus* II. 1, 121, and note 3; S. Casson, *Thrace, Illyria, and Epirus*; Kazarow, *Kulturgesch. d. Thraker*.

<sup>3</sup> For the use of *σφραγίς* in this sense see Dölger, *Sphragis* (Paderborn, 1911), p. 20 (for animals) and pp. 31 sqq. (for men). See Carl Clemen in the *Hibbert Journal* for July, 1928, p. 716, for parallel 'primitive' practices which involve pictorial representation.

Otto Keller indeed seems to have read somewhere a notably variant account of the lion-portent (*Antike Tierwelt*, Vol. I., p. 53): 'When the wife of Philip of Macedon was pregnant with Alexander, she ordered that her body be sealed with the picture of a lion. This is the form of the legend in Suidas, while other authorities simply speak of a dream.' If it could be found, this alleged passage of Suidas would serve to strengthen the view suggested above; but I cannot find it, and consequently note with pleasure that O. Gruppe, in *Bursian Suppl.* 186, p. 144, criticizes Keller strongly for his loose methods of citation.

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It would seem that a fragment of Empedocles (127 Diels) throws light on the matter in a sufficiently direct fashion. The passage, which is taken from Aelian, *nat. an.* XII. 7, reads:

λέγει δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι μετοίκησιν τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ μὲν ἐς ζῶον ἢ λῆξιν αὐτὸν μεταγάγοι, λέοντα γίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ ἐς φυτὸν, δάφνην. ἃ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει ταῦτα ἐστίν

ἐν θήρεσσι λέοντες ὀρειλεχέες χαμῖναι  
γίγονται, δάφναι δ' ἐν δένδρεσιν ἡνκόμοισιν.

It was a commonplace with those Greeks who believed in the transmigration of souls that the human soul might after death inhabit the body of an animal. It is only logical to suppose that such people also believed that a new-born child might have derived its soul from a dead animal; and if this aspect of the matter is not stressed in the ancient authors, that is only because the imagination of an already existent human being tends to play around his future rather than his past, his death rather than his birth. Pythagoras at any rate was supposed to have given a sketch of his previous embodiments. Now the whole system of transmigration lends itself to the construction of a *scale* of lives, such as is highly developed in the schemes of Eastern religions. Even in the sphere of human lives there is clearly a better and a worse, and when animal or plant lives are called in question this must be much more the case. 'Non dissimile Platonis illud est quod aiebat se gratias agere naturae: primum quod homo natus esset potius quam mutum animal; deinde quod mas, potius quam femina; quod Graecus, quam barbarus; postremo quod Atheniensis, et quod temporibus Socratis.'<sup>1</sup> Such a scale of lives whereby a soul might ultimately escape from the bodily is implied or expressed in Pindar, *Olympian* II. 75 sq., in Empedocles, fr. 146 Diels, and in the Platonic myths.<sup>2</sup> The principle is baldly stated in the *Timaeus* (42b-c): καὶ ὁ μὲν εὖ τὸν προσήκοντα χρόνον βιούς, πάλιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ συννόμου πορευθεὶς οἰκησιν ἄστρον, βίον εὐδαίμονα καὶ συνήθη ἔξοι, σφαλεῖς δὲ τούτων εἰς γυναικὸς φύσιν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ γενέσει μεταβάλοι· μὴ πανόμενός τε ἐν τούτοις ἐπὶ κακίας, τρόπον ὃν κακύνοιτο, κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς τοῦ τρόπου γενέσεως εἰς τινα τοιαύτην αἰὲ μεταβάλοι θήρεων θύσιν κ.τ.λ. Thus the scale of lives in descending order would seem to be: Hero, Man, Woman, Animal. It is not possible, however, boldly to attribute such a scheme in its detail either to popular thought or Orphic literature solely on the grounds of Plato's mythology, for, as can be seen from *Rep.* 620a sqq., his own imagination played with this material, and arranged it to suit his own literary and mythological knowledge. He dispenses poetic justice to well-known characters. So the soul of Orpheus, the tuneful prophet of homo-sexualism,<sup>3</sup> becomes a swan, *μίσει τοῦ γυναικείου γένους* . . . οὐκ ἐθέλουσαν ἐν γυναικὶ γεννηθεῖσαν γενέσθαι. *Thamyris* becomes a nightingale; *Agamemnon* an eagle (*Aeschylus'* simile); *Atalanta* an athlete; *Epeios* a *τεχνικὴ γυνή*; *Thersites* a monkey. Hence no importance can be attached to the metamorphosis of *Ajax* in such a list into a lion, for the well-known Homeric simile was doubtless present in the author's mind, and solely responsible. Thus neither the treatment of animal metamorphosis in *Timaeus*, *i.e.*, nor the still wilder one of *Timaeus* 90e, can be accepted as evidence of anything beyond the workings of the Platonic imagination. There remains, however, the fact that some schematization of the lives to be lived is almost a logical necessity for a system

<sup>1</sup> Lactantius, *Instit.* Div. III. 19; see also Plutarch, *v. Mar.* 46. The touching death-bed prayer reminds one strongly of the critical successors of Callimachus, who had a special liking for delineating the fashion of a great man's death.

<sup>2</sup> *Rep.* 618a sqq.; *Phaedr.* 248c-d. O. Kern has received this last passage into his *Orphicorum*

*Fragmenta* (No. 20); but it is not meant to imply that the actual form of the grading of the lives is anything but purely Platonic. In this case only human lives are taken into account.

<sup>3</sup> οὐνεκα πρῶτος εἰδείξεν ἐνὶ Θρήκεσσιν ἔρωτας ἄρρενας, οὐδὲ πόθους ἤνεσε θηλυτέρων.

Phanocles ap. Stob. *Eclog.* IV. 20, 47.

of transmigration, and that Pindar and Empedocles—neither of them, probably, in this particular original—do suggest such a scheme. Taking full account therefore of the fact that Empedocles states definitely that the leonine life is the best, I would suggest that we have here the life which is parallel in the animal sphere to the lives of those βασιλῆες ἀγαοὶ καὶ σθένει κραιπνοὶ σοφία τε μέγιστοι | ἄνδρες (*Thren.* frs. 133, 3 sq., Schroeder). This life successfully lived among men leads on directly to the islands of the blest. In the same way I would suggest that the leonine life leads on to the life of the highest type of man. If this is so, it immediately becomes intelligible why a lion-portent was so important before the birth of a child. It meant that the child was well on the way to eternal bliss, and, moreover, was capable of living a splendid human life as soldier, statesman, or, Pindar would add, poet, and Empedocles, doctor.

## IV.

In conclusion it may be permitted to point out one or two details in which the application of lion symbolism in the sense sketched in this paper may be illuminating. Firstly, Λέων as a personal name is by no means uncommon,<sup>1</sup> and although derivatives like Λεοντοδάμας and Λεόφρων rather suggest that the symbolism behind the name is simply one of physical prowess or 'spirit,' and although perhaps Λέων itself as a personal name may have been eventually used in this sense,<sup>2</sup> it is nevertheless possible that the original use of this name was a consequence of the belief in the transmigration scheme detailed above.

Secondly, there comes to mind the interesting Mithraic 'leontica,' the grade of Mithraic worshippers that was first admitted to full participation in the rites of their religion. In discussing the initiation robe of the 'leontica,' Porphyry, *de abst.* IV. 16, first describes it as being covered with representations of animals,<sup>3</sup> and then proceeds to give two different explanations, both taken from Pallas: ὃν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδοῖς Πάλλας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Μίθρα τὴν κοινὴν φησι φορὰν οἶσθαι ὡς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ κύκλου ἀποτείνειν· τὴν δὲ ἀληθινὴν ὑπόληψιν καὶ τὸν ἀκριβῆ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν αἰνίττεσθαι ὡς παντοδαποῖς περιέχεσθαι σώμασι λέγουσι.<sup>4</sup> Such a belief would be one of those intangible grounds of sympathy which enable one people of a different age and nurtured in a different civilization to accept the beliefs and practices initiated in the past amongst another people with differing characteristics and modes of thought. Such grounds of sympathy there must have been to account for the growth of Mithraism, and it may not be entirely erroneous to suppose that

<sup>1</sup> Pape-Benseler s.v. for full name. Fick-Bechtel (second edition), p. 190, for compound names with Λέων-element.

<sup>2</sup> In Herodotus VII. 180 the Persians, having captured their first ship, and having decided on a ceremonious slaying of a member of the crew (doubtless for religious purposes), they chose a man called Λέων. Herodotus is much exercised as to why they chose this man, and explains that he was κάλλιστος, which the Persians considered to be of good omen; 'but,' he continues, 'perhaps he may have had his name to thank in part for his fate.' The passage has been discussed variously (see e.g. for alternatives Macan *ad loc.*); but the simple explanation seems to be that Herodotus is pointing out that the man's name was that of an animal, a thing which may well have determined the choice made by the

Persians when on the lookout for a sacrificial victim, especially as the lion in a sacral connexion was well known in Asia Minor. If this is so, then we have here an example of the personal name interpreted apparently without any reference to ideas of transmigration.

<sup>3</sup> A well-known parallel is the robe in Apuleius, *Met.* XI. 24: 'quaqua tamen uiseres, colore uario circumnotatis insignabar animalibus, hipec dracones Indici, inde gripes Hyperborei, quos in speciem pinnatae alitis generat mundus alter: hanc Olympicam stolam nuncupant.'

<sup>4</sup> For a discussion of the passage, see Cumont, *Les Mystères de Mithra*, German trans. by Gehrich-Latte, third edition (1923), p. 139; Reitzenstein, *Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, third edition, p. 263.

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Pallas has put his finger upon one of them.<sup>1</sup> Granted some such latent belief in the vulgar mind of the importance of lions in connexion with transmigration and re-birth as has been suggested above, the fact that Pallas offered his transmigration explanation of the Leontic robe becomes more understandable. What is more important is that such a belief would form a most suitable groundwork for the reception of the seven grades of Mithraic initiates, with its animal symbolism.

Lastly, it is not impossible that the particular connexion of lions with child-birth and transmigration may explain the enigmatic fragment of Epimenides, which runs :

καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ γένος εἰμὶ Σελήνης ἡυκόμοιο,  
ἢ δεινὸν φρίξας ἀπεσείσατο θήρα λέοντα·  
ἐν Νεμέῃ δ' ἀγχοῦσ' αὐτὸν διὰ πότνιαν Ἥραν  
<θείῃ ἱς ἐδάμασσε βίης Ἡρακληείης>.

Fr. 2, Diels.

Teachers of the order of Epimenides and Pythagoras were in a specially exalted category of men, for intelligent beings were to be divided into gods, men, and men like Pythagoras.<sup>2</sup> In claiming to be a descendant of the Moon, Epimenides was but imitating the claim made for Musaeus.<sup>3</sup> The strange thing is that, having claimed to be a descendant of the Moon in the first line of the extant fragment, Epimenides goes on, whether Diels' reconstitution of the text is correct or not, to mention, not apparently his own line of descent, but the seemingly absurdly irrelevant fact that the Nemean lion was a child of the Moon. May it be that Epimenides treated this lion as the link between himself and the Moon, that he claimed to be a reincarnation of the soul of the Nemean lion? If so, the passage becomes intelligible, which before it certainly was not.

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<sup>1</sup> My colleague, Dr. H. W. Lawton, has pointed out to me the description of a robe in Benoit de Ste. Maure, *Roman de Troie*, vv. 13, 333 sqq., which may possibly be a twelfth-century reference to a magical tradition which has inherited the embroidered dress of the mysteries, unless, indeed, it was merely engendered by marvellous eastern silks.

<sup>2</sup> En Inde la Superior  
firent un drap enchanteur  
par nigromance et par merveille.

si n'a soz ciel bestes ne flors  
dont l'om n'i veie portraitures,  
formes, semblances et figures.

un sage poëte Indien  
qui o Calcas le Troïen  
ot esté longement apris  
li enveia de son pais.

<sup>3</sup> Iambl. *Vit. Pyth.* 31.

<sup>4</sup> The person speaking may actually be Musaeus (Diels, *ad loc.*).

## THE TRIBUNATE OF CORNELIUS.

### I. THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE TRIBUNATE OF CORNELIUS.

THE two years which intervened between the consulship of Pompey and Crassus in 70 B.C. and the tribunate of Cornelius in 67 B.C. are for the most part neglected in the standard histories of the period. It is true that they were uneventful, if by uneventful is meant the absence of open hostilities between the two political parties. Yet a careful investigation of the political affiliations of the men who were prominent in these years, and of the significance of events which usually are considered of secondary moment, reveals political undercurrents which go far towards explaining the meaning, not only of what happened in 67 B.C., but also of the more serious disturbances four years later.

In 71 B.C. the senatorial party capitulated before the combined armies of Crassus and Pompey, and these two men were elected consuls for 70 B.C. This reaction, in so far as it was not due to a show of military force, was in a large measure the result of the successful prosecution of Verres and the subsequent publication by Cicero of the *actio secunda*. Several measures of reform were promptly carried. The *lex Aurelia* of 75 B.C., by which the disqualification of the tribunes for higher office was removed, was supplemented by a *lex Pompeia de tribunicia potestate*, which abolished the restrictions imposed by Sulla on the powers of the tribunes. A brother of the reforming consul of 75 B.C. was the author of a *lex Aurelia* which reformed the *quaestiones perpetuae*. Henceforth the juries were to be composed of senators, *equites* and *tribuni aerarii*. Censors were again appointed, and they began their duties by expelling from the senate sixty-four of the partisans of Sulla. Unquestionably, these three measures of reform were badly needed, and the enactment of them was a distinct triumph for the anti-senatorial party. But the extraordinary fact is that the ascendancy of the party of reform was as short-lived as it was sudden, and the magnificent gesture of constitutional revolt premature. The appreciation of this fact is essential if one is to understand the political situation during the seven years preceding the Catilinarian conspiracy. The causes of discontent were many, but the fundamental reason why the elements of discontent were forced to abandon a policy of constitutional reform and resort to open rebellion is to be sought in the practically uninterrupted domination of the senatorial party. Therein lies the explanation of the turbulent tribunate of Cornelius in 67 B.C., the attempted murder of the consuls in 66 B.C., and finally in 63 B.C. the armed outbreak of the Catilinarians.

The senatorial domination was the result of several factors. First of all, the personal relations between Pompey and Crassus were never cordial, and their alliance in 71 B.C. was half-hearted. Again, the Popular leaders were frankly suspicious of Pompey, while he on his part, then as always, preferred to play a lone hand. As for Crassus, there is nothing in his life to show that, eminently successful though he was as a financier, he was possessed of those qualities of political genius which mark a leader. Caesar at this time was still a novice in politics. The consequence of this lack of capable leadership was that the actual initiative among the discontented elements was in the hands of men of distinctly secondary importance. Crassus and Caesar were no doubt in the background, and had a hand in directing the political manoeuvres of their partisans, but certainly they were not in a position effectively to control the actions of the rank and file of the Popular party. Autronius, Sulla, Piso,

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<sup>1</sup> Asc  
<sup>2</sup> Ibid

Vargunteius and even Catiline are names of minor political significance, and yet these are the names of the men who during this period led almost every assault against the entrenchments of the nobles. The third reason for the ascendancy of the *optimates* was the obviously superior organization of that faction. Years of almost uninterrupted control had given it not only invaluable experience in the management of foreign and domestic relations, but also a distinct influence among the Roman electorate. There is no doubt but that the actual machinery for the control of votes and elections was much more highly developed among the *optimates* than among the *populares*. In consequence the opposition, despairing of constitutional methods of reform, resorted to violence. In 67 B.C. rioting in the streets of Rome twice caused the postponement of the consular *comitia*. In 66 B.C., after the conviction of Autronius and Sulla for bribery, a *coup d'état* was planned, which was to be inaugurated by the murder of the consuls, and finally in 63 B.C. the utter hopelessness of their situation provoked the Popular leaders to open rebellion.

There are certain passages in Asconius which tend to show that the senatorial party had evolved a political organization, the management of which was vested in a few leading *optimates*. In the *argumentum* of Cicero's speech *pro Cornelio de maiestate*, which was delivered in 65 B.C., Asconius, referring to the *rogatio* of Cornelius *ne quis nisi per populum legibus solueretur*, writes *indigne eam Corneli rogationem tulerant potentissimi quique ex senatu quorum gratia magnopere minuebatur*.<sup>1</sup> When the senatorial tribune, P. Servilius Globulus, interceded, Cornelius modified his *rogatio*, and in its modified form it was carried. The comment of Asconius is *nemo enim negare poterat pro senatus auctoritate esse eam legem; sed tamen eam tulit inuitis optimatibus qui per paucos (amicis) gratificari solebant*.<sup>2</sup>

Additional light is thrown on these two sources by a comment which Asconius makes on a passage in the second speech of Cicero in defence of Cornelius. *Quinque enim consulares, ut iam diximus, in Cornelium testimonium dixerunt: Q. Catulus, Q. Hortensius, Q. Metellus Pius pont. max., quos hac secunda oratione tractat, et duo qui nondum dixerant quos nunc significat Lucullus et Lepidus*.<sup>3</sup>

In another passage Asconius again mentions by name these five men, calling them *principes civitatis qui plurimum in senatu poterant*.<sup>4</sup>

It is abundantly clear from these passages that the senatorial party itself was controlled by an inner clique composed of these five men. The uncompromising conservatism of Catulus was proverbial. He vigorously opposed the Gabinian and Manilian laws, and, as censor with Crassus in 65 B.C., played an important part in checking the liberal tendencies of his colleague. His death a few years later was a severe blow to the *optimates*. Hortensius, who was a friend of Verres and undertook his defence, was elected consul for 69 B.C., an indication of a violent reaction on the part of the electorate in favour of the senatorial party. Lepidus was one of the successful senatorial candidates for the consulship of 66 B.C. The part played by these men in this critical period is important, and bears out the evidence of Asconius. They held securely in their hands the reins of government, and exerted a compelling influence over the Roman electorate. When their influence was being lessened by the activities of Cornelius, and their system of patronage threatened by his measures, they vigorously opposed his legislation, and after his tribunate did not rest content until they had brought him to trial *de maiestate*.

Let us turn to the events of 69 B.C. The coalition of Pompey and Crassus in 71 B.C. had put into power the party of reform. Yet the most striking event of that year occurred at the consular *comitia*. The voting resulted in the election of two leading *optimates*—Hortensius and Q. Caecilius Metellus. Certainly it is surprising

<sup>1</sup> Asconius (ed. Clark), p. 58, ll. 11 sqq.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59, ll. 4 sqq.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79, ll. 20 sqq.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60, ll. 19 sqq.

that the Roman electorate should so soon repent of having put in power the Popular party. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that at the time of the elections Pompey and Crassus were in at least nominal control of the situation, and in all likelihood had in the field candidates of their own. Their defeat was decisive. Hortensius was such a decided conservative that he undertook the defence of the notorious Verres. In fact, Verres rested his hopes of acquittal on the postponement of the trial to 69 B.C., when his friend and advocate would be consul. A man of Hortensius' convictions could have had no sympathies whatever with the party of Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar. His colleague, Q. Caecilius Metellus, though a less prominent, was not a less loyal optimiste. The attitude of defiance which, as proconsul of Crete, he displayed towards Pompey, required not only great personal courage, but also confidence in the security of his position. The astounding fact is that Metellus eventually had his way, conquered the island, celebrated a triumph at Rome, and received the complimentary title of *Creticus*. It is hard to believe that his opposition to Pompey would have been successful had there not existed at that time in Rome a powerful senatorial clique upon whose influence he could and did depend. Certainly it is remarkable that seven months after the consulate was assumed by Crassus and Pompey, under whose leadership the overthrow of the Sullan constitution was substantially accomplished, the election should result in the return of two leading reactionaries.

The *comitia* of the following year again proved a disappointment to the *populares*. L. Caecilius Metellus and Q. Marcius Rex were the successful candidates. Metellus died in the early part of the year, and the man chosen in his stead (we do not know his name) died before assuming office.<sup>1</sup> We have no further information regarding Metellus, but it is safe to assume that he was a senatorial, and probably a relative both of Metellus Creticus, consul of the previous year, and of Metellus Pius, the *pontifex maximus*, and one of the five *principes civitatis qui plurimum in senatu poterant*. Q. Marcius Rex, who for the major portion of the year was sole consul, while not a decided optimiste, was a *persona grata* to the senatorial party. Dio tells us that the *optimates* were indignant, because by the provisions of the Manilian law Marcius and Acilius were being removed from their command before its period had expired.<sup>2</sup>

Again, at the outbreak of the Catilinarian conspiracy Marcius was unequivocally on the side of law and order, and was despatched by decree of the senate to Faesulae.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the failures of the opposition at the elections of 70 B.C. and of 69 B.C., the Popular agitation was all the while gaining momentum. In the canvass for the consulate of 67 B.C. one notes the first evidences of nervousness on the part of the senatorial party. The optimatist candidates, C. Calpurnius Piso and M. Acilius Glabrio, were successful, but neither of them escaped the suspicion of bribery, and the former was actually indicted on the charge. He escaped being brought to trial, according to Dio, by indiscriminate bribery.<sup>4</sup>

That bribery was thought necessary to insure election is significant. Bribery may have been employed by the *optimates* in the canvassing of the two previous years. It is difficult to explain in any other way the outcome of the elections for the consulship of 69 B.C., if indeed the Popular reaction of 70 B.C. was at all genuine.

<sup>1</sup> Dio Cassius XXXVI. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* XXXVI. 43.

<sup>3</sup> Sall. *Cat.* XXX. 3; cf. XXXII. 3 *sqq.* Too much ought not to be made of his connexion with Clodius. He married one of the sisters of Clodius, but so also did Lucullus, whose conservatism is above suspicion. Clodius, it must be remembered, was a patrician of the bluest blood, and though in his conduct at this time

there is ample evidence of potentialities for evil, there is nothing to show that he assumed the rôle of leader of the Roman mob until after the *causa célèbre* of December, 62 B.C. After that scandal Clodius ceased to be in the good graces of his brother-in-law, who omitted to name him in his will (Cic. *ad Att.* I. 16, 10).

<sup>4</sup> Dio Cassius XXXVI. 38.

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But in 68 B.C. the abuse must have been of a more flagrant character. Unfortunately we do not know the names of the other competitors, but the *populares* must have had a man in the field whose candidacy was considered by the *optimates* a real threat. The indictment for bribery obviously was inspired by the Popular leaders, for Piso was a senatorial. His vigorous opposition to Cornelius in the year of his consulship is proof enough of that.<sup>1</sup>

But the indictment of Piso is not the only sign of a renewed activity and a larger confidence on the part of the Popular party. At the tribunicial elections of 68 B.C. one of the successful candidates was Cornelius, a man who had been a *tribunus militum* on the staff of Pompey, and was now put forward by him to represent his interests. Probably he represented Crassus as well as Pompey, as there is no evidence that the estrangement between these two had yet arisen. The election of Cornelius was no mean victory for the *populares*. In the previous two years they not only had failed at the consular *comitia*, but also were unable to elect a tribune of influence sufficient to cause the senate embarrassment. In Cornelius, however, they at last had a man who during his year of office was to be a most unpleasant thorn in the side of the *optimates*. In him rested all their hopes, and they determined, through his agency, to exert every effort to break the hold which the senatorial party had on the Roman electorate.

## II. THE TRIBUNATE OF CORNELIUS.

The year 67 B.C. was a stormy one. The consular elections were twice postponed, rioting in the streets of Rome was not infrequent, and actual murder was barely avoided. The occasion and the centre of the agitation was the question of bribery. Dio has an important statement to make on this question. Two events, both of which occurred in 70 B.C., especially caused bribery now to become rampant. The first was legislation restoring the prerogatives of the tribunate; the other was the act of the censors in striking off the list of senators the names of sixty-four *Sullani homines*. The result of both these moves was the formation of a large number of factions and cliques, composed both of those who aimed at the tribunate as a stepping-stone to political power, and of those who by achieving election to a curule office sought to regain their senatorial rank.<sup>2</sup>

Cornelius was not the only representative of their party whom the Popular leaders had succeeded in electing to the tribunicial office. The *concilium plebis* also returned Gabinius, who, if we are to judge by the character of his legislation, was much more closely allied with Pompey than was Cornelius. However, since Pompey had not yet openly broken with Crassus, it is preferable to consider both tribunes as representative of a party, rather than of this or that leader in the party. Indeed, Pompey's political position during this and the following years is not at all clear. Certainly his leanings were towards the Popular party, but at the same time he was careful not to identify himself too closely with it. His main purpose at this time was to secure for himself a military command, and Crassus and Caesar were not unwilling that he should. Pompey with a powerful army at his back, might very

<sup>1</sup> There are other recorded incidents in his life which make it clear that his devotion to optimate principles was not of the inactive kind. In 63 B.C. he joined with Catulus in an effort to induce Cicero to incriminate Caesar in the Catilinarian conspiracy. (Sall. *Cat.* XLIX. 1.) Soon afterwards, at the memorable debate in the senate on December the fifth, he was one of those who spoke for death (Cic. *ad Att.* XII. 21). It was fitting that on his return from the governorship of Gallia Narbonensis he should be prose-

cuted by Caesar for maladministration.

<sup>2</sup> Dio Cassius XXXVI. 38. Of all the Popular acts of 70 B.C., this summary action on the part of the censors probably caused the most resentment among the *patres*. It was calculated to ruin the career of the more notorious of the partisans of Sulla. Among them was Antonius, who was guilty of flagrant maladministration in Achaea, and on his return was prosecuted by Caesar. (Asconius, p. 84, ll. 12 sqq.)

easily become a lever with which the Popular leaders could turn to their own profit the political situation.

The year 67 B.C. began with the *populares*, as usual, on the defensive. The consuls were Calpurnius and Acilius, both *optimates*, and both under grave suspicion of having secured their election by bribery. The party of reform determined to strike. They had a powerful instrument in the person of Cornelius, and he was chosen to propose a law against bribery. The immediate consequence of this aggressive gesture on the part of the Popular party was an open battle between the senate and Cornelius. The tribune was not a man of half measures, and he struck hard and often. On the other side the senators, and especially that clique of senators which directed the policy of the party, fought desperately to retain its power. What happened during the year, and why it happened, is fairly clear, but the order of events is not so evident. Dio Cassius and Asconius, the two principal authorities for the history of the year, agree in the main, but differ on details. The narrative of Asconius is found in his *argumentum* of Cicero's speech *pro Cornelio de maiestate*.<sup>1</sup>

With his description of the order of events let us compare that of Dio :<sup>2</sup>

#### ASCONIUS.

(i.) Alienatus [Cornelius] autem a senatu (est) ex hac causa. Rettulerat ad senatum ut, quoniam exterarum nationum legatis pecunia magna daretur usura turpiaque et famosa ex eo lucra fierent, ne quis legatis exterarum nationum pecuniam expensam ferret. Cuius relationem repudiavit senatus.

(ii.) Cornelius ea re offensus senatus questus est de ea in contione . . . promulgavitque legem qua auctoritatem senatus minuebat, ne quis nisi per populum legibus solueretur.

(iii.) Indigne eam Corneli rogationem tulerant potentissimi quique ex senatu quorum gratia magnopere minuebatur ; itaque P. Servilius Globulus tribunus plebis inventus erat qui C. Cornelio ob-sisteret (the result of the *intercessio* of Globulus was a riot from which Piso barely escaped with his life). Quo tumulto Cornelius perturbatus concilium dimisit.

(iv.) Tum Cornelius ita ferre rursus coepit ne quis in senatu legibus solueretur nisi CC adfuissent, neque quis, cum solutus esset, intercederet, cum de ea re ad populum ferretur. Haec sine tumultu res acta est.

<sup>1</sup> Asconius, pp. 57 sqq.

#### DIO CASSIUS.

(i.) Γαίος τις Κορνήλιος δημαρχῶν πικρότατα ἐπιτίμια τάξει κατ' αὐτῶν ἐπεχείρησε καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ ὁ ὄμιλος ἤρεϊτο. ἡ γὰρ βουλὴ . . . μεταρρυθμίσει πῇ τὴν ἐσθγγισιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῖς ὑπάτοις νομοθετησάι αὐτὴν ἐκέλευσεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸς ἀρχαιρεσίαι προσηγγεμέναι ἦσαν, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲν προνομοθετηθῆναι πρὸς αὐτῶν ἐξῆν, καὶ οἱ σπουδαρχῶντες πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ ἐν τῷ διακένῳ τούτῳ ἐποίουν, ὥστε καὶ σφαγὰς γίγνεσθαι, τὸν τε νόμον ἐψηφίσαντο καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνων ἐσνεχθῆναι καὶ φρουρὰν τοῖς ὑπάτοις δοθῆναι.

(ii.) ἀγανακτήσας οὖν ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ Κορνήλιος γνώμην ἐποιήσατο μὴ ἐξεῖναι τοῖς βουλευταῖς μήτε ἀρχὴν τινὲ ἐξω τῶν νόμων αἰτήσαντι δίδόναι μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν τῷ δήμῳ προσηκόντων ψηφίζεσθαι.

(iii.) Θορύβον τε ἐπ' αὐτῷ πολλοῦ συμβάντος (καὶ γὰρ ἀντέπρασσον τῶν τε ἄλλων τῶν ἐκ τῆς γερονσίας συχνοὶ καὶ ὁ Πίσων) τὰς τε βάρβδους αὐτοῦ ὁ ὄχλος συνέτριψε καὶ αὐτὸν διασπᾶσθαι ἐπεχείρησεν. ἰδὼν οὖν τὴν ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν ὁ Κορνήλιος τότε μὲν, πρὶν ἐπιψηφίσαι τι, διαφῆκε τὸν σύλλογον,

(iv.) ὕστερον δὲ προσέγραφε τῷ νόμῳ τὴν τε βουλὴν πάντως περὶ αὐτῶν προβουλευεῖν καὶ τὸν δῆμον ἐπάναγκες ἐπικυροῦν τὸ πρόβουλεμα. καὶ οὕτως ἐκείνόν τε διανομοθέτησε . . .

<sup>2</sup> Dio Cassius XXXVI. 38-40.

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The only point on which these two accounts seriously disagree is in their statements of the *occasion* of the disorders. According to Asconius the trouble began with a *relatio ad senatum* aimed at the practice of lending money at usurious rates to foreign envoys. When the senate refused to consider it, Cornelius attacked the senate at a meeting of the *plebs*, and tried to carry a *plebiscitum* forbidding the senate to dispense with the laws in any case without first submitting the question to the *populus*. The narrative of Dio is quite different. According to his account, Cornelius prepared and carried a *relatio ad senatum*<sup>1</sup> on bribery. The senate contended that the *relatio* was unnecessarily severe, and instructed the consuls to modify it, and to have it carried in the assembly. But the elections had already been announced, and the consuls were forbidden to summon a legislative assembly until after the election. To obviate this difficulty the senate passed a *privilegium* dispensing the presiding consul, Piso, from the provisions of the inconvenient law.<sup>2</sup>

Cornelius retaliated by bringing forward a bill to forbid the granting of such dispensations save by vote of the assembly. From this point the narratives of Asconius and Dio are in substantial, and sometimes verbal, agreement.

There is no doubt but that Asconius is *per se* a more reliable authority than Dio. Moreover, in this particular case he had before him the text of Cicero's speech *pro Cornelio*, which included a *narratio* of the events of 67 B.C. For all that there are certain points in his account which one is severely tempted to question. According to Asconius, after the senate refused to consider the *relatio* of Cornelius regarding the lending of money to foreign envoys the tribune attacked the *patres* in a *contio*, and proposed a law *ne quis nisi per populum legibus solueretur*. But what is the point of this law precisely in these circumstances? Did it have no connexion with previous episodes, and was Cornelius merely on general principles venting his spite on the senate? Or was it aimed at a recent action of the senate, which pointed towards an abuse which the law sought to remedy? The second alternative is preferable. It is difficult to see how the law against dispensations by the senate can have had any connexion with the law against lending money to foreign envoys. If, on the other hand, we follow the story of Dio, we find a logical *nexus* between the law against dispensations *nisi per populum* and an immediately preceding act of the senate. The senate, in order to kill Cornelius' law on bribery, had drawn up a law of its own, which it was most desirous of carrying before the consular *comitia* were held. But there were serious difficulties in the way of this procedure. According to the terms of the *lex Aelia et Fufia*, a legislative assembly could not be convoked between the time of the announcement of the elections and the day on which they were to be held, nor could an elective assembly be used for legislation.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dio does not precisely say that the proposal of Cornelius was in the form of a *relatio ad senatum*. But, since it was adopted by the *concilium*, and the senate had no authority to reject or modify a *plebiscitum*, it could not have been in the latter form.

<sup>2</sup> The *lex Aelia et Fufia*; see explanation *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> This inference is drawn from the passage in Dio (XXXVI. 39) which reads: *ἐπεὶ δὲ αὖτε ἀρχαιρεσθῆναι προεπηγγελμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲν προνομοθετηθῆναι πρὸ αὐτῶν ἔξῃ, καὶ οἱ σπουδαρχῶντες πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ ἐν τῷ διακέρῳ τοῦτω ἐποίουν, ὥστε καὶ σφαγὰς γίνεσθαι, τὸν τε νόμον ἐψηφίσαντο καὶ πρὸ ἐκείνων ἐσενεχθῆναι καὶ φρουρὰν τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν δοθῆναι*, and a passage in Cicero's letters (*ad Att.* I. 16, 13) *Lurco autem tribunus pl. qui magistratum \*insimul cum lege alia\* iniit, solutus est et Aelia et Fufia ut legem de ambitu ferret. . . .*

This letter was written in July, 61 B.C., very shortly before the *comitia* of that year. The situation of 61 B.C., as described in this letter of Cicero, is very similar to that which we are now examining. Lurco, a tribune, desired to carry a law on bribery. But the consular elections had already been announced. Accordingly he must be dispensed from the provisions of the *lex Aelia et Fufia*, in order that he may summon a legislative assembly before the holding of the consular *comitia*. In 67 B.C. the consuls are anxious to carry a law on bribery. The same process of dispensation has to be gone through. Dio describes it accurately enough, but he fails to mention that the law from which the consul had to be dispensed was the *lex Aelia et Fufia*. (There were originally two laws, the *lex Aelia* and the *lex Fufia*, which came to be considered and spoken of as one *lex Aelia et Fufia*.)

A *privilegium*, therefore, was passed by the senate dispensing the presiding consul, Piso, from the provisions of the inconvenient law. Cornelius attempted to thwart this summary procedure on the part of the senate by a *rogatio ne quis nisi per populum legibus solueretur*, which was obstructed by the *intercessio* of the senatorial tribune Globulus.<sup>1</sup>

In this account the law against senatorial dispensations has a logical place in the development of the situation. It is a retaliatory measure proposed by Cornelius for the purpose of preventing the dispensation of the consul Piso from the provisions of the *lex Aelia et Fufia*. It has no such place in the story of Asconius.

Let us try now to reconstruct the events of 67 B.C. There is an item of evidence from Cicero which throws considerable light on the problem. In his speech on the Manilian law Cicero says:<sup>2</sup> *Nam cum propter dilationem comitiorum ter praetor primus centuriis cunctis renuntiatus sum, facile intellexi, Quirites, et quid de me iudicaretis et quid aliis praescriberetis.* This evidence makes it absolutely certain that the *comitia* of 67 B.C. were twice postponed. The occasion of this must have been rioting of a serious nature, which occurred on at least two distinct occasions. What were these two occasions? It is unlikely that the proposal of Cornelius *ne quis legatis exterarum nationum pecuniam expensam ferret* was the cause of a serious disturbance. The senate quietly replied that the matter was sufficiently provided for in a previous *senatus consultum*, and the question was dropped. Both riots, therefore, must have been occasioned by the agitation concerning *ambitus*, and the effort of the senatorial party to pass its modified version despite the clauses of the *lex Aelia et Fufia*. The first riots took place at the *concilium plebis*, before which Cornelius laid his proposal restricting senatorial dispensations. In the face of the *intercessio* of Globulus, Cornelius boldly proceeded to read the *codex*. This unconstitutional procedure brought forth a vigorous protest from Piso. Rioting broke out, and Piso barely escaped with his life.<sup>3</sup> This disturbance occurred but a few days before the *comitia*, or perhaps on the very day of election. The senate was alarmed, and immediately postponed the *comitia*. Probably it was during this interval that the senate voted Piso a bodyguard.<sup>4</sup> Thus protected, Piso attempted to carry the senatorial *lex de ambitu*. Asconius gives us the details in his note on a passage in the *pro Cornelio*, which reads: *At enim extremi ac difficillimi temporis uocem illam, C. Corneli, consulem mittere coegisti: qui rem p. saluam esse uellent ut ad legem accipiendam adessent.* His comment is: *Piso qui consul eodem anno fuit quo Cornelius tribunus plebis erat, cum legem de ambitu ex S. C. grauiorem quam fuerat antea ferret et propter multitudinem diuisorum qui per uim aduersabantur e foro eiectus esset, edixerat id quod Cicero significat, et maiore manu stipatus ad legem perferendam descenderat.*<sup>5</sup> Thus rioting again took place when Piso first attempted to carry the senatorial law on bribery. We are probably right in inferring that this disorder was the occasion of the second postponement of the *comitia*. Piso thereupon made his proclamation *qui rem p. saluam esse uellent ut ad legem accipiendam adessent*, and, protected by a more substantial bodyguard, carried the law before the assembly.

In brief, then, the political events of 67 B.C., in so far as they are involved in the dispute between Cornelius and the senate, were these:

<sup>1</sup> I am here following the clear and accurate account of Asconius. Dio's inaccurate statement reads: ἀγανακτήσας οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦτοις ὁ Κορνήλιος γνώμην ἐποιήσατο μὴ ἐξεῖναι τοῖς βουλευταῖς μήτε ἀρχὴν τινὲ ἐξω τῶν νόμων αἰτῆσαντι διδόναι μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν τῷ δήμῳ προσηκόντων ψηφίσεσθαι.

<sup>2</sup> Cic. *de imp. Cn. Pomp.* I. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Asconius, p. 58, ll. 11 sqq.

<sup>4</sup> Dio Cassius, XXXVI. 39.

<sup>5</sup> Asconius, p. 75, ll. 20 sqq. The phrase *maiore manu* implies that Piso was protected by a bodyguard at the assembly before which he first attempted to carry his law.

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1. Cornelius carried a *relatio ad senatum* on bribery (Dio XXXVI. 38).
2. The senate modified his proposal, and voted that the revised law should be introduced before the elections (Dio XXXVI. 39). A *privilegium* was passed exempting the presiding consul from the provisions of the *lex Aelia et Fufia*.
3. Cornelius retaliated by proposing a law *ne quis nisi per populum legibus solueretur*. The senate obstructed this measure by the instrumentality of the tribune Globulus (Ascon., p. 58, ll. 3 sqq.; Dio XXXVI. 39).
4. This attitude of obstruction on the part of the senate resulted in a serious riot (Ascon., p. 58, ll. 14 sqq.; Dio XXXVI. 39). This disorder occurred immediately preceding the date set for the consular *comitia*, and apprehension on the part of the senate caused the first postponement of the elections.
5. Soon afterwards, and shortly before the new day set for the elections, Piso attempted to carry the *lex de ambitu*. *Diuisores* broke up the assembly, and the elections were for a second time postponed (Ascon., p. 75, ll. 24 sqq.).
6. The second attempt of Piso to carry the law was successful, and the *comitia* were held without incident (Ascon., p. 76, ll. 1 sqq.).
7. Cornelius subsequently modified his law against senatorial dispensations to read *ne quis in senatu legibus solueretur nisi CC adfuissent, neque quis, cum solutus esset, intercederet, cum de ea re ad populum ferretur*. This law was passed without any disturbances.

It is obvious that much of this attempt at restoration is conjectural. The writer does not put it forth in any spirit of dogmatism, and the chief merit he claims for it is that it is not in itself unreasonable, and that it does not do violence to the evidence which is extant. The year itself was one of confusion, and in July or August Cicero wrote to Atticus: *quod in epistula tua scriptum erat me iam arbitrari designatum (praetorem) esse, scito nihil tam exercitum esse nunc Romae quam candidatos omnibus iniquitatibus nec quando futura sint comitia sciri*.<sup>1</sup>

It remains to examine the political significance of the events of this year. The Popular party was in desperate straits. For three years not only had the *comitia centuriata* failed to return as consul one of their faction, but even the *plebs* had been unable or unwilling to elect a tribune who might be used as an instrument to cause the senate embarrassment. At last, in December, 68 B.C., Cornelius was successful. Through him the Popular leaders determined to strike at the senatorial control of the electorate. It was natural that their attack should take the form of a proposal designed to curb bribery. Cornelius introduced it in the form of a *relatio ad senatum*. It was directed in general against the *optimates*, whose political 'machine' dominated the electorate, and in particular against the consuls of the year, who were under grave suspicion of having bribed their way into office. The reception it received in the senate was not enthusiastic. It could not be expected that the consuls themselves, who, to use a euphemism of Dio, αἱροὶ . . . διασπουδάσαντες ἀπεδείχθησαν, would be favourably disposed towards the proposal of the tribune.<sup>2</sup> Piso, moreover, actually had been indicted for *ambitus*.<sup>3</sup>

The senate as a body was opposed to the measure on the principle that it was calculated to lessen its influence. At once steps were taken to render it, if not innocuous, at least less potent for reform. The consuls were instructed to modify the law. The reason which, according to Dio, was given to justify the modification is curious. The penalties imposed by the law, the senate contended, were excessive, and when penalties are excessive it is difficult to find either an individual to accuse or a jury to convict. The proposal, therefore, if enacted as a law, would defeat its own purpose.<sup>4</sup>

The validity of the senate's objection may be accepted, and at the same time

<sup>1</sup> Cic. ad Att. I. xi. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Dio Cassius XXXVI. 38.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

their sincerity may be questioned. Surely, had the *optimates* been genuinely desirous of legislation against bribery, they would not have allowed the initiative to rest with Cornelius. Their objection was a clever manoeuvre to gain time. The fact is that they were grievously distressed over one particular clause of the *relatio*. Cornelius in his draft had been especially careful to impose very severe penalties on the *diuiores*. Bribery, though no doubt practised by both parties, was at this time an instrument of much more potency in the hands of the *optimates*. And the *diuiores* were an integral part of the machinery of corruption. Cornelius, in attempting to exact severe penalties from the *diuiores*, was aiming at the very heart of the system.<sup>1</sup>

The consuls, therefore, either struck this clause from the law or substantially modified it. Cornelius immediately appealed to the people. Asconius tells us the result: *Cum a tribunis plebis doceretur (populus Romanus), nisi poena accessisset in diuiores, extinguere (ambitum) nullo modo posse, legem hanc Corneli flagitabat, illam quae ex S. C. ferebatur repudiabat, idque iure, ut docti sumus duorum consulum designatorum calamitate.*<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile Cornelius had proposed his law *ne quis nisi per populum legibus solueretur*. The optimate party, who rightly considered this the most serious threat they had yet encountered, were genuinely alarmed, and used the senatorial tribune Globulus to obstruct the measure. The result was an *impasse*, which lasted perhaps even as long as a month. The senate could not enact its modified version of the law *de ambitu*, and Cornelius could not pass his law against senatorial dispensations. Both parties exhausted themselves, and we have good evidence on which to conjecture that a compromise was arrived at. Cornelius consented to make his law against senatorial dispensations less severe on condition that the senate reinstated in its *consultum* on bribery the clause in respect of the *diuiores*. Both laws were carried, though the extreme conservatives found unpalatable even the modified law against dispensations; and the first attempt of Piso to carry the *lex de ambitu* resulted in a riot instigated by the *diuiores*. Piso then issued a proclamation invoking the aid of all patriotic citizens, provided himself with a stronger bodyguard, and at a second assembly carried the law which became known as the *Lex Acilia Calpurnia de ambitu*. The deadlock was broken, and the *populares* had gained an important point.

There is little evidence what were the terms of the *relatio* of Cornelius. From Asconius we know that it was aimed in particular at the *diuiores*, and Dio tells us that the penalties it imposed were most severe.<sup>3</sup> But it is quite likely that the final draft of the *senatus consultum* differed very slightly from the *relatio ad senatum* of Cornelius. The terms of this *lex Acilia Calpurnia* are clearly given by Dio, and his evidence is confirmed by Asconius and the *Scholia Bobiensia*. According to Dio those convicted under this law were liable to the following punishments:

(1) μήτε ἄρχειν, (2) μήτε βουλευεῖν, (3) ἀλλὰ καὶ χρήματα προσοφλισκέειν.<sup>4</sup>

The testimony of Asconius adds nothing to that of Dio. He writes *in qua (sc. lege Calpurnia) praeter alias poenas pecuniaria quoque poena erat adiecta.*<sup>5</sup>

The *Schol. Bob.* adds the important evidence that the exclusion from public honours was permanent. *Aliquanto postea seuerior lex Calpurnia et pecunia multauit et in perpetuum honoribus iussit cavere damnatos; habebant tamen licentiam Romae morandi.*<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The special function of the *diuisor* was to distribute the bribes. Perhaps their duties made them peculiarly liable to detection. Evidently Cornelius thought the *diuiores* to be the most vulnerable part of the elaborate system.

<sup>2</sup> Asconius, p. 74, ll. 21 sqq.

<sup>3</sup> Dio Cassius XXXVI. 38 (πικρότατα ἐπιτίμια).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Asconius, p. 69, ll. 12 sq.

<sup>6</sup> *Scholia Bobiensia*, p. 361 Or. The preceding sentence in the *Scholia Bobiensia* reads: *damnati*

*lege Cornelia hoc genus poenae ferebant ut magistratum petitione per decem annos abstinerent.* It is not clear to what *lex Cornelia* the scholiast refers. There was a *lex Cornelia Boebia* passed in 181 B.C. (Livy XL. 19, 11), and also another *lex de ambitu* passed in the consulship of Cn. Cornelius Dolabella and M. Fulvius Nobilior, 159 B.C. (Livy, Ep. XLVII). But the words *aliquanto postea* seem to point to an enactment of much more recent date, and possibly a law of this character was passed by the dictator Sulla.

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The convicted person therefore was liable to the following penalties:

1. He was permanently excluded from public office.
2. He was permanently excluded from the senate.
3. He was subject to a fine.

He had, however, the privilege of remaining at Rome.

The severity of this law is obvious, and it is unlikely that the *relatio* of Cornelius was more severe. Cicero says of it: *erat enim seuerissime scripta Calpurnia*.<sup>1</sup>

We ought not to close this discussion without saying a few words respecting the character of Cornelius. The words of Asconius in this respect are valuable: *C. Cornelius homo non improbus uita habitus est . . . In eo magistratu ita se gessit ut iusto pertinacior uideretur*.<sup>2</sup> Cornelius was not a Clodius, nor was he, either in spirit or in purpose, a forerunner of that irresponsible demagogue. There is every reason to believe that the abuse which he tried to remedy was real, and of such a nature that it called for immediate and drastic measures. The legislation on bribery, which he initiated and forced the senate to accept, was an effort by constitutional means to avert just that kind of a situation which soon afterwards actually did throw the Popular party into the arms of the revolutionaries and made of the moderates extremists. His attack on the senate's practice of using a well-disposed tribune to obstruct legislation, while perhaps constitutionally unjustifiable, was not unprecedented. Obstruction of that sort was against the spirit, if not the letter, of the tribunate, and a perversion of the *raison d'être* of that office. It is difficult to see how tribunes ever could initiate legislation so long as the senate succeeded in having elected to that office at least one of its servants. To defy a constitutional abuse of that sort was an act of progressive politics.<sup>3</sup>

### III. THE AFTERMATH OF THE TRIBUNATE OF CORNELIUS.

Despite the victory of Cornelius, the Popular party was singularly unsuccessful in the elections of 67 B.C. The *comitia*, which had been twice postponed, resulted in the return of two staunch *optimates*, M'. Lepidus and L. Volcatius. Lepidus was not merely an optimate, but one of the *potentissimi quique ex senatu* who controlled the optimate party. Volcatius led the opposition to Catiline in 66 B.C., which forced him voluntarily to withdraw his candidature.<sup>4</sup>

The *populares* were more fortunate in the election of the praetors. Both C. Attius Celsus, who begged Cicero to undertake the defence of Manilius,<sup>5</sup> and P. Cassius, who graciously absented himself from the court on the day first appointed for the trial of Cornelius,<sup>6</sup> were members of the Popular party.

<sup>1</sup> Cic. *pro Murena* 23, 46.

<sup>2</sup> Asconius, p. 50, ll. 4 sqq.

<sup>3</sup> Cornelius was responsible for the passage of another important law. The words of Asconius are *Aliam deinde legem Cornelius, etsi nemo repugnare ausus est, multis tamen inuitis tulit, ut praetores ex edictis suis perpetuis ius dicerent: quae res studium aut gratiam ambitionis praetoribus qui uarie ius dicere assueuerant sustulit* (Asconius, p. 59, ll. 7 sqq.). The aim of this law, as Asconius suggests, was to prevent arbitrary enactments by the praetors in the interests of patronage. It was another blow aimed at the senatorial bloc. It attempted especially to destroy the elaborate system of privilege, according to which public contracts (*συμβόλαια*) were awarded (Dio XXXVI, 40). In this year, too, the Gabinian law was passed, which gave Pompey an extraordinary command in the war against

the pirates, and paved the way for the Manilian law of 66 B.C. Crassus and Caesar, of course, favoured the granting of the commission, not because of personal affection for the disciple of Sulla, or sympathy with his political ambitions, but because they knew full well that the fear of a military dictatorship would make a recalcitrant senate more amenable. For the next seven years both parties said their prayers with their eyes to the East.

<sup>4</sup> It is interesting to note that both Volcatius and Lepidus took a moderate position during the Civil War, and decided not only not to flee with Pompey, but even to attend Caesar's senate, though they privately expressed their disgust at the turn of affairs (Cic. *ad Att.* VIII, 15, 2).

<sup>5</sup> Asconius, p. 65, ll. 5 sqq.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65, ll. 6 sqq.; p. 59, ll. 18 sqq.

The Popular tribune of the year was Manilius, of whom we shall have more to say later.

This year the Popular leaders determined to take the offensive, and the disturbances of 67 B.C. were but a prelude to the more serious disorders of 66 B.C., the year of the so-called first Catilinarian conspiracy. The party of reform was encouraged by the success of Cornelius in forcing the senate to adopt the law on *ambitus*, but they were disappointed at the outcome of the *comitia*. What they had, however, they resolved to use to the utmost—one tribune and two praetors. The very first day of the year witnessed an *émeute* in which many of the partisans of Manilius were killed. The occasion of this tumult throws light on the situation in respect of the electorate. On the last day of December Manilius carried a *relatio ad senatum* which would grant freedmen the right to vote with those who had freed them. On the first of January a panicky senate rejected his *relatio*.<sup>1</sup> This law, though much more revolutionary in character, had the same basic purpose as had that of Cornelius *de ambitu*. It was a desperate attempt on the part of the Popular leaders by distributing the freedmen among all the tribes to wrest from the senate the control of the Roman electorate. But it was of such a character that it was opposed not only by the *nobiles*, but by the more respectable element of the *plebs*. Manilius, in order to carry the *relatio*, had suborned some of the populace, and had held the *concilium* towards evening. The next morning the bulk of the *plebs* were extremely angry, because of the nature of the proposal and the trick by which it had been carried. Manilius, when he realized the temper of the *plebs*, at first ascribed the idea to Crassus and some others, but, as no one believed him, he paid court to Pompey in the person of Gabinius.<sup>2</sup>

This is the first evidence we have of a serious estrangement between Pompey and Crassus. It is clear that, as soon as Pompey left Rome, Crassus and the other Popular leaders began to attack his influence. Asconius tells us what on grounds of intrinsic probability we should have inferred, that Manilius entered upon the tribunate as the successor of Cornelius, and the representative of the Popular party.<sup>3</sup> But no longer was it true that a tribune represented a party rather than an individual, and, when Crassus disowned Manilius, the tribune threw himself into the arms of Pompey.<sup>4</sup>

After the failure to carry the measure *de libertinorum suffragiis*, the *populares* determined to make an intense effort to win the consular *comitia*. They decided to meet bribery with bribery, and for this the fortune of Crassus was available. Unfortunately, they forgot that the *lex Acilia Calpurnia* might prove to be a boomerang.

The candidates were, on the senatorial side, L. Cotta and L. Torquatus; on the Popular side, Publius Paetus and Cornelius Sulla. Catiline had expressed his intention to stand for the consulate, but he was *reus repetundarum* and when Volcatius took measures to thwart his candidature, he withdrew.<sup>5</sup> The *comitia* resulted in the return of the Popular candidates, Autronius and Sulla. The *nobiles* immediately availed themselves of the powerful weapon which the year before the *populares* had placed in their hands. Both successful candidates were prosecuted under the *lex Acilia Calpurnia*, and both were convicted. The senatorial candidates, Cotta and Torquatus, were chosen in their stead.<sup>6</sup>

The immediate outcome of this defeat of the Popular party was the planning of the notorious *coup d'état*, which is commonly known as the first Catilinarian con-

<sup>1</sup> Dio Cassius XXXVI. 42.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Asconius, p. 64, ll. 11. sq.

<sup>4</sup> None of the *nobiles* believed Manilius when he said that the inspiration of his law *de libertinorum suffragiis* was Crassus. This phenomenon of senatorial inability to believe any-

thing which might incriminate Crassus occurs more than once, and the reason for it is to be sought in the predominating financial influence of the latter.

<sup>5</sup> Asconius, p. 89, ll. 6 sqq.

<sup>6</sup> Dio Cassius XXXVI. 41; Asconius, p. 75, ll. 4 sqq.

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spiracy. It is to our purpose here to discuss not the details of this conspiracy, but its *rationale*.<sup>1</sup>

The attempted *coup d'état* was an abandonment of constitutional methods, and a resort to downright violence. What was it that caused the *populares* to adopt extreme measures? First of all, the agitation for constitutional reform during the past five years had been thwarted by the astute leaders of the senatorial party. The efforts of the Popular party to loosen the hold which the *nobiles* had on the Roman electorate had in the main been of no avail. The very weapon which they had forged for use against the senate, the *Lex Calpurnia de ambitu*, was now being turned by that body against them. Two members of their party, Autronius and Sulla, who were convicted under the terms of that law, were permanently disqualified from public office and the senate. Though the prosecution of Cornelius was for the time postponed by the convenient absence of a sympathetic praetor, and a show of force *a notis operarum ducibus*, there was little likelihood that the senate would abandon its avowed purpose to have its revenge on Cornelius. Catiline had been forced to withdraw his candidature for the consulate of 65 B.C., and there was slight hope that he would be allowed to stand for that of the next year. Crassus, in the person of Manilius, had made a serious tactical blunder in introducing the proposal *de libertinorum suffragiis*, and the responsible element of the *plebs* had been temporarily alienated. Pompey, in the meanwhile, had sailed off to the East with an unqualified *imperium* and a powerful army, and the *populares* were between the sword and the wall. It is a commonplace of history that a movement of reform which has to contend with an uncompromising attitude on the part of the conservative party eventually falls into the hands of the extremist element within itself. This is exactly what happened in 66 B.C. The Popular party was *in extremis*, and the advice of those who counselled caution prevailed. The prime movers of the plot to murder the consuls and to seize the government were the two disqualified consuls, Autronius and Sulla, and a dissolute and irresponsible young blood by the name of Piso. But there is reasonably good evidence that both Crassus and Caesar were involved in the conspiracy.<sup>2</sup>

The plan of the conspirators was twofold. After the murder of the consuls, or perhaps of the senate, the control of the government was to be seized by Crassus, as dictator, and Caesar, as his *magister equitum*. Autronius and Sulla were to be reinstated as consuls, and the young Piso was to be despatched with *propraetorian imperium* to Spain. The first measure was, of course, downright revolution, and contemplated the thorough extermination of the senatorial oligarchy. Piso, on the other hand, was to go to Spain to make ready a *point d'appui* against Pompey.

The attempt at murder, or the attempts, if there were more than one, failed. But a curious aftermath of the plot was that the senate actually despatched to Spain the notorious Piso. The secret of this strange manoeuvre is that both the senate and the Popular leaders agreed that it would be a good thing to have anyone, even the rake Piso, in the West to counterbalance the threat of a victorious Pompey in the East. The rumour that Pompey had a hand in the sudden and violent death of Piso may or may not be true, but it shows clearly enough that it was common knowledge why Piso was sent to Spain, and what was the reaction of the partisans of Pompey. The murder of Piso, pawn though he was, left both sides without a piece by which they might force Pompey into a position of perpetual check.

Three years later the Catilinarian conspiracy broke out. In 63 B.C. the Popular party again fell into the power of the extremists, and for precisely the same kind of

<sup>1</sup> For an excellent discussion see E. G. Hardy, *The Catilinarian Conspiracy* (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1924), Chap. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Suetonius, *Jul.* 9. The authorities of Suetonius

are the evidence of a contemporary historian, Tanusius Geminus, the *edicta* of Bibulus, the *orationes* of C. Curio pater, and a letter of Cicero to Accius.

reasons which provoked the contemplated revolt of 66 B.C. In 66 B.C. the leaders were Autronius, Sulla and Piso; in 63 B.C., Catiline, Lentulus, Cethegus and Vargunteius. But Caesar and Crassus, the men who mattered, had learned their lesson, and though they were in substantial sympathy with the aims of the revolutionaries, they carefully refused to identify themselves with their activities.

Every genuine movement for political reform has its *sans culottes*, and so also has every conservative party its ultramontanes. The senatorial party cannot be absolved from blame for the disaster which was soon to overtake the Roman state. And in Cicero, with his watchword *concordia ordinum*, they had a statesman, who, had he been of sterner stuff, might have shown them the path of mutual forbearance and judicious compromise.

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# MENANDREA.<sup>1</sup>

*Epitrepontes* 353-355 :

ἐκείνην λήψεται, ταύτην [δ' ἐγὼ  
ἐπεύξομαι τ]ὴν ἔμφοι ἀπολείπειν · ὁ[μωσ  
καὶ νῦν χαριέντως ἐκνευκέναι δο[κῶν  
τὸ μὴ δι' ἐμοῦ ταυτὶ κυκᾶσθαι.

EDITORS have given the supplement in line 355 as δοκῶ. This seems to require the translation of καὶ νῦν as 'here too,' 'this time also,' which clearly cannot be right, for Onesimus' worry is due to the fact that he actually was held responsible the time before when he had told Charisius of his wife's predicament. To avoid this difficulty it is necessary either to repunctuate against the evidence of the papyrus, or alternatively to adopt the supplement δοκῶν. The latter would permit us to translate ὁμωσ καὶ νῦν δοκῶν 'although in any case I seem this time.' This leads to the restoration of a verb in the first person in line 354. Since ταύτην appears to be the subject of ἀπολείπειν, Sudhaus' ἐπείξεται is excluded, and ἐπεύξομαι becomes the most likely possibility. It seems impossible to improve on Sudhaus' τὴν ἔμφοι. At the end of the preceding line ἐγὼ is an obvious supplement. Translate : 'He'll take her; and as for this one in the house, my prayer will be that she quits her husband, though in any case this time I seem to have dodged having anything to do with the trouble that is brewing.'

*Epitrepontes* 869-871 :

ON. λογιστικοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς καὶ σφόδρα  
φρονούντος ἢ σπουδῇ · τό θ' ἄρπασμ', Ἡράκλεις,  
θαυμαστὸν οἶον. ΣΜ. πρὸς θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων.

In spite of the double point after σπουδῇ in the papyrus, most editors give what follows to Onesimus as I have done. This is strictly necessary if we are to read τό θ' ἄρπασμ' with the papyrus. Smicrines would not begin with the connective τε. The interpretations suggested for ἄρπασμα, however, have not been convincing. It should mean 'booty,' 'prize,' not 'kidnapping.' I suggest that Onesimus, when he sees the hasty Smicrines hauling the aged Sophrona along by main force, is suddenly struck by a humorous resemblance to the rape of Persephone, Ganymede, etc., or to the numerous scenes in comedy where a pretty girl is carried off. A humorous comment on the scene is exactly what one would expect. Translate : 'For his haste befits a man of reason and extreme good sense; and his prize, Lord save us, what a stunner !' The prize is of course Sophrona.

*Samia* 104-106 :

οἶδα γὰρ ἀκριβῶς σ' ὄν]τα καὶ πῶ[ς αἴτ]ιόν,  
ὅτι Μοσχίωνός [ἐστιν,] ὅτι σύνοισθα σύ,  
ἔ[πε]ρ τεκ[οῦς], ὥς φ]ησι, νῦν αὐτὴ τρέφει.

The text that I suggest for line 104 suits the MS. reading as reported by J<sup>1</sup> and J<sup>2</sup> rather better than Allinson's οἶδα γὰρ ἀκριβῶς πάντα καὶ τὸ παῖδιον, which is other-

<sup>1</sup> In these notes I refer to Lefebvre, *Papyrus de Ménandre* (Cairo, 1911); Jensen, *Rheinisches Museum* (1910) 65, 539 (J<sup>1</sup>); *Hermes* (1914) 49, 382 (J<sup>2</sup>); Sudhaus, *Menanderstudien* (Bonn, 1914); and to the *Georgos* of Grenfell and Hunt (Oxford,

1898). I have not knowingly neglected any articles, reviews, or editions published in English, German, French, or Latin. The lines are numbered as in the Loeb edition of Allinson, Heinemann (London, 1921).

wise quite acceptable. In line 106 Sudhaus'  $\delta$  γὰρ τεκεῖν οὐ φησι, νῦν αὖτη τρέφει does not suit at all. Demeas has expressed no surprise at seeing Chrysis nursing the baby. It merely confirmed what he knew already. He notes what he has observed here as in line 55 in order to prove beyond a doubt, so he thinks, that Chrysis is the baby's mother. Since unfortunately he does not name her, Parmeno can think of Plangon as the mother in question, and the misunderstanding continues. Demeas' language and attitude throughout can only be explained on the assumption that Plangon's baby has been presented to Demeas by Chrysis as her own. Chrysis was also a mother, but of her baby nothing is said in what we have of the play. It probably was a few weeks' younger than Plangon's, and had conveniently died just before the return of Niceratus and Demeas.

*Samia* 409: For this line I suggest ἐξ ἀναγκῆς ἐστὶ γὰρ [τὰ πολλὰ· χρ]ῆ μὲν νοῦν ἔχειν. This agrees with the evidence of the papyrus as reported by Jensen and Sudhaus, and the words come naturally from Demeas to Niceratus. 'Most things can't be helped. We've just got to be reasonable.' If there is room for διὰ in the space before πολλά that would be even better. 'He must, for many reasons.'

*Samia* 411: Demeas' remark at the end of this line must contain some sort of a witticism to account for Niceratus' comment: κομψὸς εἶ. I suggest τὰ παρ' ἐμοὶ δεῖ καταλαβεῖν, 'the situation in my house needs catching up with.' The reference would be to Plangon's baby, which had got ahead of the wedding. It is quite as amusing as anything we have a right to expect from Demeas.

*Perikeiromene* 203: The gap between ἐκποδὼν and πάντ' ἀνῆρπαστ' ἐκ μεσοῦ may be filled satisfactorily by a parenthetic οὐκ ἔστιν] ἄλλ[ο, equivalent in meaning to 'there's no doubt of it.'

*Perikeiromene* 205-207:

MO. σὺ δὲ κ]έχρησαί μοι . . .

ΔΑ. γέλοιον· ἡ μὲν οὖν μήτηρ . . .

MO. τί φῆς;

οὐκ ἔαν ἡ]κουσαν αὐτὴν ἢ τί πράγμ'; οὐχ ἔνεκ' ἐμοῦ  
εἶπας ὡς πέπεικας ἐλθεῖν πρὸς μ';

In line 206 J<sup>1</sup> states that there is room at the beginning for seven letters only. This rules out most of the possible supplements in favour of the one that I give. This supplement also seems to fit the sense better than most. Moschion says: 'You have treated me . . .' Davus interrupts: 'No; it's your mother.' Moschion must thereupon ask what his mother is doing—that is, the infinitive to be supplied in the next line must have τὴν μήτερα as its understood subject. Yet αὐτὴν must refer to Glycera, as the reference to her in line 207 shows. Consequently it must be the object of the infinitive, which can only be εἶν. Translate: 'Does she forbid the girl now she has come, or what is it? Didn't you say that you persuaded her to come to the house on my account?'

*Perikeiromene* 243-245

καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον οὐδέπω λογιζομαι,  
τὸν δεσπότην, ἂν ἐξ ἀγροῦ θάπτον πάλιν  
ἔλθῃ, ταραχὴν οἷαν ποίσει παραφανεῖς.

Translators and editors have failed to note that ἂν θάπτον always means 'as soon as.' It certainly has that meaning in Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 3. 3. 20, and in Plato, *Alcibiades* I. 105a. Compare also ὅταν θάπτον in Aristotle, *Historia Animalium* 6. 7 (563b) and 9. 3 (611a), where the most recent translation makes nonsense by failing

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to follow the old interpretation 'as soon as.' Translate: 'And I haven't yet reckoned in the chief item, what a disturbance my master, once he arrives from the country, will raise when he appears on the scene.'

*Perikeiromene* 355-359: In line 355 I prefer to take the alternative reading of the MS. *διαλύετε* and punctuate the sentence as a question, giving the next speech also to Sosia. 'Will you disband when storming is the proper thing? I tell you this Pataecus here is ruining me.' Properly of course a Pataecus, a ship's figurehead among the Phoenicians, should preserve the ship, not ruin it. This leads Pataecus to expostulate with the question *οὐκ ἔσθ' ἡγεμών*: 'Is there no one in command?' Thus spurred, Polemon urgently requests Sosia to depart: *πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἄνθρωπε, ἀπελθ'.* Sosia does go with the protest: 'I am going; I thought you were going to do something.' The scurrilous remarks that follow must also surely belong to Sosia. They are appropriate to no one else. My interpretation of this scene is that of Van Leeuwen's third edition (Leyden, 1919), except for *οὐκ ἔσθ' ἡγεμών*, which he gives to Sosia.

*Perikeiromene* 591-594:

εἰλόμην δ' οὕτως ἐγὼ  
ἀφρόνως ἔχειν, ἐχθραν τε πράξ[αι τῇδ' ἄμα  
ὑμῖν θ' ὑπόνοιαν καταλιπεῖν, [ἣν οὐποτ' ἂν  
ἦν ἐξαλείψαι τ' οὐκέτ', οὐδ' αἰσχ[ύνομαι;

J<sup>2</sup> vouches for ξ at the end of line 592 and for τ after ἐξαλείψαι in line 594. Glycera points out that she wasn't such a fool as to make both houses at once unfriendly to her. In line 592 the reference must be to Myrrhina's house. Since she expects to go on living there, Sudhaus' *γειτόνων* will not do. *ἐνθάδε* would be possible, but ἄμα earns its place by making the statement more emphatic. In line 593 the reference is to Pataecus and Polemon, who are evidently connected in some way. In line 594, since there is no place for the required ἂν, we cannot use an optative ἐξαλείψαιτ' nor a relative ἣν. The verb is infinitive, and we must supply a relative at the end of the preceding line. Possible alternatives for what I give are οἶανπερ οὐκ and ἣν οὐδαμῶς. The particle after ἐξαλείψαι may be a mistake for γ', or it may connect the relative clause loosely with what precedes. In *Epitrepontes* 297 we find τε occupying fourth place in its clause. There is no apparent reason why it could not come fifth or sixth. Translate: 'Was I deliberately so foolish as at the same time to cause enmity here and to leave in your minds a suspicion, one too that could never be blotted out again? Am I so shameless too?'

*Perikeiromene* 905-907: I prefer to accept the stage direction preserved in the MS.: 'Exit Polemon.' Polemon's invitation is given as he and Glycera enter the house together, an effective exit; and Pataecus addresses his reply to the audience, but is overheard by Moschion, who exclaims and betrays his presence.

*Georgos* 33-43: Editors have accepted the interpretation of this passage by H. Richards in the *Classical Review* (December, 1898, 433 sq.). This seems to me to be a mistake. In the first place, Myrrhina and Philinna clearly do not withdraw at line 34 when Davus enters. Myrrhina does propose: 'Shall we withdraw a little?' but Philinna protests: 'Tell me, what do we care for him?' To this Myrrhina assents: 'It would be a fine thing [if we were to care for him] indeed.' The γε of Myrrhina's *καλόν γ' ἂν εἴη, νῇ Δία* indicates assent to Philinna's protest, and *καλόν* is here sarcastic, like *ἀστέιον* at *Samia* 149. In the second place, there is no occasion for emending the δς γε of line 42, which Grenfell and Hunt read in the papyrus. To make Davus say: 'I wasn't observing you, noble lady. What are

you doing?' seems pointless. With  $\delta\varsigma \gamma\epsilon$  there is a rapid exchange of remarks. Davus begins it with his greeting  $\delta\omega \chi\alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\epsilon \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ , *Μυρρίνη*. Her reply  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\upsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \sigma\acute{\upsilon} \gamma\epsilon$  is equivalent to: 'Yes; and you too by all means rejoice.' The  $\gamma\epsilon$  of his reply then means: 'I do rejoice.' He continues: 'Since I have been observing how you prosper. I want,' etc.

*Georgos* 62:  $\delta[\iota\varsigma] \zeta\omega\nu\tau'$   $\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\sigma\tau\eta\sigma'$   $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\mu\epsilon\lambda\omicron\upsilon\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$ . Bury originally suggested  $\delta\acute{\iota}\varsigma$  in this place (Grenfell and Hunt, page 24), but this certain supplement has been displaced by Haberlin's unmetrical and insipid  $\delta\iota\alpha\zeta\omega\nu\tau'$ . The reason appears to be that no one has observed that  $\delta\iota\varsigma \zeta\omega\nu\tau'$  means 'living a second time,' 'raised to life again,' a most appropriate expression for a man almost miraculously cured. For this meaning of  $\delta\acute{\iota}\varsigma$  compare the proverbial  $\delta\iota\varsigma \pi\alpha\acute{\iota}\delta\epsilon\varsigma \omicron\iota \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$  and the  $\delta\iota\varsigma \beta\acute{\iota}\omega\nu\alpha\iota$  of fragment 223. 4. Translate: 'By his care he raised him to a second lease of life.'

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## SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS.

### LITERATURE AND GENERAL.

**Classical Philology.** XXIII. 4. October, 1928.

J. Wells, *Herodotus and Athens*. Develops some conclusions of his *Studies in H.* H. is not a prejudiced panegyrist of Athenian empire and democracy. His departure from Athens may have been due to the quarrel with Samos, his old friend, in 440: the parody in Arist. *Ach.* suggests he was in Athens again before 425. *Birds* 1124-38 may be topical parody of H. occasioned by the recent publication of his Book II.: if so, H. was still alive and in Athens between 420 and 415 and seeing the results of Athenian ambition. G. L. Hendrickson, *The Third Satire of Persius*. Examines sequence of thought and decides that ll. 88-106 and 107-118 are two detached passages irrelevant to the argument, written for a first draft and preserved by conscientious editing. Paul Shorey, *Recent Interpretations of the Timaeus*. Reviews the works of Rivaud, Taylor and Erich Frank and discusses points of detail; many of his criticisms rest on the assumption that it is impossible either to translate Plato correctly or to see the faults of Archer-Hind without being indebted to his own notes in *A.J.P.* B. L. Ullman, *Another 1508 Aldine Pliny*. From an imperfect copy in his possession draws observations on Aldine editorial practice in correcting and indexing. R. M. Jones, *Notes on Porphyry's Life of Plotinus and Plotinus Enneads I.-III.* H. F. Rebert, *χαμαλός in Homer*.  $\chi$ . of Homeric islands cannot mean 'low': Leaf and Murray rightly translate 'in-shore' (comparing Mod. Gk. usage) of Ithaca (Leucas) and this also suits Aeaea (Monte Circeo). The same quasi-nautical force ('appearing low in the inclined plane from eye to horizon') fits *Il.* XIII. 683 ( $\tau\epsilon\acute{\iota}\chi\omicron\varsigma$   $\chi\theta\alpha\mu\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omicron\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$  'running close to shore') and *Od.* XII. 101: in *Od.* XI. 194  $\chi$ . has its ordinary sense. Donald Macfayden, *The Newly Discovered Cyrenaean Inscription and the alleged Imperium Maius Proconsulare of Augustus*. Contends against Von Premerstein that, though A. issued edicts in Cyrene, he did not necessarily do so in virtue of an *imperium maius* over Senatorial provinces. M. E. Deutsch, 'I am Caesar, not Rex.' Caesar's reply (Suet. *Jul.* 79. 2) on Jan. 26, 44 B.C. is (as Bacon, Drumann, Cary and probably several earlier edd. saw) a play on the proper name *Rex* (found in C.'s family). L. R. Shero suggests that Lucilius *fragg.* 438, 440, 442, 444-6 belonged not to a narrative but to an argumentative satire on luxury which may have been the prototype of Horace, *Sat.* II. ii., and that *fragg.* 1235-7, 1238-40, 1122 (all quoted in Cic. *de fin.* II. 24) come from the same satire.

**Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung.** V. 1-3, 1929.

V. 1. E. Hoffmann, *Kulturphilosophisches bei den Vorsokratikern*. Discusses the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus, and Hippocrates and the Oath, from the point of view of their attitude to human society. 2. F. Geyer, *Die Diadochen*. A historical sketch of the period between the deaths of Alexander and Seleucus, with appreciations of the leaders, and an estimate of the new elements in early Hellenistic culture. E. Stemplinger, *Antiker Okkultismus*. A discussion of various ancient beliefs and practices, with modern parallels. 3. E. Norden, *Lessing als klassischer Philologe*. Though he wisely preferred to concentrate on creative work, Lessing was a well-equipped scholar, and sometimes gave an important lead, for instance in his method of approach to Aristotle's *Poetics*. F. Wassermann, *Die Bakchantinnen des Euripides*.

A careful analysis of the whole play, with running comment on its significance. W. argues that Euripides' attitude here is not that of the earlier plays, and that Dionysus is not to be judged by human standards of conduct.

**Philologus.** LXXXIV. 1. 1928.

Fr. Pfister, *Die Hekate-Episode in Hesiods Theogonie*. The Hymn to Hecate (ll. 411-452) is an integral part of the poem, composed with the intention of doing justice to a deity whom the Epic had neglected. M. Bernhard, *Die penthemimerischen Wortformen im griechischen und römischen Pentameter*. Collects from Greek and Latin poetry (including metrical inscriptions) instances of half a pentameter being composed of a single word. L. Weber, *Zum athenischen Staatsfriedhof*. Criticizes the views of Domaszewski and adds fresh suggestions. Ph. Finger, *Die beiden Quellen des III. Buches der Tusculanen Ciceros*. A detailed analysis of Cicero's debt to Antiochus and a Stoic source, with a preliminary account of Posidonius' doctrine regarding the  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\eta$ . H. Georgii, *Textkritische Beiträge zu Seneca*. Discusses 95 passages from the prose-works. Miscellaneous: E. de Waele interprets  $\chi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \pi\acute{\epsilon}\delta\omicron\nu$  in Aeschylus, *Pers.* 683 as meaning the earth is furrowed, i.e. literally by the trenches, metaphorically by the tearing of the face in grief; B. Warnecke argues for disregard of the Unity of Place in the *Heautontimorumenos*; P. Keseling claims that Seneca's description (*Apoc.* 7, 2, 11-13) of the Rhone and Saone at Lyon adapts Caesar, *B.G.* 1, 12, 1.

LXXXIV. 2. 1928.

P. Walters, *Das spartanische Siegesdenkmal der Schlacht bei Tanagra*. Discusses in detail the exact nature of the monument and argues the building completed in 456. R. Pfeiffer, *Gotttheit und Individuum in der frühgriechischen Lyrik*. An inaugural lecture delivered at Freiburg. E. Wüst and W. Crönert, *Die Ausgeforschte*. Restoration and analysis of No. 52 in the *Catalogue of the Literary Papyri in the British Museum*. This important papyrus is a mime adapted from a comedy, and throws light on the origin of Roman comedy. Crönert appends an account of the "Lament for Phaethon" (No. 51 in the above Catalogue). Ida Kapp, *Callimachea*. Suggestions on following passages: Hymn 5, 93 sqq.; frag. (Pf.) 9, 39; frag. 6, 8; frag. 60, 50 sqq.; Oxyrh. P. 2079. Argues against Pfeiffer that the last-named is the actual prologue to the *Aetia* and that this work belongs to Callimachus' old age. C. Wendel, *Die Überlieferung des Attizisten Moiris*. Emphasizes the importance of other MSS. besides the Coislinianus. W. Capelle, *Zu Tacitus' Archaeologien I*. Rejects Sternkopf's view that the *barditus* (*Germ.* 3) celebrated Heracles and argues that Livy was Tacitus' authority for the use of this war-song as an *augurium*. F. Zucker, *Plinius epist. VIII.* 24. Analyzes form and content of this letter and indicates its great importance as an illustration of the Roman attitude to the Greeks. J. Stroux, *Die Zeit des Curtius*. Argues that C. wrote under Vespasian, not Claudius. Miscellaneous: H. Bulle discusses the element of  $\delta\psi\upsilon\varsigma$  in Aristotle's theory of Tragedy; L. Radermacher collects examples of the synzesis of iota in Greek verse; E. Kapp discusses the form  $\pi\omega\theta\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\iota\omicron\varsigma$  in Aristophanes' *Birds*; W. Kolbe deals with the administration of the Treasury of Athena in the fourth century; A. Rehm interprets Hymn V. of Mesomedes.

LXXXIV. 3. 1929.

W. Schleiermacher, *Die Komposition der Hippokratischen Schriften περὶ ἀγμῶν· περὶ ἄρθρων ἐμβολῆς*. The two tracts are taken from an older work entitled *κατ' ἡγεσίον*. H. Roppenecker, *Vom Bau der Plautinischen Cantica*. Textual and metrical suggestions on a number of passages. Ph. Finger, *Die beiden Quellen des III. Buches der Tusculanen Ciceros*. Continuation and conclusion of previous article.



W. Capelle, *Zu Tacitus' Archaeologien II*. Supplements on certain points Norden's account of Tacitus' debt to the literary tradition in his characterization of the Germans. Miscellaneous: J. Stroux would read *controversio* for *controversia* (*aquae*) in Digest, tit. 39, 2, 24, 3 sqq. and comments on other words of the same group.

**Rivista di Filologia.** N.S. VI. (1928) 4.

M. Bartoli, *Ancora deus e θεός e una legge del ritmo ario-europeo*. The author develops his theory (*Rivista* N.S. VI. p. 108 sqq.) that the aspirates (*dh* etc.) arose late in the history of the I.-E. parent language from the unaspirated stops (*d* etc.). At this period the accent fell on the penult, if this syllable was long: if it was short, the accent was on the last syllable. L. Castiglioni, *Lattanzio e le Storie di Seneca Padre*. Lactantius preserves with some accuracy the preface to Seneca's *Historiae*, a work of which precise reminiscences are visible elsewhere in the writings of Lactantius—and of others. V. Pisani, *Elena e l'εἶδωλον*. The story of the substitution can be traced to Stesichorus, that of Helen's presence in Egypt during the Trojan War to Herodotus. The tale of Saranyū in the Rigveda is a parallel to the Stesichorean version. G. Coppola, *Un nuovo frammento dei Giambi di Ipponatte*. Editio princeps of a papyrus found by Breccia at Oxyrhynchus in 1928. G. Croenert *Catalogi Hesiodi fragmentum Vitellianum proposuit*. Restoration of a text published in the *Bull. de la Soc. archéol. d'Alexandrie* no. 23. Q. Cataudella, *Il prologo degli Aitia e Gregorio Nazianzeno*. Detects reminiscences of lines from the prologue in the works of G. M. A. Levi, *Servio Tullio nel P. Oxy.* 2088. Reconstructs the fragment, with lines containing from 56 to 58 letters or spaces. A. Degrassi, *Appunti all'iscrizione onoraria di Flavio Giunio Quarto Palladio*. Discusses various problems raised by an inscription from the Aventine published by L. Cantarelli in *Bull. com. arch.* LIV. (1927) p. 35 sqq. Miscellaneous. I. G. De Sanctis, *Un pagamento degli Epidauri*. On a text, published by von Hiller in *Ep. ἀρχ.* 1925/6, p. 35 sqq., recording a payment by the Epidaurians to the Elisphasians. Five thousand drachmae are paid and eighty minae received. This is another instance of the Attic mina being used by people whose drachma was Aeginetan and who therefore equated the mina with seventy drachmae. II. G. Bendinelli, *Ipogei e stucchi dell' Isola Sacra*. The author finds similarities between the 'Basilica' of the Porta Maggiore and the tomb on the Isola Sacra marked 'N' in the plan on p. 138 of *Notizie degli Scavi* 1928. 'N' is Trajanic. *Recensioni. Note bibliografiche. Cronache e commenti. Pubblicazioni ricevute.*

N.S. VII. (1929) 1.

G. De Sanctis, *I fasci littori e gli ordinamenti romani antichissimi*. The number of a consul's lictors was originally six—a number familiar in other Roman institutions such as the Vestals, the military tribunes and the *sex suffragia*. The dictator's lictors were twelve. The numbers were doubled when the levy was raised from two legions to four. The *praetor urbanus*, so called to distinguish him from his two colleagues, like them at first had six; but by custom these were reduced to two inside the city, and at two the number was definitely fixed by the *lex Plaetoria*—the measure which created the *praetor inter ciues et peregrinos*. E. Bignone, *Ennio e Empedocle*. The starting-point is Norden's treatment of the Ennian connections to be found in the Allecto passage of *Aen.* VII. The being of Ennius v. 521 sq. (Vahlen) is certainly not the Νεῖκος of Empedocles. The line *cui par imber et ignis spiritus et grauis terra* is explained by Empedocles fr. 17 v. 15 sqq. and especially by lines 27-9. The author discusses Empedocles' doctrine of ἰσομοιρία in the combination of elements and argues that the debt of Ennius to Empedocles was large. C. Gallavotti, *Genesis e tradizione letteraria dell' Agone, tra Omero ed Esiodo*. On the fragment of Alcidas published by J. G. Winter in *Trans. Am. Phil. Ass.* LVI (1925). The whole of Cod. bibl. Laur.

LVI. 1 is derived from the *Μοῦσειον* (= Treatise on Poetry) of A. But the *Agon* was not A.'s invention: it was known to Aristophanes—*Peace* 1270 sqq. and *Frogs*. The origin of the work is to be sought in Boeotia about 600 B.C. Its purpose is to glorify the works of peace as the poet's theme: it is not to be connected with Lesches. The author identifies T. Castricius (Gellius *N.A.* XIII. 22. 1) with Castricius of Nicaea, and suggests him as the compiler of the work preserved in the Laurentian MS. M. Guarducci, *Gli Scipioni in una nuova iscrizione cretese e in altri monumenti dell' epigrafia greca*. Publishes an inscription from Aptera which shows L. Scipio Asiaticus, the elder Africanus, L. Aemilius Regillus and another Cornelius, whom the authoress identifies with Cn. Scipio Hispallus—consul in 176 B.C. The party visited Crete in 189 on the way back from the East. Other monuments of their presence in the eastern Mediterranean are collected. E. Albertario, *L'uso traslato di salubris, salubritas, salubriter nelle fonti giuridiche romane*. It is argued that the metaphorical use of these words in legal Latin is not earlier than the time of Diocletian. Apparent exceptions are explained as due to interpolation. A. Solari, *Claterna*. Collects such evidence as exists for the topography of C.—between Bologna and Imola. *Recensioni. Note bibliografiche*. G. De Sanctis, *Giulio Beloch*. A memoir. *Pubblicazioni ricevute*.

## LANGUAGE.

*Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*. 56 Band. 3/4 Heft.

E. Schwyzler in a short article upon the word *ἐκπράνιος* found in an inscription from the Theseum in Athens of the 3rd cent. A.D. endeavours to show that it is not a form borrowed directly from *Lat.* extraneus, but had had a previous history in Greek.

O. Behaghet writing *Zur Stellung des Verbs in Germanischen und Indogermanischen* concludes that the position of the verb was different in principal clauses from what it was in dependent clauses, certainly in Germanic, probably in Indo-European.

F. Specht contributes an article on the history of pronominal inflexion in Indo-European and Lithuanian, while J. Scheffelowitz writes at length on the treatment of stems in *sĕ-* and *sk-* in Balto-Slavonic and Albanian.

H. Lüders discusses the meaning and correlatives of Vedic *çáma-* with reference to a previous article by Lidén (*Z. f. v. S.* XL. 257 sqq.). W. Krause contributes a collection of notes on various Iranian problems. *Die Indogermanische Abtönung* is the title of a lengthy contribution by R. Loewe, in which he goes into the question of Ablaut with much detail. E. Lidén connects etymologically certain words from various Indo-European languages in a contribution entitled *Zur vergleichenden Wortgeschichte*, and contributes also an interesting article on fortuitous resemblances of form in words in various languages of similar meaning not etymologically correlated. W. Schulze has various short notes throughout.

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